The Huntly Disaster.

Huntly Press and District Gazette, Volume 3, 6 November 1914, Page 3

The Huntly Disaster.

FINDING OF COMMISSION. The report of the Royal Commission set up to inquire into ; the cause of the recent mining s disaster was presented to s Parliament on Friday by the Minister (Hon. W. Fraser). In the opinion of the Commissioners the disaster was due to the emission of fire-damp from the roof of No. 5 level in No. 5 section (old workings) where a fall had occurred several ! months previously. “It is possible, though not probable that the exudation of gas had not long commenced in No. 5 and had reached No. fi just when Martin arrived there. Be that as it may, we are perfectly satis- ; lied that if a proper inspection of . the old workings had been made with a safety lamp prior to these men entering through the door the presdjpi of firedamp in the air must certainly have been discovered, and, in that case, without doubt, steps would have been taken to render the air pure, and the calamity which we now deplore would have been averted. “It is only fair to the Inspector of Mines and to the mine manager to say that, though, as a matter of general knowledge, the danger of dust explosions in a coalmine was known and re-, cognised, the extraordinarily inflammable nature of the dust in this mine was unsuspected until after the accident. Analysis I hen made by Professor Harold Daily Dixon, of the University of Manchester, and Dr MacLaurin. Dominion analyst, first revealed its unusual potency in creating a disaster. In the opinion of your Commissioners, some legislative provision should be made having for its object the prevention or mitigation of the danger rising from the presence of dust in a mine.” NEGLECT. “ There is no evidence that i firedamp was permitted to accumulate in the actual working places in contravention of Special Rule 3 ; but with res- ' pect to the old workings, we are satisfied that sufficient examina- 1 tion for gas was not made, and that gas was allowed to accumulate in dangerous quantities in . contravention of Special Rule 1. 1 The manager did not see that the mine was properly ventilated J in ail parts, and did not see that j the working of the mine was \ carried on with all reasonable provisions for the safety of the _j persons employe l . In contra- -! ventation of Spesi il Rule 16 the 1 door for ventilation and safety 1 purposes connecting bord No. 6, in which the disaster occurred, with the working portion of No. J 5 district, and which was only used occasionally, was not j locked or even-provided witli a lock. In contravention of ' Special Rule 18, the old workings and return air courses of the mine, also herds 4, 5 and 6, No. 5 district, were inadequately fenced, persons being therefore ! liable to inadvertently enter the same. Notwithstanding re- ' peated ignitions and explosions ' in Ralph’s Mine and the ad- ' joining Extended colliery, any of ' which might have created a disaster, the manager continued to permit naked lights to be used, although under Special Rule 14 it was liis duty to direct ; the underviewer to see that locked safety lamps only were used, and naked lights excluded wheresoever and whensoever danger from fire-damp was ap ( prehended. “The frequent occurrence of gas in the old workings was, in on:- ( opinion, a source of danger, and there is no evidence that No. 6 bord was examined on the morning of September 12. Had the provisions of the Act been strictly adhered to on that occasion i the explosion would have been averted. We consider, therefore, that no regular or systematic examination for gas was made in the old workings. The only surviving official, Joseph Young, now an ex-employee, who Lad passed the Government gas test, and had formerly acted as assistant examiner of the old workings (or return air courses), gave evidence to the effect that the state of the mine caused him a great deal of concern on two occasions. Last April he had found dangerous quantities in the No. 5 district. At the inquest this witness stated that he had frequently found accumulations of gas in dangerous quantities. The absence of ladders for examination throughout the mine, as disclosed by the evidence, indicates that the examination of them for fire-damp was inadequate and unreliable. We cannot refrain from referring to the frequent occurrence of gas in dangerous quantities in the | ! working places ot the mine, to j which we think sufficient j importance was not attached by [ the manager. The nature of the I 1 explosives used in the mine does j ' not affect our opinion as to the 1 cause of the explosion, for it is j quite clear from the evidence j 1 that no shot was fired in the i‘ ’ mine on the day of the accident. | , WITHDRAWAL OF WORICI MEN. “There was no evidence! 1 I tendered at the inquiry to show , 5 that af any time the workmen 1 were removed from the mine. 5 The ine had for many years enjoyed an immunity from serioiQ ,r cidents, and apparently nooc'/isian had arisen rn which F dan:, to life had been • a [•;,!( • Jided by the management 1 neceM-.ieating the withdraw! of 1 the nleii. The means of escape J arc" 10. Plate. The tendency for • ga- j" umulations in the high

