THE BRITISH NAVY

Hokitika Guardian, 28 April 1930, Page 8

THE BRITISH NAVY

“ARE we BEING PLAYED WITH?”

MR, CHURCHILL’S QUESTIONS,

LONDON, March 4

Mr Winston Churchill was in one of his host oratorical veins when lie addressed a meeting organised by the Navy League last week. Lord Linlithgow presided, and on the platform were Mrs Churchill, Lord Howe, Lady Richmond, Lord and Lady Denbigh, and Admiral Sir Sydney Fremantle. The chairman moved a resolution expressing the opinion that no further reduction in our naval forces should he sanctioned, and that adequate annual provision should be made for laying down vessels necessary to maintain existing strength. Mr Churchill seconded the resolution. In the course of his speech Mr Churchill contrasted the attitude of our own Government with that of the other Powers at the Naval Conference. “Every one of these Powers,” he said, “has a clear idea of what its safety or its interest or its prestige requires. They know, or seem to know what they want, and no one of them is in the least afraid of stating the requirements, courteously, no doubt, but at the same time firmly. His Majesty’s Government alone seems to he unsure of themselves. They alone seem to wish to apologise, for the existence of our navy. They alone present an aspect of ‘squeezenhility,’ of shuffling retreat, or precipitately Proffered ' concessions.' We know were Japan stands; we know the position of France and Italy. What we do not know is the principle upon which the British Government is proceeding, and the relation of that principle to our national safety and imperial unity: and whether there is any point, and, if so, at what point, his Majesty’s present advisers will make a stand.”

Great Britain, who formerly exercised an undoubted supremacy on the sea, went on Mr Churchill had been steadily reducing her fleet from the pre-war period in ships, in gun power, and in men. ' Yet‘ we were the only Power of those "gathered at the conference table to whom naval defence spelt national and imperial existence, the only Power to whom naval defends spelt daily bread.' Were the other' nations Hvise iVi desiring to weaken an instrument from which in times surely' not forgotten, they had themselves derived enormous assistance and security ?

AN EXTii AOItDIN AR Y CHANGE. He would 1 only deal with two ex tremely simple points. The first was Liie number of cruisers we required to prevent our Empire being driven as under and ourselves starved to sur render or death. What they wanted to know about the opinion of the Sea Lords was that it was professional op inion, scientific opinion, expert opinion, ail'd'-that it wa's based oil the marshalling' of facts and on making calculations on those facts, and that if whs not vitiated by all sorts of extraneousi ' political considerations. During the times of the late Government' the Admiralty stated that 7(, cruisers was the indispensable absolute minimum of safety.' Now they were told that the naval experts consider ed 50 cruisers sufficient.' They wanted to know what had happened to make that extraordinary change of scientific judgment possible. The Prime Minister in the House of Commons said that it was the Kellogg Pact. But what had the Kellogg Pact got. to do with the strategic precautions of the Admiralty? Hie. Kellogg Pact might be a very proper matter for Parliament to take into consideration, but it played no rnrt in the technical question which vhe Admiralty was responsible foe answering. “We ask ourselves,” Mr Churchill continued, “are we being played with? Are wo really being informed of the true opinion of the naval authorities or have they changed their opinion, and if so why? We hope that iff there is a difference of opinion between the Admiralty and the Government we should be informed of the true Admi rial ty opinion; then, as a separate matter, of the Government reasons for

over-riding that opinion. .. . But if we accept the figure of 50 cruisers now vouched for by the highest expert authorities as sufficient for our needs how imprudent and unskillful was the diplomacy which announced thus enormous British reduction before the conference had even opened, instead of using i't, as it might well have been used, at the critical moment in the negotiations to secure similar concessions from other Powers.”

We ought to build, after hearing unbiased naval advice, whatever Parliament considered to be necessary for our safety. British naval requirements ought to be fixed by ourselves and bv ourselves alone, because our life depended on them.

A PRACTICAL SUGGESTION

He did not wish, however, to end without associating himself with a practical suggestion made some time a rr o by Lord Bridgeman. They all wished tin* conference to reach an agreement. Instead of pursuing sterlie discussions about para ties and ratios, which were either misleading or invidious reflections on the r n vnl status of great Powers.- let the different delegations table their programmes for the next five or six rears in a sn'r't - f neighbourly and sober goodwill W ’ so-naml to be the onlv great nation whirU dared not sneak nr for itself, which bad lost confidence in its mission, which was ready to resign its

hard..won ..rights. There fceL I ;ng That l|iigliv!i(l undqrrUhd; Socialists ! \v:)s ' “(lowifc? nhd , out,”'" i l-and|j| on' thq j, “dole.” Bute, wo were still a ’Consider? able people and our hope was that j amid the.Jxjoih and confusion of our presents-, situation 4the British nation jvouiarMll (have'.the sanity 'and resolu-

tion. to ’'sustain' that ancient naval power which across four centuries had so •often defended* i good. ,/pgu.S’eSi find;, had never defended good cafises in'vain. The resolution was ’carried.