JAPAN DEFIANT

Hokitika Guardian, 23 November 1932, Page 5

JAPAN DEFIANT

LYTTON REPORT ' : v'> / SETTLEMENT PLANS REJECTED (United Press Association—By Electric Telegraph—Copy right.)

LONDON, November 21. Considerable //animation marked tlie opening of the momentou s session of the League by the Chairman of the Council, Mr de Valera, "tvhe'n the Lytton Cotmiiission report on Japan’s action in Manchuria caih e op for consideration, also Japan’s reply to the report. The dominant feature of Japan’s reply is a flat rejection' of the Lytton Commission’s proposals for the settlement of the' problems a s between China and Japan.

Lord Lytton, in his broadcast from -the League's" short wave station, sa’d the outlook' at the moment, while not bright j was not hopeless. ’He hoped the storni .advancing . from Manchuria might "be diverted by wise statesmanship into a harmless direction. The success of the negotiations ' ‘ about to begin would -be profoundly''' important for the peace of “the world, In his address to' the " Council, the Chinese delegate, Hr Wellington Koo, said that M. Matsuoka "’made Japan Appear as 1 meek as a lamb,• “but her teeth were those, .(if* a. jgfggifius lion. Her. traditional .ppHcy hjs~b_gen to interfere .with Chinese unification, while complaining abroad of a disunited China. Japan’s pol'cy. ser'oucly menaced peace in the Far East, and disturbed the rest of .the . world. Chin was content to learn from the C°uucil •whether, the. Kellogg, »P*ict covered the invasion of Manchuria.

The speech of the Japanese delegate, M. Matsuoka, followed the general lines of the memorandum. H e asked the League to outlaw Ahe Chinese boycott proposal., Japan and the Japanese were not hostile to the Chinese. Japan believed that China’s main desire was for peace, but the Chinese were misled, * terrorised, and misrepresented. “We don't want war. We don’t want more territory. We are not -aggressors. We desire deeply and earnestly the welfare of our great neighbours. Japan canniot consider any alternative in Manchukuo, because possibly it would lay the entire ffar East situation open to serious disorders.”

In her reply, Japan states that the report contains many just conclusions, ‘“flowing . mostly from '-observed facts, ibut they are (enveloped : in a mist of optimism, and the glarribur of which wtould ‘jcertainly mislead anyone _ unaware of ( true facts.” The Commission <- through siiftrtnOss time available, * had -acquired only a superficial impres&iom If the Commissioners had visited other parts of the country, especially South China, Jlifir optimism re-, garding the Chines®- situation would be modify -Japan casts no Reflection on the conscientious nature of the report, but feels the comparative weight of evidence has been wrongly estimated. The report was ws-ed invariably against Japan. This wag particularly noticeable in the section dealing with the’ incident on ' 18/9/31, and the establishment of the independent state of Manchukuo. The reply disclaims "any such bitter feelings towards China as certain passages in the report suggest. On the contrary Japan looks forward to friendly and prosperous eo-operntion with China, and declares operations from 18/9/31 were entailed by the execution of a plan' carefully prepared to meet the alarming" eventuality of a Chinese attack. They were not related t 0 anything but self-de- . fence. Japan cannot allow either their lack of necessity or inapprppriatene 6 s, to be the subject of discussion. Any scheme tending to destroy the condition of peace and orderliness now -being restored, will irresistibly produfce a new era of disputes and difficulties. A - settlement of the Manchurian question will pave the way to a settlement of the whole Chinese -question,. Following, are the principal points of Japan’s reply io the Lytton report, the dominant feature being the flat rejection of the proposals for a settlement of Sino-Japanese problems: — Firstly: China is an abnormal country, in a condition bordering on anarchy. Secondly: Foreign lives and property cannot be adequately protected, because of the internal conflict, and also of the Kuomintang’s " “revolutionary” policy against foreign Powers! Thirdly: Foreign Powers have been obliged to exercise exceptional powers and privileges iU order t 0 protect their subjects and interests.' Fourthly: Japan has suffered more severely than'' any other Power from China’s anarbhial condition and antiforeign policy: Fifthly: Japan’s position in Manchuria, geographically arid! historically by virtue of treaty rights,' economic interests and the need for her own national security is exceptional. Sixthly: The former Manchurian authorities intrigued to undermine this special position, and frequently and flagrantly encroached on Japan’s rights and interests in Manchuria. Seventhly: None of Japans actions .since September, 1931, exceeded her Tights of self-defence. Eighthly: Manchuria has always occupied a separate position in relation t 0 China itself. The ; .foundation of Manchukuo wa s .accomplished by the Manchurians’ spontaneous action. Ninthly: A general recognition of the present regime would contravene I -no jinternational obligations, would satisfy the Manchurians’ aspirations, pnd would eventually be realised by

China herself as the only satisfactory basis of stable relations.

Tenthly: Disguised .international control of Manchuria would bo acceptable neither to Japan nor to Manchukuo.

The Lytton Plan, which requires that each of the parties shall have the sina qua non of strong stable government, would make confusion worse. Japan ‘considers it impossible to demilitarise Manohuria, and maintain order by international gendarmerie.