APPEAL ALLOWED

Hokitika Guardian, 29 March 1933, Page 6

APPEAL ALLOWED

HEAVY TRAFFIC TEST CASE,

SUPREME COURT JUDGMENT.

CHRISTCHURCH, . March 28

Reserved judgment in favour W appellant was given by .Mr Justice Kennedy in the Supreme Court yesterday in the case in which Rij|k Taxis, Limited, appealed against ?® decision of Mr E. D. Mosley, S.M., in the Magistrate’s Court recently in convicting the company of a breach of the traffic regulations relating to' heavy traffic vehicles. Mr J. Id. Upliam appeared lor the appellant'company and Mr R. J. Loughnnn ‘for the respondent, Herbert Macintosh, Christchurch city traffic inspector. '

Tlie charge against the company w.-s that, it had permitted a heavy motor vehicle to be used in Moorhouse avenue before a heavy traffic license had been obtained.

Counsel for appellant at tlie, hearing stated that the firm had for many years carried oil two different kinds of business. Half the business was concerned with the hiring of ears for private purposes;; ows hired thus were kept as far a s 'possible indistinguishable from private cars. The other side of the business was concerned solely with taxis. Appellant had always endeavoured to distinguish between private hiring and public hiring. The two classes of business were quite distinct.

Mr Loughnan argued that appellant’s vehicles plied for hire, were therefore public, vehicles, and as such came hinder the heavy motor vehicles regulations. The appeal was in the nature of a test case.

THE JUDGMENT,

“It was conceded by the respondent, and it iy clear, that the conviction could not he supported for the reasons given by the learned magistrate, but it remains to consider whether it may otherwise be upheld,” s aid his Honour. “Ihe real question ig not whether the Heavy Motor 'Vehicle 'Regulations,. 1932, a pp]y to all heavy motor vehicles, but whether the vehicle referred to is a heavy motor vehicle within the mean, ing of those words as artificially defined for the purposes' of the regulations. If it ig not, the regulation does not apply and the conviction must be set aside.

“Ihe definition, so far as material for the present purposes,, may be thus stated : —‘Heavy motor vehicle means a motor-lorry within the meaning of •section 16(5 of the Public ’Works Act, 1.928, and includes any motor vehicle within the meaning of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1924 (other than a private motor-car as defined by the said act, which, with the greatest load it 'Vs at any time carrying, exceeds two tons in weight.’ A motor-lorr v i s defined in section 160 of the'Public’Works Act, 1923, as including ‘every motor vehicle (ocher than a private motor-au is defined by the Motor Vehicles Act, 1,924').’ A ‘private me tor-ear’ is defined in the Motor Vehicle's Act, 1924 , as ‘a motor-car ether tliaif a public motorcar.’, A .public motor-oar was originally defined in the Motor Vehicles Ac’t. 1924, as meaning ‘a motor-car which ig plied for hire.’ This W’s, however, altered by the Motor Vehicles Amendment Act, 1927, so that ;1 vnihlic motor-car i.s now defined as meaning ‘a motor-car which is licensed by any competent authority to plv for hired The vehicle in Question, whatever he its weight—and the weight is not tliOf pole test !.\s to whether' a motorcar is a heavy motor vehicle within the meaning of the regulations—i s not a motor-car ‘which is licensed bv any competent autheritv to plv for hire.’

“It accordingly follows that the appellant's vehicle is not a public motorcar ;>s defined, but is, for the .purposes of the regulations, a private motorcar and hence is. not a heavy motor vehide. The a”’peal must accordingly he 'allowed and the conviction he set aside.”