TRUTH ABOUT THE WAR

Hokitika Guardian, 24 May 1929, Page 7

TRUTH ABOUT THE WAR

TRAGEDY OF THE SOMME.

GHASTLY COST OF ATTRITION

THE AUSTRALIANS IN FRANCE.

Tlie recent publication of a further volume of the Australian official history of the war, by Captain C. E. W. Lean, which deals with “The Australian Imperial Forces in France. 1916,” is referred to by a contributor as “One of the most remarkable books dealing with the Great War.” Strange as it may seem, the stark truth about the Great War is rarely told, which is possibly one of the reasons why so many people talk about the “next war,’ as if 1914-18 hao never been, writes “S.W.” Sonic statesmen have dealt with the causes and genesis of the Great War. Many politicians and more generals have told us how they “won the war” or would have done if other politicians and generals had not made mistakes and “queered their pitch.” Very few writers have told us “the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth.” Very 7 few of the soldiers who actually went through the fiery furnace ever care to tell the truth. Most of them, are inarticulate, and while the mists of war-time propaganda still poisoned the air what the others said was not accepted as evidence. Now that the war has been ended more than ten years, the turgid flood of. wartime books has changed to a clear ■ stream of more serious literature that lets the cold light of truth in upon the. dark miasmic “fog of war.”

A REAL MILITARY HISTORY. One of the most remarkable books dealing with events of the Great M ar is “The- Australian Imperial Force in France- 1916,” by Captain C. E. M. Bean (Angus and Robertson, Sydney, publishers). It is Volume 111. of the monumental “Official History’ of Acs trnlia in the War of 1914-1918,” which will be completed in twelve volumes, of which half (not in numerical sequence) have now been published. The volume at present under notice bears unmistakable evidence right through its 1050 pages of the indefatigable and painstaking industry of the author. Captain Bean tells us that to his “twofold dcsiroto give a true picture of the test of battle, and to distribute the credit as widely as possible among those win' deserve it—the particularity of these narratives has been due.” The author has. however, “endeavoured to prevent mere multiplicity. of detail from obscuring its own bearings either on the development of the A.I.F. or on the course of the grea,ter struggle, ’ and it can fairly he claimed that hr lms succeeded. “The sources from which war histories have sometime been written—dispatches of general l " (which often afford only second-hand or oven third-hand evidence of wluß nctuallv happened to their troops), second-hand reports composed lon ,T after the events, and stories already half-crystalised as legend—may indicate what the leaders thought am 1 intended, but have little authority for the occurrences on the actua battle-front.” Remarking that “pro bably tho colrnial writer regards mow sceptically than those of older conn tries the dispatches both of states men and of generals,” Captain Bean goes on to say that “lie is also, perhaps less likely to !be influenced by the assumption necessary in military operations, but in no degree Gindin -

on their historian —that for a commander’s decisions- the commander alone is responsible. The colonial historian, convinced that the true credit for famous achievements in wai. as in politics, lies often with unknown subordinates, endeavours to .silt tin details until be can lay a just share of praise at the feet of those to whom it is due.” In this book Captain Bean brings to light many important happenings which had a great hearing on the operations in which the Australians took part, and on wliicl the official reports were silent, “sint ply because the higher leaders nad never beard of them.”

AN EPOCHAL BOOK. Mere than twelve years of careful thorough research have gone to tlv making of this book. The essentia data were obtained from “those :m tunlly engaged and within a fev weeks of most of the events,” but m addition every available record, off’ r-ial and private, lias been studied German military archives and wa> histories have been searched and vol uminous quotations and footnote from them are used to fill important gaps in the narrative of confuse' operations, to clarify the story, am to ensure that scrupulous accuracy ir detail for which Captain Bean’s worl as a. historian is noted. The greatc portion of the book covers the actua 1 operations of only a few weeks h’ France, but “chapter and verse” i* given for everything There are nin' full-page or double-page maps, am’ hundreds of small detail maps aw sketches which make it possible t< follow every* feature of the opera tions. There is a wealth of pictures many of them terrible evidence ol the nature of warfare. There are weT over 2000 foot-notes in which a twoline biography of every officer am man mentioned in the narrative n given, and there is a wonderfully complete index of nearly 70 pages Apart from its general interest as ai Australian history, the hook has mud to say about the doings of New Zealand troops, who in Egypt and during the early days in France were closely associated with the A.1.F., and fc this reason it will be doubly’ inter esting to readers in the Dominion.