places and of spontaneously ignited fires where coal and debris become pilod up is great, calling for special care and attention. Special attention was given to the prevention of heating, but we think, on account of the presence of gas, more frequent inspections were necessary. WARNINGS. “ Ih view of what lias been stated above, and of the fact, that the Coal Mines Act, and the special rule thereunder have to some extent • been neglected or disregarded by the manager, Mr. Fletcher, it cannot be said that the mine was well and safely managed -by him. It Mr. Fletcher had performed his obvious duty in causing safety lamps only to lie used in Ralph’s colliery, tire disaster would.never have occurred. He had ample warnings by previous explosions. A manager has not only to comply with the requirements of the law, but he has a duty to liis fellow men beside mere statutory obligations. Had the Mines Department known of these cases at the time, no doubt legal provision would have been made for the Inspector of Mines to enforce the use of safety lamps, by which the disaster would have been averted. Of the several cases of injury to workmen by the ignition of gas in Ralph’s mine and the Taupiri Extended, only one instance —that of Kelly —was reported to tlie Inspector of Mines. It is unfortunate that the Coal Mines Act does not enforce the reporting of all cases of injury by gas ignition, whether trivial or serious. It only requires a report where accident is attended with ‘serious injury to any person ’ leaving it to tlie manager to decide as to what is or is not a serious injury. The manager in these case* decided that the injuries were not serious, hut we are of tlie opinion that where tlie man is incapacitated for fourteen or more days, as was the case in more than one instance, the injury should not be treated as Anything less than serious. ERROR OF JUDGMENT. “ With regard to the efficiency of the inspection of the mine by the inspector of mines for the district, your Commissioners find that tlie present occupant of the position, Mr. Boyd Bennie, has been assiduous and conscientious in the discharge of his duties, and has shown himself to be a capable and painstaking officer, but we consider that on occasions lie has been satisfied witli less than a strict and prompt compliance with orders given by him \io the manager with respect to matters relating to the working and safety of the mine, incur opinion, after the explosion by which Kelly was injured, the use of safety lamps should have been insistently urged upon the manager. The inspector quite honestly considered that the gas occurring in the mine could be kept harmless by careful inspection and proper ventilation, and that no risk was run of any ignition or explosion by continuing the use of naked lights. That i if this he was guilty of an error of judgment is too abundantly proved by the terrible accident which resulted from tlie continued use of naked lights. ENFORCED USEOF SAFETY LAMPS. “ Doubt, has been expressed as to whether an order given by tlie inspector for the use of safety lamps could be enforced by him under the present Act or special rules. In the opinion of the Inspector and apparently of the officers of the Mines Department, the inspector has no power to do so. There is no direct authority given by tlie act or rules to the inspector to order the use of safety lamps, but we are of opinion that section 58 of the Act, though not apparently framed for such purpose, may be employed on an emergency to effect the purpose by an indirect method. DEPARTMENT'S LEGAL ADVICE. “ The inspector duly reported to tlie Under-Secretary of Mines tlie results of liis inspections and his observations on the condition and working of the mine, and, after the accident to Kelly, instructions were recieved by him from the head of the Department to prosecute the manager for a breach of special rule 14 for not providing safety lamps, subject, however, to a favourable legal opinion of the case being obtained. In consequence of an adverse opinion being received by the inspector from tlie firm of solicitors to whom he referred tlie matter, no proceedings were taken against tlie manager. Before there was time for the Department to consider the position and to decide what further steps | should be taken to secure tlie I safety of tlie mine, the disaster | apprehended by tlie inspecting j engineer of the Mines Departi mont (as shown by iris several j memoranda to the Under-Secre-tary) unfortunately occurred. . AN UNFORTUNATE OMIS- * SION. “ Mr Reed (inspecting engineer j of the Mines Department) is enj titled to credit for bringing so I forcibly under the notice of the ] Mines Department his fear of ] impending danger in the Taupiri Co.’s mine by reason of the gas known to exist there. We agree with him in his view that, not being the inspector of. mines for the district, he had no right to interpose in any directions or orders given to/ tlie manager, although liis right as an inspector of mines to ihspcct the mine is beyond quest 1 u. We' cannot. : refrain, bowo-e, from saying 1 that we regre \ hat Mr. Reed did

not, in tlie interest of human life, personally visit and examine tlie mine and acquaint the manager of his very strong convictions as to the immediate danger threatening the mine. We also regard it as unfortunate that specific instructions were not given him by the Mines Department to do so. Mr. Reed had no occasion to visit the mine for niiy considerable time before lea ruing of the presence of gas there, but he had while at the Thames on other official business arranged with the district inspector to visit the mine in his company only a short tune beiore the explosion, and lie had yrith him two electrical lamps for trial there, but, being called away to the West Coast on official business, the visit of inspection to tlie mine was. unfortunately deferred. FARCICAL INSPECTION. “No evidence was given by the workmen’s inspectors before the Commission, but from the evidence of other witnesses we learned that only two inspections were made by the workmen’s inspectors during the past twelve months. That is practically, since the new union was formed after the first strike during 1912. Inspector-Bennie, in liis evidence, complained that he had received no help from the union or their check inspectors. The reference to them in his letter to the Under-Secretary as the creation of mining companies was not supported by any witnesses produced before the Commissioners, who declined to hear evidence attempting to show victimisation. SUMMARY. In the course of summing up, the Commissioners remark that the ventilation of the mine generally was efficient, but was defective as regards section 5. The examination of tlie mine on the whole was satisfactory, but the inspection of the old workings was inadequate, and the absence of ladders in tne high bords prevented a thorough examination in such places for gas. “ The only explosive used was Curtis and Harvey’s Masting powder.” “ There was not, to our knowledge, in the past history of the mine any occasion on which it was necessary to withdraw the workmen. “The means of escape in case of accident was afforded by three three shafts,which in our opinion, were adequate. “ The management of tlie mine was, speaking generally, good; but in certain respects, 0.g., tlie prompt carrying out of the inspector’s orders, the precautions taken against danger from gas, j the ordering of safety lamps, and examinations of tlie old worki rgs, it was lax and unsatisfactory. “ The Inspector of Mines is a careful and competent officer, zealous and conscientious in his work, but he was remiss in not exacting prompt and strict obedience to his orders, in not more frequently visiting the old workings; and lie committed an error of judgment in not insisting on safety lamps being used in the mine after the accident to -miner Kelly. “ The door at the end of bord No. 6 of Section 5, where it connects with the working part of the mine, was not locked, nor in anyway securely fastened. It there had been no neglect with respect to the matters mentioned in the two previous paragraphs, the disaster in the mine could not have happened.” When the report was presented it was agreed that the discussion on it should be deferred until printed copies were available. When the copies were circulated about 9 a.m. the House was engaged in another discussion, and tlie debate on the report was further adjourned.