WORLD WAR ECHO

Hokitika Guardian, 17 June 1929, Page 8

WORLD WAR ECHO

WHEN AMERICA CAME IN. LEO YD GEORG'K INTERVENES. SAN FRANCISCO, May 25. On August 80, 1918, Marshal Foch I'aci'd General Pershing in France and demanded : “Do you wish io go into battle?” “.Most assuredly,” the American commander replied calmly, “hut as an American army.” Foch objected that it would take a month to complete such an army. “Live me a sector anywhere you decide,” declared Pershing, “and I will take it over at once.” This historic scene is pictured in a narrative oil' the U.S. Government presses, which for the first time gives an official account of how it was decided a. million Americans would enter the Argonne as an American army, not as French reinforcements. It also is disclosed that Allied diplomatic pressure was repeatedly exerted directly on President Wilson in Washington to over-ride Pershing’s decision. The purport of the War Department cables to Pershing telling of these moves and the President's great concern over the picture of depleted Allied man-power painted for by the diplomats is given, once or twice in text form. “The President, having selected the man (Pershing), abstained almost entirely from interference with his worn, and this complete confidence and trust which he reposed in his commander-in-chief proved the key to General Pershing s successful solution of the difficult problems he faced,” the army historians say.

Headed “The Genesis of the American First Army,” the document was prepared by the historical section of the Army War College. The narrative leading up to the climactic meeting between the French and American commanders recounts in detail from heretofore unpublished records Pershing’s long battle against Allied demands for American troops as replacement in their own armies. “TIGEIt” ACCUSED PERSHING. Its publication led .army officers to recall an interview with Marshal l'och published in Paris after his death, in, which the French commander was quoted as having silid Premier Clemonceau had considered that Pershing s efforts to build up an autonomous army was preventing tbe Americans from giving the aid tliev should have given the Allied cause as a whole. “The Tiger” was said to have accused General Pershing of being too stubborn. Regarding the meeting between Pershing and Foch, which ocoured at the First Army Headquarters in Ligney-en-Barrios, the narrative now published says: “It was a moment of high tension. Ihe two commanders faced each other, both with decided convictions. The decision affected more than a million Americans. Eleven dnvs later, September 10, 1918, while Pershing’s first army crouched for its spring at St. Mihiel, the agreement was ratified that gave him a 90-mile front. Within two weeks all his forces were driving through the Argonne toward Sedan and the Armistice.”

The monograph is a chapter of the official narrative history of American military participation in the world war, which the War College specialists have been preparing with access to Allied and German records as well ns American. It is devoted exclusively to the account of Pershing’s difficulties in carrying out President "Wilson’s instructions, given him before ho sailed, to co-operate with the Allied armies as his judgement dictated, but to keep in mind “the underlying idea” that his forces in France “arc a separate and distinct component of the combined forces, the identity of which must be preserved.” Of the idea for incorporation of American troops in Allied armies as the quickest means of making their battle power effective, the War College historians say it was “advanced initially as a proposal, but became in the minds of the Allies a necessity when Russia withdrew from the-war and Germany seriously threatened the successful outcome of the conflict by a great drive on the Western front.”

Just how much of a necessity Allied statesmen ns well as soldiers regarded the use of American troops as replacements in their armies is revealed in connection with the “London agreement” of April 2-1, in which Pershing assented to give priority during May troops shipments to infantry and machine gun units of six divisions to he trained and used temporarily with British forces. This grow out of the placing of additional British troopcarrying tonnage at his disposal Tor the purpose. On May 1-2, however, the supreme war council mot at Abbeyvillc, France, with Premier Olomeneeait presiding and Premiers Lloyd George and Orlando also present, as well as Foch, Retain, Haig, Pershing. Bliss and others. TIGER. DISAPPROVED. Clcmenceau disapproved the London agreement for American infantry and machine gun shipments in May lor the British army unless similar shipments for the French army followed in June. Pershing promptly told the council the Allies could not decide what the United States would do with its forces, but Clcmenceau was insistent. Llovd George intervened to ask: “Why consider the whole of the Allies. England’s Ipsses (in the gicnt

German offensive then in progress) are Lie greatest, lienee we must have replacements. Ten British divisions have been entirely knocked out. ’I here are no British to refill them.”

“1 do not understand that the American army is available Jor ai.location as recruits to either Gnat Britain or France,” Pershing m>m eied, “nor for any indcliuiVj period, ue must June an Amen-m army. [ shall insist on this pri-i yle taken

„p and agreed to liu.v by tii.s eon t Cll.”

i he principle was enunciated by the council, but tile army historians mite that both F reiicli and British atithoiitios accepted it with; the belief that it could not and would not be realised until tne campaigns of 1918 bad ended, due to winter. They also note that diplomatic pressure for replacement siiipments from America was renewed in Washington, quoting a War Department eabio to. Pershing of May 12, showing that the two Ambassadors had informed President Wilson than Foch planned to the subject with Pershing. That message also iniormed Peishing that there remained in the United States, due to accelerated shipments less than 809,000 infantry and machine gun troops with any degiee of training, which would be the “practical limit” of that programme “unless the acceptance of untrained infantry is desired.”