- SOME INTERESTING REVELATIONS. ’ - Tho “A.I.F. in France,” undoubted-. |y, will create a considerable stir ii the military dovecotes of Britain, in his earlier chapters,. dealing with tin. policy of the higher command whim led to the transfer of the Australian.’ and New Zealanders from Egypt” tc France, Captain Bean niakes many interesting revelations regarding tli attitude, in the stress and strain o. a war that, was going badly for the Allies on land, of the professional soldier towards the political leaders aim ime volunteer soldiers of Australia and- New Zealand. He tells of tin happenings which led to the doubling of the A.I.F. and its ultimate expansion to five complete divisions ant more; and of the difficulties of reorganisation and training with in adequate equipment, which were undoubtedly added to By ' the policy ol some highly-placed British officers “o; that cold, scholarly, and somewhat exclusive type with which the smart appearance of troops, neatness oi uniform, and punctilious ceremonial both on parade and in the streets weighed most heavily as signs of tlioii military’ worth.” Of absorbing interest, too, are tli< chapters dealing with the move of tin Australians to France, of their arriv ,al at the front, and of their cany experiences, side by side with tli New Zealanders, in the trench war fare a,t Annentieres. Captain Beai rudely tramples on many cherishes tnulitions regarding the purpose am the achievements of the Germans a. Verdun, and shows how that grea. battle gradually absorbed the great or part of the troops whom the Frenci had intended to reserve for the Alied offensive on the Somme. Ilia, offensive was to have been “a truly tremendous one, with a front of 4miles, the British launching, possibly. 25 divisions on a front of 15 mile north of the river, while the French with 39 divisions, attack on a 31 mile front, mainly south of it.” In June it finally became clear tliai through the consuming of the Freud reserves at Verdun, the French paron the Somme must be a minor one. and it was derided that the British should adhere to their attention o< breaking through and turning north eastward, while the French would con fine themselves to protecting the British Army’s southern flank. In lib. ehapter dealing with the “Plannin, of the Somme Offensive,” and iu otlie. covering subsidiary operations, Cap tain Bean shows conclusively that tin great Allied effort of 1916 was lore doomed to failure as a “breakthrough,” and that German tug;, command was in no way deceived a* to the aim and object of the subsidiary operations.

TRUTH ABOUT l-'ROMELLJuS. Oiie of these, planned hy General Sir Richard Halving, eonmmuder of the XI Corps, to prevent the Herman withdrawing troops for the Somme was terribly iil-couceived, and rosuU ed in a severe reverse at the Battle of Kromelles, the truth being concealed from the public in the official communique: ■‘‘.Yesterday evening, smith of Armentieros, we carried out some important raids on a front of two miles, in which Australian troo's took part. About 140 German prisoners were captured.” The truth wn • that the sth Australian Division ha-1 5533 officers and men, including 400 taken prisoners, and the 61st Divis-

ion had 1547 casualties, tlie total German casualties being under 1500. The sth Australian Division, mostly ran troops, was crippled by the fight at Fromelles for the remainder of the summer.

