THE HUNTLY PRESS PUBLISHED WEEKLY AT 1 P.M. FRIDAY, JANUARY 8, 1915. The German Strength.

Huntly Press and District Gazette, Volume 4, 8 January 1915, Page 2

THE HUNTLY PRESS PUBLISHED WEEKLY AT 1 P.M. FRIDAY, JANUARY 8, 1915. The German Strength.

A RECENT issue of the “Review of Reviews ” has a very instructive article on the strength of the various armies engaged in the war. That a great deal of misconception exists with regard to the number of men actually in the firing line or who are available for the firing line is evident from the contradictory statements we see in the various newspapers. Some very wild statements are made, and while intended no doubt to stimulate recruiting, by giving people the idea that the forces arrayed against us are greater than they really are, they have in fact an opposite effect, for some of the statements are so ridiculous that people refuse to believe anything at all, and they are apt to think that the danger is much less than is represented. The too strict censorship is doing much harm, and the oft repeated “ satisfactory progress” report is lulling people into a state of fancied security which is a direct bar to recruiting. However, to our figures. The number of Germans actually engaged in the fighting is often stated at ,6,250,000 and some times as high as 8,000,000. Now the population of Germany is 64,000,000. The number of men between the ages of 18 and 45 is 22 per cent of the total population, or 13,000,000. Of these, 20 per cent may be reckoned as unfit, leaving 10,400,000 men available, but the civil life of the country has to ,go on, the dockyards and arsenals must be kept going and the mines must be worked. In these ways f illy 3,000,000 are employed, leaving 7,400,000, which tallies very closely with the yen' books which givo 7,000,000 as the actual number of men available for military purposes.

Of these ~nly 4,000,000 have undergone any military training, the other 3,000,000 at the outbreak of the war being untrained. But supposing the whole 7,000,000 to be trained, it is necessary to allow for the killed, wounded and missing up-to-date, besides all those who are used in the various services necessary to keep an army in the field, before one can arrive at anything like a fair estimate of the number of men who can actually be engaged by tire Germans at any one time. As the German losses must have been at least 1,000,000 and as probably 2,000,000 have to be kept in the various depots, and in the' lines of communication, this would reduce the actual fighting force to about 4,000,000. Of course the armies of the Allies have to be reduced in much the same way before we can get at their actual fighting strength, and it would not be very farwrong to say that only about 50 per cent of the forces sent out are at any one time available for the firing line. As the British and French together have only about 3,000,000 in the field, it will be seen that recruiting must proceed very briskly if the allied forces are to be brought up to the required strength.