A WHITE PAPER

Hokitika Guardian, 24 October 1928, Page 6

A WHITE PAPER

BRITISH OFF!CIAL STATEMENT,

NAVAL LIMITATION PROPOSALS

(British Official Wireless.)

RUGBY, Oct. 22

A 1928 white paper dealing with Anglo-French proposals for limitation of‘ naval armaments was issued this evening. It is a comprehensive document. Covering, the history of negotiations leading up to the exchange of notes containing the terms of proposed compromise arid subsequent correspondence with other chief naval Powers. As a result of unauthorised and incomplete disclosures, the compromise became the object of public speculation, often of an erroneous and misleading character and it is believed the White Paper will place the matter in its true perspective.

In a circular despatched to British representatives in the capitals of countries represented on the Preparatory Commission, Lord Cushendun emphasises that the Anglo-French compromise cannot be regarded as a detached or isolated event. It is the most recent link in a long chain of endeavour to improve the provision embodied in Article 8 of the Covenant .League of Nations to the effect that members of the League recognise that the maintenance of Deace require a reduction of national armaments to the lowest point, consistent with national safety. The. first steps taken by the League to fulfil this obligation, were turned in the direction of comprehensive schemes of mutual assistance, in the belief that the creation of a general sense of security Was. the most promising avenue to an all round reduction and limitation of armaments, in the face of the continued failure to reach an agreement oil anv such scheme.

This line of approach was abandoned in favour of more direct methods and in December, 1925. the Assembly sot up a special commission with a mandate to prepare the ground for a genera Ico i i fere n ce. This commission known as the Preparatory Commission attacked its main task at its third session, March to April, 1927, at which British and French representatives each put forward a draft skeleton to the convention as the basis of discussion.

There was a wide divergence between these two drafts on the naval side. The British d— provided for limitation of vessels of war in nine separate categories. The French draft was for limitation broadly speaking by tot;; 1 tonnage.

It was between these two nrincit'les of limitation jby classes or limitation by total or global tonnage, that the, chief controversy has turned. Other Governments represented on •the commission ranged themselves, some on one\ side, some on the other. In the hope of bridging this divergence, the French delegation some days Inter )out 'forward a modified proposal which went so far to meet the British view as to introduce classification by four classes. It contained a provision, however, for unlimited tonnage from one class to another, and partly for that reason and partly owing to the small number of classes, pyovide in acceptable to the British delegation. , Confronted by these acute and seem ing I v i rreco no i I able dive rge ncies and anxious to do nothing which might prejudice the success of the naval conference to which the United States Government had recently issued invitations, the Preparatory Commission adjourned without hav ing made any progress towards an agreed text of the skeleton convention.

Two months later the naval conference met in Genova, only to break clown after seven weeks of effort. Tn the face of the deadlock in the Preparatory Commission, followed hv the failure of the Geneva conference, all prospect of immediate progress appeared to he extinguished. Informal conversations, however, were frequent at Geneva and ultimately culminated in a conversation between M. Briand and Sir A. Chamberlain in March, 1928, which led to the compromise under review. Tn the course of their discussions, Sir A. Chamberlain mentioned certain suggestions which bad been made Ibv the British Admiralty, and he subsequently communicated a. written note of them to M. Briand at the latter’s request. Th-'v provided- for limitation by six classes, all types of vessel being included. They were not acceptable. Tn considering these successive steps towards a compromise it should be homo in mind that the British contentious hr l always (been for a limitation in detail, the French contention for limitation by total tonnage. Thus the original British plan had been for classification by nine classes under modified British omnosals n-s snbirHt'xl to M. -Briand after the March conversation.' Tim number ot classes bad been reduced to six, 'but included vessels of s »II types.

On the ; r side the French Government no less, any : ous than the British Government to promote agreement. had shown a disposition to moot t-lie British thesis as far as possible.

In the end a compromise was reached on the basis of limitation applicable to four cl as-os n f ” r ar vessels. While admittedly i'ncomo'ete as a final solution of flip "av-d limitation question, they would, if ."'’opted, lui\e added two further cl a—; of vessel to the two classes limited under the Washington Treaty. They could only lead to useful results if other principal naval Powers were ready to regard them as ottering a po_i.-ble

basis for the resumption of negotiation iu the Preparatory Commission as in a matter of naval disarmament, the fuestion classification versus global tonnage, had hitherto impeded pro-

gross. So, in the matter of laud disarmament, the question of limitation of military trained reserves had proved a stumbling block. The French Government and a majority of the Governments represented on tlie Preparatory Commission had held that reserves should ibe excluded from the limitation while the British Government had cmisistentlv supported' the opposite thes : . For some time, however, they ha ! realised that, further opposition on their part to the exclusion of these trained reserves could, in the face of the attitude maintain'ed by a majority of the Preparatory Commission, only have the effect of prevnting progress indefinitely. So long ago as April, 1927. Viscount Cecil clearly foreshadowed the withdrawal for the sake of agreement of British opposition. When, therefore, the two Governments we e advancing towards a compromise in the "after of naval limitation, it w " h” the process of agreement could mly he facilitated bv the formal lii ; talion. That concession was made ,to the views of the British Government on naval classification would enable them to withdraw their opposition to th* French standpoint in the matter of military trained reserves. Referring to criticisms of alleged secrecy of negotiations, Lord Cusheudun recalls the March announcement that the conversations were proceeding and points out that when the compromise proposals were ready foi submission to other naval Powers, the fact was announced by Sir A. Cham- , berlain in the Commons. “T myself crave to the press on the 30th August a full account of the circumstances in which the comp-omise "'as reached and an emphatic denial (if speculations as to the existence of secret clauses and political understandings.. The whole case is revealed in the correspondence and anv suggestions to the contrary are totally devoid o foundation. The proposals were submitted at the end of July to the Governments of United States, Italy and Japan. While the Japanese Government express concurrence in the purport of the proposals United States and Italy, for reasons clearly and cogently explained in their notes, have not seep their way to accept them. Their communications are receiving the attentive consideration and a reply will he made in due course.