NAVAL ESTIMATES

Hokitika Guardian, 18 March 1930, Page 5

NAVAL ESTIMATES

THE' YEAR'S FIGURE'S

(British Official Wireless)

(Received this day at 11 a.m.) RUGBY, March 17. Introducing the Navy Estimates in the Commons (Mr A. V. Alexander, First Lord of the Admiralty) said they amounted to £51,730,(100 against £55,tt6o,UvJ last year, showing a reduction ot £4,126,000. The Estimates were within £1.90,000 of 'the figures submitted for 1914, which were the last pre-war Estimates, but in order to get a true comparison with 1914, allowance must be made for higher costs and prices to-day. Calculated on the pre-war rates, the provisions covered by the present Estimates would not have cost more than £3i,{);.Q,0.y0, or a reduction of 39 per cent.

Provision this year, however, covered a iimicli larger proportion of non-effect-ive charges than in 101-4. To-day noneffective charges amounted to £8,500,000 compared with £0,000,000 in 1914. So if one compared the actual effective services of the Navy, the present net Estimates .were £13,000,000 compared with £48,500,000 in 1014, . Reducing the present Estimates to pre-war values there was a reduction of no less than 40 per, cent, 'I beg the House to remember,” said Mr Alexander “no other Naval Power in the world has voluntarily made a reduction compared with .pre-war,” With regard to the reduction in shipbuilding, Mr Alexander said:—“lt is with great satisfaction the Government have found in the general trend of world affairs, and in the general outlook for peace, justification for proceeding still further along the road already to some extent marked of by the last Government of the slowing down rates of our naval construction, and giving proof of our sincerity in tne cause of all-round reductions in armaments. The reductions we have made in the last two annual programmes of the five year’s programme of the late Government have been made in the same spirit as actuated tiie late Government in reductions. They themselves made certain of their annual programmes, but I would say they have been made with greater courage and stronger determination for the end in view and have been made accordingly very much more drastic. “We are convinced the provision we are now making is adequate.' Our replacement programme must he related, not to the present strength, but to future needs. What those needs will be, cannot be accurately forecasted until the results of the London Conference have been ascertained and duly collated.” \ He hoped the feeling of pessimism regarding the Conference, so often expressed, would prove to be unfounded, and he depreciated any discussion today of a kind which would not be of ; assistance in bringing the Conference to a successful issue.

No provision was made for a construction programme for 1830, and the Government were holding over any decision as to what this should he, not only so but in respect of the 1931 programme it had been thought best, in view of the proposals which the British delegation had made at the Conference for the total abolition of Uie submarine, to suspend for the present, the submarine part of that

programme. The House need not- view with alarm the prospect ot Supplementary Estimates to meet the future needs. In tins respect provision was made in 1929 ror new construction of submarines amounting to ±,fcJ,uol), and no greater hgure'tnan unit- would be asKeq m respect of 1960, unless he had to ask for tne provision for three submarines provisionally included in the 1929 programme. smnucl this necessity umortunately arise,. and he would not delude tlie House into thinking the contingency might he ignored, me supplementary grant might have to be inceased to n more material size, but it would still represent a small fraction oi the reduction of the Estimates 'its' a whole, aiul it would still mean that the .ultimate saving on the 1929 construction programs would be no less than £6,500,000. Air Alexander added that a very considerable slowing down of work on the Singapore Base had been found possible without in any way prejudicing the ultimate decision. Final decision on the future development of the Base would be sought as soon as possible after the Naval Conference, but would not be taken until after consultation with the Overseas Governments affected. Hon. W. Churchill said that Conservatives <lid not assent to the present proposals and estimates of the Government. He asked why a reduction in cruiser strength was announced- before the Conference began, in-

stead of becoming part of the general process of disarmament. Whereas every other Power stated its requirements at the maximum we began by announcing an enormous reduction of armaments and the Conference proceeded on a basis of seeing how much more could be counted down. “There is grave danger,” said Mr Churchill, “that the Conference may become a process, not of general naval disarmament, but of disarming Great Britain, while other Powers become actually stronger.” Mr Churchill pointed out that before the war we had 1-16,500 seamen and mariners and at the end of the war 199,000, we now sought to reduce file number to 9-1,000. During the same period United States, the next strongest naval power, bad increased its personnel from 6. ,000 in 1914 to

114,0-30 in the present year. In the face of such figures, what became of the Doctrine of Parity. LONDON, March 17. Replying to Hon. W. Churchill's criticism that the Government’s action would reduce the naval construction programme to less than would maintain the minimum standard that the Government itself had proclaimed Mr Kenworthy said he considered the* Naval Conference was going to be a teVrible failure. The forces against the Government had been too great. The next few years were bound to see considerable building, programmes embarked upon.

If uiinlble to arrange a general five years building holiday. Britain alone should declare a cessation. She could do this with perfect safety and should then postpone the Conference sino die and part friends. Mr West Russell moved an amendment as follows: “‘This House having regard to defence of Km pi re on sea routes i« of opinion that maintenance of adequate naval forces and establishment of steady building replacement programme are of vital importance. AW argue that the Ciovernment had no right to risk the defence of trade of the Kmpire in order to make gesture before going to the Conference. the results of which it could not possibly foresee.”