OIL AND THE NAVY

Hokitika Guardian, 9 June 1931, Page 5

OIL AND THE NAVY

NAVAL REDUCTIONS. LORD J ELLICOE 8 DISCLOSURE. LONDON. May i. " Lord Jellicoe presided at a meeting on Wednesday night at University College when Admiral Sir Richard Webb' lectured on certain problems of the Navy. Any interference with our lines of communications in war, said Lord Jellicoe, would mean starvation for the people of this country if it were continued for a.few weeks. It would also mean los sof prosperity if there was any serious reduction in the amount of our imports. On the question of whether the strength of the Navy at present was adequate for its purpose, lie entirely shared the lecturer’s misgivings on the subject of the number yf cruisers, destroyers, and submarines. If aircraft were going to bomb defenceless cities and kill thousands of women and children, could anyone expect that they would not equally bomb merchant ships coming to these shores in the narrow waters? Could anyone expect that If that took place that it was their business to carry on unrestricted warfare against merchant ships? Personally, he could not.conceive that a treaty was going to stop that sort of thing unless it was applied in some way to aircraft, which was. a far .move--savage method of warfare than anything else,and nothing that had yet been donw to limit armaments had yet touched the air. Only the Navy, which was the shield of this Empire, and, in some circumstances, its s'Word, had . so far been touched

i mulling upon the effect on the personnel of the Navy of constant reductions, Lord Jellicoe said it must be difficult for members of the Navy to see the force being gradually wiped out of existence and to retain that efficiency which the country expected in such a high, degree, and which was absolutely necessary for this country. There were also the hardships inflicted on the officers, who entered the Service as a life profession, and who, owing to reductions, were east ashore between the ages of 30 and 40 in such a position that it was almost impossible for them to find new employment. Thaf kind of thing must in the end reflect mi the moral and efficiency of the Navy. OIL FUEL FROM COAL.

Sir "Richard. Webb said that the use of well oil fuel on which the Navy was wholly dependent and the British n •..•>)cantii •. very largely so for motive power subjected the Navy to great anxiety and to a very grave added responsibility for its safe transport" to those shores. [Moreover, in almost all cases we were dependent on supplies, which, by enemy action sabotage, or other causes- beyond ‘ our control, might he cent off itt the; source without warning hi-any moment: It would he uneconomical, he- said, to produce oil from coal export tin a very large scale, and its adoption for naval purposes would call for large and elaborate plants. Tt was essential also that such plants should he near coalfields. large towns, and ports like Rosyth and .Milford Haven. Experts estimated that to obtain the Navy’s annual peace requirements of 750,000 tons of oil would mean treating 20,000,000 tons of coal. This could he obtained at about 50s a ton compared with 42s a ton for well oil. It would enable the Navy to obtain its oil at borne, reduce the present oil transport risks, help to relieve unemployment, save the cost of guarding present sources of supplies, and some 30') miles of pipelines, which would wipe out the difference in price. On this subject Lord Jellicoe said; . “In spite of the fact that we- bad before the war something" like four' months’ reserve of oil, fuel for our Navy .in 1917 we had come down ti something like three weeks’ supply "of oil fuel, and such was -'the Dosition that, as Chief of the Naval Stall. I had to issue orders to the Ifleat..that they wore never to steam at i Uglier speed than 20 knots—any class of "vessel—unless in the presence of .the ouemv.”