COATS’ APPEAL

Hokitika Guardian, 5 December 1931, Page 5

COATS’ APPEAL

CONVICTION TO STAND.

JUDGE’S SUMMING UP,

(By Telegraph —Per Frees Association)

WELLINGTON, December 4. At the hearing of tho Coats appeal, the'second counsel for Coats submitted that the statement made by Coats was a break in the chain of the Crown’s evidence, and, as such, was a “confession” within the meaning of Section 20 of the Evidence Act, and, as that statement had been induced by a threat, or promise that “it would be better for him to tell the truth,” it was rendered inadmissible by the provisions of that section, «'

Counsel said that the Judge in the Court below, in summing up for the jury, had said: “If you feel that the Crown produced such a case as satisfies you that he murdered the girl, it is equally your duty to bring him in guilty, notwithstanding that, as far as this Court is. concerned, the result would be the imposition of the gravest possible sentence in this 'Court. I say “this Court,” because, as you know, all sentences are considered by the Governor-in-Council.” Counsel contended that the last sentence constituted a misdirectVi to the jury, iti that it tended to make the jury feel that their judgment would be independently considered again, thus removing from. their shoulders that sense of responsibility which, by law they should bear. Counsel went on to refer briefly to a rumour which lie said, had been current ill Wellington before, und since, the trial, that the Governor® General would not sign the w&ri'aiit ntithcirisijsg the carrying into effect of the death penalty,, Tho Bolitiitor-ueneml, nt tile request of the Court, very briefly .answered' the main ground of tho prisoner's ease by submitting that the statement in question was purely a statement, and that it could not, in any way, be considered a confession within the meaning of the Evidence Act.

Sir A. Myers, in delivering judgment, said that, in his opinion, the word ‘“confession” in the Evidence Act meant just what it said, and no more—i.e., an admission of guilt of the offence actually before the Court. It was clear that the statement was not a confession within the‘meaning of Section 20. In any case, lie was satisfied that the evidence before the Court did not show any threat, or that any promise had been held out to the prisoner which was likely to have induced a false admission of guilt. He considered that no grounds had been shown why the statement should be rejected. As to the second point raised on behalf of the prisoner, His Honour said that, whether or not it was desirable for a Judge to tell the jury in a murder trial that the sentence of the Court would be considered by .the Gov-ernor-in-Council was a question which could not be answered in tne same way in all cases. Speaking generally, he thought it just as well to avoid such statements, but it all depended on the circumstances in each case. The Court in any event, could only interfere if there had been a misdirection involving an error of law. He was satisfied that no such misdirection had been made, and. in his opinion, l the conviction should stand. Mr Justice Adams, in agreeing, said that counsel for the prisoner had very ably presented his case, but had failed utterly to convince him with arguments which, nevertheless, had been very ably put. Mr Justice Ostler and Mr Justice Smith also concurred with the reasons given by the Chief Justice, Judge Ostler stating, that, in his opinion, counsel for the accused, by his diligent research, had done all that- could possiblv be done for him!