WARTIME NAVAL SECRETS

Hokitika Guardian, 15 August 1931, Page 6

WARTIME NAVAL SECRETS

BRITAIN’S PERILOUS POSITION.

COMMAND OF SEA LOST.

LONDON, July 2

(Remarkable revelation as to Britain's naval position during the most critical period of the war are made in the fifth and final volume of the Official History of 'Naval Operations, now published. Among the many startling secrets disclosed are a memorandum by Lord Jellicoe, issued in April, 1917, stating, “We have neither the undisputed command of the sea, nor a reasonable measure of that command •” and the endorsement by the Admiralty, in January, 1918, of Lord Beatty’s view that “it is no longer desirable to provoke a ■fleet*, action. We can no longer be certain of meeting the German Fleet even on terms of equality.” Lord Jellicoe’s memorandum sought to “bring home more fully to the Government the very serious nature of the naval position, with which we are now confronted. I fear that the War ■Cabinet is not as yet fully impressed with the gravity of the situation,” he added. >

“The real fact of the matter is this. We are carrying on the war at the present time as if we had the absolute com-

mand of the sea, whereas we have not such command or anything approaching it. 'lt is quite true that we are masters of the situation so far as surface ships are concerned, but it must be realised —and realised at once—that this will be quite useless if the enemy’s submarines paralyse, as they do now, our lines of communication. Our present policy is heading straight for disaster. “I must, therefore, advise that the Government should so shape its policy as to recognise that we have neither the undisputed command of the sea nor even a reasonable measure of that command. “If we do not recognise this, it is my firm conviction that we shall lose the war by the starvation of our people, and the paralysing of our allies by failing to supply them with coal and other essentials.”

■LORD JELLICOE’S ADVICE. Among other recommendations made by Lord Jellicoe were : “That all forces be immediately withdrawn from Salonika, “as this is the quarter which taxes our. resources to the uttermost and from the military point of view gives no promise of a successful offensive.” That troops from the colonies and Dominions, be convoyed only in ships carrying other necessities, such as foodstuffs, “as we cannot afford to provide the necessary escorting .ships" ; That the importation of labour be abandoned for the same reason ; and ■ That the import of everything not essential to the - life of the country be “ruthlessly and immediately stopped.” These steps, Lord Jellicoe stated, would release ships which should be devoted- to the import of foodstuffs, j “until we have placed this country in a position to withstand the siege to which it is about to be subjected. With-j out some such relief as I have indicated ; —and that given immediately— the 1 Navy will fail in its responsibilities to the country and the country itself will suffer starvation.” Lord Beatty’s opinions are contained ; in a chapter dealing with a Naval Conference, held on January 2nd, 1918, iri Whitehall, says the “Morning Post;” “ . . . the Commander-in-Chief,” the . book states, “informed the conference j that it was, in his opinion, no longer desirable to provoke a Fleet action, even if the opportunity should occur. ,_>uch large contingents of our naval forces were now \ absorbed in the regular duties of the anti-submarine campaign th'at he could no longer be certain of meeting the German. Fleet even on terms of equality.”

ENEMY ADVANTAGES. A long letter on the subject from Admiral Beatty was laid before the War Cabinet. “So long as he .(the enemy) remains in his harbours,” wrote Admiral Beatty “he is in a position to operate on interior lines, arid with such forces as he may choose, ‘•against our vitally important mercantile traffic with the ,Scandinavian countries.

! “His interior position and the presence of his agents in neutral ports from which convoys sail facilitate the execution of surprise attacks with forces stronger than our opposing forces. To take an extreme case, it is obviously impossible to have the whole Grand Fleet to effect a surprise attack with reasonable prospect of escape to their bases.

“In the Commander-in-Chief’s opinion,” it is added, “the German battle cruiser fleet was now definitely more formidable than ours. We believed it to be composed of six units—the Alackensen, Seydlitz, Moltke, Derftlinger, fHindenburg, and Von der Tann; and of our nine battle cruisers, only three—the Lion, Princess Royal, and Tiger— j would be fit to fight in the battle cruiser, 'line. J ' “The Renowns were insufficiently arm-

oured, the New Zealands and the Inflexibles were deficient in speed, protection, and armament. In addition •to this, the absorption of our destroyer 'forces-in the submarine campaign made fit virtually certain that the German flotillas would be more numerous than ours in a Fleet action.