TRAGEDY OF I’OZJRRES. Meanwhile on the Somme front. I‘Besides introducing the British \ nnv to the enemy’s barrage as a constant dominant condition, the battle was, at terrible cost, educating the staffs of both sides to a mo is skilful employment of the barrage ii attack.” Into this ghastly battle th' Australians entered on July 14, and in it three divisions were engaged more or less continuously till Septem her 2. During those .seven fearfr’ weeks they were fighting for am' about Pozieres anti Mouquot Far'" and Contain Bean dovot.es over 4O' pages to his mo'-ing account of ihoperations in which the Ist. 2nd. am 4th Division lost 9‘'. rr o offirer« am' mon. Thus, with the sth Division’' losses at Fromelles. the A"stra!iai Cu'ce in -F reive had in barely sever weeks suffered more than 28.000 e.as unities, an average of over 7000 fo: .n]i division.

A whole chapter is devoted by Cap tain Bean to "a critical discussion o' the deplorable situation’ thus created. The casualties precipitated the effort for conscription in Australia, wilier was defeated, and fixed the rate of reinforcements to be raised. Th< strain of the fighting inevitably af footed the attitude of the Australian troops towards the war, and necess: rated a new basis for the discipline uf the UP. The Australian divis ions had in six weeks launched If attacks on narrow fronts in the samf "orps sector and most of them had c bitter conviction that they were ho ’itg uselessly sacrificed. That ar iffioer who had fought nobly shoulc in his last letter speak of the “murder” of many of his friends “throng l lie incompetence, callousness anr personal vanity of those high in an thority,” is evidence, remarks Cap tain Bean, not indeed of the litera truth of his words, but of somethin? much amiss in the higher leadership

“CANNON FODDER.” In his final chanters Captain Bear analyses the dreadful situation produced by the First Battle of of th / Somme—the hardest and bloodies 1 ever fought by the British Army “The British part in it was the logical outcome of dull, determined strut egy, and the devotion of an inexper ’"enced army. Almost the whole of +he 500.000 British troops who—according to calculations made befor' the battle—were available for expendi ture in casualties, were duly expend «d; and the question arises how fai that sacrifice was "Justified hv the re suits. In his dispatch after th' battle Haig claimed: ‘The three mair objects with which we commenced oui offensive in July had already been achieved. . . Verdun had been relieved; the main German forces held on the Western Front; and thf enemy’s strength had been very considerably worn down.’ ” Captair Bean says this contention is unlikeh to be held by posterity. “No om who reads his orders, instructions am appreciations writ Ten during thcourse of the long struggle can V left with the faintest doubt that hh main object. . . • "’ as to hreal

through the front of the Germans am roll up their flank. . . It is nov known that on November 15 tin French, Russian and British staff agreed in estimating the Germai casualties on the Somme at 630,000 against 485,000 for those of the Brit : sh and French.” The figures givei in “Statistics of the Military Effor N ,f the British Empire” compiled lv the War Office show that for th< months July-December, 1916, tin British loss in France was 481,84' Mid that of the Germans facing tin British 236,194. Deducting from thest the losses estimated for other parts >f the front, the figures for the Sonina casualties would he 410,000 Britisl against 180,000 German. “I he bal ance of loss was also against tin French but not to the same degree In round figures this* period cost tin two Allies 750,000 casualties agains' 500,000 on the German side.” Ii other words, Verdun and the Somm cost the Germans less than half th casualties of France and Britain. “I is unconceivable,” remarks Captai' Bean, “that Haig would have per sisted in his offensive on the Soninn had lie realised, even approximately iow much lighter than his own wa his enemy’s loss; nor would the Gov eminent, which at tlie end of Jul; showed marked anxiety concernin casualties, have permitted him to J« so. But the argument which lie con stantly used in explaining to it hi determination to continue was grossly and tragically mistaken one Far from the German loss being th greater the British Army was beiiu worn down, numerically, more than twice as fast and the loss is not to be measured by bare numbers. Ih. troops who bore the brunt of tin Somme fighting were the cream of the British population—the new vol unteor army, inspired by the lofty ■>Hruistie ideals traditional in British upbringing, in high purity of ain

"ml single-minded sacrifice probably tho finest army that ever went to war 1 nspite the indignation expressed by one of the higher commanders at tin criticism current in England, a general who wears down 180.000 of hi® enemy by expending 400,000 men of this quality has something to answer for.”