LORD NEWTON’S BOOK

Hokitika Guardian, 13 December 1929, Page 8

LORD NEWTON’S BOOK

PATRONISING REFERENCES. Lord Newton’s biography of Lord Lausdowne, the British 'Foreign Secretary from 1900 to 1905 (Lord Lansdownej, is valuable for the light which it sheds upon British foreign policy and for its picture of the singularly simple and attarctive personality of Lord Lansdowne. There is much in, it, however, that is calculcated to provoke acute controversy, and a good many of its statements will be widely discussed and severly criticised.

Its most serious def ect is the patronising tone of its references to King Edward VII.

King Edward (we are told) was not of a studious disposition, and as lie read little, his knowledge of complicated international questions can scarcely have been profound. His minutes, for instance, upon Foreign Office correspondence, which have been irequentl.v quoted with much reverence,, are not of a very illuminating character. A statement made by Lord Lansdowne is quoted.

The King talks and writes about his .-royal brother (the German Emperor) in terms which makes one’s flesh creep, and the official papers which go to him, whenever they refer to come back with all sort of annotations of a most incendiary character. It is hard to reconcile this off-hand assertion with what is known of King Edward’s annotations from other sources, and with the ha- ,r ict;r jf dilate King. Lord Newton goes on to make an indignant complaint that—

In the case of the Anglo-French Agreement the public has been led to believe that it was brought about by the visit of King Edward to Paris in 1903.

The fact is that long before his visit to Paris the late King had been considering the possibility of an understanding with France driven to it by the naval menace from Germany and the hardly concealed hostility of German statesmen. The memoirs of the German diplomatist Eckardstein show in February 1902, a full year before the visit to Paris, King Edward warned Germany that an understanding with France would probably be reached.

To disregard King Edward’s influence on foreign statesmen or to attribute ft to snobbery, as Lord Newton does, by telling us that “foreign statemen are like humbler being highly susceptile to royal favour,” betrays the mandarin attitude of the biographer. King Edward influenced foreign statesmen, because, pace Lord Newton, he spoke with great knowledge of foreign countries and of men, though no one ever pretended that his was a bookish mind.

lie had travelled much and was familiar with the Continent and its problems, whereas his Ministers knew little or nothing of Continental Eur ope except from papers and books.

LORD SAILSBURY’S APPEAL. Sir Sidney Lee for this reason is nearer the truth than Lord Newton when lie declares in his life of King Edward that— There was certain justification for the popular belief that Britain’s foreign policy during the reign was influenced by the Sovereign’s predilections. Nor is King Edward the only prominent personalty to be smitten with Lord Newton’s random blows. There is an attack by innuendo on the la'te Lord Northcliffe, because, when William 11. visited this country in January 1901, during the Boer War—

The Harmsworth Press even went to the length of hailing him with frenzied enthusiasm as “A Friend in Need.”

The late Lord Salisbury made a personal appeal to the late Lord Northcliffe on patriotic grounds to greet his Imperial Majesty with praise and compliments; and the Foreign Office was equally anxious that “The Daily Mail” should be more than friendly. This newspaper had been busy drawing attention to the menacing German Navy Act of 1900, which contained in its preamble the declaration that England was the enemy. But for national reasons, in a grave emergency, it complied with the entreaties of the Prime Minister and Government. It is really to be abused for so doing? One very important and interesting verdict is contained in the book. Lord Lansdowne, writing after the war to Lord Loreburn, said: I have always believed, as you evidently do, that the war ymight have been avoided if Grey had been in a position to make perfectly explicit statement as’to our conduct in certain eventualities. I am under the impression that he would himself have been ready to make such a statement, but that lie could not venture to do so, and could not have got the support of the Cabinet if he had asked for it. Lord Newton repeatedly denies that Lord Lansdowne in the 'crisis of 1905 promised France British military support if she were attacked by Germany. There are no traces of any such undertaking in Lord Lansdowne’s private papers. . . . and he himself was the last person in the world who would have been likely to give such an assurance. Tn that case, however, what was the

value and meaning of the Entente, M. Hedemann, the, well-known French special correspondent of that period was definitely informed by M. Delcasse that King Edward had assurred the French Government of support in tlve event of attack, and we are inclined to believe that M. Hedemann knew the facts a good deal better than Lord Newton.

The most disagreeable revelation contained in the book concerns the attitude of President Roosevelt to arbitration, which verged upon deliberate bad faith. In the matter of the Alaska boundary dispute with Canada he sent troops to Alaska, and if the decision of the court had not been favourable to him “lie intended to use force and already made the necessay preparation. It is an ugly story. But then, as Lord Newton says, he “was less Anglophil than was generally believed.” «