“Finally, the new type of shell, de- ; : oided upon after Jutland, had not yet been supplied to the Fleet. Until the summer the bulk of our battle squad'rons would go intq action with projecA

tiles that were admittedly of poor design. ‘The correct strategy of the Grand Fleet is no longer to endeavour to bring the enemy to action at any costs,’ the Commander-in-Chief concluded, ‘but rather contain him in his bases until the general situation becomes more favourable to us.’ ” The Admiralty endorsed Admiral (Beatty's views and intensified minelaying in the Heligoland Bight. THE CONVOY SYSTEM. The introduction of the convoy system and the opposition 'of Admiral Jellicoe, Admiral Duff, and the War staff to the system form the subject of a large section of the book. The opposition was eventually overcome by the Prime 'Minister, Sir Maurice Hankey, and Commander R. G. Henderson.

A full description of the Heligoland Bight action on November 16th, 1917, is given, together with the reasons for the dissatisfaction of the Commander-in-Chief with the results achieved.

Large forces had been sent out to destroy minesweepers and auxiliaries, but haa become embroiled in a long and unsatisfactory stern chase with an inferior force. The First Cruiser •Squadron, under Admiral Napier, .had never pursued the enemy at more, .than 25 knots and had practically broken off the chase.

At a subsequent Admiralty enquiry Admiral Napier advanced the reasons which had governed his actions, and the Admiralty were “in the main satisfied—but their investigation stopped short of one final question, which might

have cleared up a matter of some obscurity. The enemy were visible Hying before him. Where they could go he could follow—lie was in superior force, and his gunners had already found their target; why, then did he follow the enemy at 25 (knots) instead oi closing with them at 50?

“Was this an error of judgment, a .failure to realise his opportunity, or was he influenced by some adverse consideration which has not been disclosed ? The question was not pot, and will probably never now be answered.

A LARGE BRITISH FLEET. Among other startling disclosures contained in the book are the following : ■A large British Fleet was at sea under orders from the Commander-ill-Chicf in ( 'October, 1917, “to intercept a force j which was. believed to be on the move.” I The enemy’s intentions being unknown, Admiral Beatty “was virtually i ordered to place the Whole North Sea under observation. The forces he set in motion were very numerous. “Eventually three cruisers, 27 light cruisers, and 54 destroyers were at sea. The Scandinavian convoy of twelve j ships protected by two destroyers, the , Mary Rose and Strongbow, and two armed trawlers, were at sea on October 17thj and were attacked by two enunv cruisers—the Brummcr and tile Bremso. ! After a hard fight both de-stroyers were sunk. Two trawlers and three other ships oT thV convoy 1 got away, But" the remainder, nine ships in all, were sunk. The attackers succeeded in j making good their escape, despite the fact that the big British Fleet was .searching during the whole time. | Tile exploits of the Goeben and Breslau raid are fully described. Jt is disclosed that, when the crippled tioej ben had run fast aground, luck still ; favoured the Germans, for, although she 1 was constantly attacked by British aircraft, iictle damage was done, although the work of salvage was rendered difficult. Another chapter deals with the daring raids on Ostend, when attempts were made to block the fairway from the harbour, which was being used as a destroyer base by the Germans. The raid, which sought to use the Vindictive for blocking the remaining gap, makes thrilling reading. ' The' raid was by no means completely successful, though an official communique was published in this country at the time giving the impression that the hoped-ior result had been achieved. Another episode related in the book seems extraordinary alter the event. The Dover barrage patrol—sß vessels of different types in all—was attacked by two enemy destroyers. Seven ships were sunk and seven damaged. The enemy vessels escaped unengaged owing to a number of circumstances, among which was the too rigid adherence to regulations of the officers in one of the ships involved in the attack.