GAS IN WAR

Hokitika Guardian, 3 April 1930, Page 8

GAS IN WAR

“LESS BRUTAL” THAN EXPLOSIVES. ’

DR H. LEVINSTEIN ON ILLUSORY TREATIES.

Dr Herbert Levinstein, president oi' the Society of Chemical Industry, read a paper on “Chemical Warfare” before the London section of the society at the institution of Mechanical Engineers recently. He criticised the “illusory” character of treaty provisions against gas warfare, contended that the limitation of naval armaments increased the importance of the chemical arm, quoted figures to establish that gases were less brutal and destructive of human life and property than shells, and pleaded for the prosecution of chemical warfare research. '

Dr Levinstein said President Wilson was the main author or inspire!* of Clause 171 in the Treaty of Versailles, which forbade chemical warfare ; yet, fresh from the drafting of this clause, he telegraphed lo the Congress that although the United States would gladly join in a national disarmament programme, it would nevertheless be obvious prudence to make certain of the successful maintenance of many strong and wellequfpped chemical plants. If President Wilson thought this obvious prudence for the United States we were not war-mongers or panic-mongers if we examined the problem for ourselves and pursued a similar course. The restriction of naval armaments,

the limitation of the number and size of ships, was almost purely an economy measure, hut limiting the size.or number of battleships 1 or ordnance did not necessarily make wai

less likely; on the contrary, by making it cheaper, in a sense it made it easier. In any case, decreasing the relative importance of ships .or guns or man-power was hound ’to increase tho importance of any other arm particularly the chemical arm.

Chemical warfare had in a kind of way been forbidden at Versailles, at 'Washington, and by the League of Nations at Geneva, and, indeed, evei since the Hague Convention of July, 1899. His object was not lo show that the prohibition was illogical, but if it could be proved to be ineffective, that was another matter, for to rely 011 ineffective prohibition might be as dangerous in the fiitim. as it was in the last war.

The Germans claimed that t-hej did not break the letter of The Hague Convention of 189!) when in April, 1915, they let loose a Hood of chlorine over the British lines at the second battle of Yjpres and made a gap eight miles wide jn our line. In the terms - of the Convention the co.ntraetinp Powers agreed to “abstain from the use of projectiles, the sole object of which is the diffusion of asphyxiating or deleterious gases.” The gas in April, 1915, was discharged not from projectiles but from cylinders, an important technical difference. Most, if not all, of the gas-shells employed afterwards had' a high-explosive charge, and their object was not, therefore “solely” the liberating of asphyxiating or deleterious gases, i The loosing of that stream of chlorine on the Canadian and French Colonial

troops created a gap through whic the Germans might have poured ha tfteir General Staff really believed : that time in the efficiency of t-h chemical weapon. This surprise attack showed the e> treme danger of allowing ourselves t neglect defence against chemical wai fare, because we did not expect it o« ing to some inaccurate or iucldinit form of words used in a treaty. J Article 171 of the Treaty of Versailles intended to prohibit cheinicaJ warfare I there was a proviso at least as vagu< j as that of 1899 forbidding in German.' j the manufacture and importation o i toxic gases and aniilagouis liquids. | LOOPHOLES IX PROTOCOL. What exactly did the Geneva Pro toeol of 1925, which Great Britain line promised to ratify, prohibit? It prohibited the use in war of asphyxiatin'’ -poisonous oi' other gases and of analogous liquids, materials or devices, but it did not prohibit the use ol screening smokes. We of all people should be crazy to prohibit their use Yet, in concentrated form, most of the smokes had deleterious effects on the human organism. No one could claim, for intsance, that cfilorosulphonic acid smoke, the ZcTi'inigge so.cen, was plea - sant to breathe in concentration. Those who used it in chemical works knew it to be a most unpleasant substance

to handle. There was no screen smoke which was wholly lion-deleterious, and if smoke screens were allowed and not defined or limited the rest of the prohibition lost its virtue. Again, were tear gases to be regarded as coming within the ban? Many people would argue that these were not poisonous, for in very low concentration they only affected the eyes. If tear gas was prohibited’, that would prohibit in war the use of a weapon permitted and used in peace. Tear gas was used in the United States for dealing with riots and similar disturbances, and as a protection to banks and safe deposits against burglars and thieves. If it were permissible to use tear gas in peace time against one’s own citizens, how could it be wrong to use it in war against

an enemy? High explosive shells, again, generally produced poisonous fumes which under cerain conditions would poison men in the neighbourhood of the burst. The Geneva Protocol did not prohibit the use of high explosive shells that released poisonous fumes, not did it define in any way what high explosives were permitted in war. The Protocol waS certainly inaccurate in stating that the use of chemicals in war had been justly \ condemned by the general opinion of the world.

The casualties of the last war showed that the military results desired could foe obtained more easily and with less human suffering from gas than from high explosives. Gas maimed or killed a much smaller proportion of those it put out of action than any other weapon used in the war. In proportion to the military results it caused far loss human suffering, temporary or permanent. From January 1 to September 30, 1918, the number of German casualties was, in round figures, 58,000 of those only 3 per cent died. From August 1 to 10, 1918, the French had 14,578 gas casualties; of those 2.9 per cent died. The total British casualties and deaths from gas from September 15, 1918, to- the end of the war, were 24,363 casualties, 5-10 deaths, percentage of deaths 2.2. Of the American gas casualties less than l per cent died, and very few were •permane/Utly injured. Out of every 1.00 casualties from all forms of warfare other than gas more than 25 died, ind of those that survived two to five wore maimed, blinded, or disfigured i’or fife. It was estimated that mustard gas killer! one man for every 10 put out of action, while shells killed me for everv three.

, ECONOMY OF FORCE. / While not suggesting that gas warfare was anything but dreadful it was less wasteful of human life and property than older forms of warfare, and it was of such outstanding importance chat, when the time came, it would be used even if such use were against the spirit of the Protocol. The persistent products such as mustard gas permitted a great economy of force. No place sprinkled with mustard gas could be usefully held. Against high explosive shelling men could go underground, and when the shelling ceased they could come up; but they con'd hot come up and carry out useful miliary movement if the surface had be- , come contaminated by mustard gas. j Byj means of mustard gas an army could I protect its flunks against attack, and I an enemy could be denied territory which large number's of troops would be required to defend. The use of mustard gas would also create a contaminated area just where an enemy was proposing to'land troops or stores. It seemed to him an elementary act of prudence for a nation situated as wo were to see that research for ehemi•a! warfare should continue. \\ hiit, finally, would be the effect of lie. limitation of other armaments on die value of the chemical weapon? At die outbreak of war the first anxiety would be to increase those restricted tcapons as rapidly as possible. '1 hero vero ways of using gas that could he adopted very quickly without guns and vithont shells. There were large stocks if gas cylinders a,t once available in all nun tries where there were an alkali

industry. Containers su‘table for in'us* t.ard gas, of simple design, fitted vitli I some bursting a.nfngement, could be quickly constructed. They could be j thrown by band from aircraft, .tanks, I armoured cars and other vehicles, from projectors. Commercial aircraft | could be turned into machines for i carrying and dropping bombs or improvised containers within 24 hours. No one could deny that to saturate arsenals, dockyards, ordnance dumps, and so on behind the lines with mustard gas in a war tiif movement would be effective. He did not assume that the enemy would use mustard gas. It might well be .something new and surprising which might break down our gas defence unless we were alert. All these considerations proved that it was prudent in peace time for the War Office to he in contact with the chemical industries. If an emergency occurred it would occur quickly. Chemical warfare materials might prove the quickest to improvise as well as the most effective.