FRENCH AND KITCHENER

Hokitika Guardian, 18 August 1928, Page 4

FRENCH AND KITCHENER

GENERAL HUG GET’S STORY. AN ASTONISHING REVIEW. General Huguet in tho first eighteen months of the war was head of the French .Military Mission attached to the British Army in France, m this book he has given a record of his experiences and observations which is not only extremely interesting in itself nut of great importance for history. The work was written six years ago, and lias not subsequently been modicd, or corrected, whence perhaps its hitter tone. Tho author was a warm admirer of Lord Kitchener and a severe critic of Lord French. Gencal Huguet makes no secret ot tho enormous mistakes with which the French staff opened the war: The Gorman mass of manoeuvre consisted of 274 army corps and 7 cavalry divisions with 12 brigades of landwclir, whereas our calculations placed its maximum strength at 12-or 15 corps. UNEXPECTED DECISIONS

. The British leader,’ Sir John French, I who had to face the terrible risks created by this miscalculation and this surprise was in General Huguet’s view ill-fitted for the task. Of extraordinary personal bravery lie was warm-hearted and generous. Easy of approach, and knowing how to speak to his men with kindness and to say the right work, sympathising with them in the trials, always pre-oceupied with their welfare, lie gained their , affection and was greatly loved by them. Unfortunately, a temperament which was impulsive and impressionable ns that of a child, combined with an ardent imagination which lie kept under insufficient control prevented, him from taking a sound view of difficult situations and led him frequently to the most unexpected decisions. He was not on good termsTwTtli other great soldiers, except Foch: His quarrels with Kitchener were constant, and nearly always the wrong was on his side. With, General Joffre his relations were marked by the utmost coolness. On his advisers, Murray is described as a “pessimist” and “inclining to ,tlie least risky decisions;” Sir Henry Wilson as a really great soldier and thinker. n ltli Lnnrezae, the French general who commanded the French Army on his right and who was to save France and Europe and to earn for his insight in escaping from a gigantic German trap, disgrace, Sir J. French quarrelled „at once, ap the result of some tactless words from Lanrezac’s Chief of Staff. ,Nor did Joffre,do much to gain French’s confidence. lii an.interview which he had with French after the battles of Mons and Le Cate an: He might have found some .words, of sympathy for the position of Bis allies and have addressed 1 some words of thanks and praise to their army, which had been so severely tested. Unfortunately, such a thing never occurred to him. j- , 1 ■ HEATED DISCUSSION. French hurriedly ;left in dudgeon. So completely did French lose heart that he . wanted to retreat behind the Seine and to quit his place in the Allied front. This Intention brought over Lord Kitchener to France, and there was an interview between these two soldiers at which General Huguet was present and 1 of which lie gives this sensational account:— From the very outset the discussion between them became so heated that I thought it discreet to fall hack. I gathered that Lord Kitchener wanted to ascertain the exact state of the

British troops and that French opposed him violently; hut I only heard very imperfectly the actual words

which they exchanged. . I could not help being struck bv tho difference between the two disputants. Kitchener was calm, weighty, thoughtful, master of himself and fully conscious of the great and patriotic duty which ho had to discharge. French was hitter, violent, flushed in features, with the attitude of furious bad temper. . Tho contrast between them was striking. The one stood out as the big man and the great leader that he was: the other showed himself to be only

child whom Fortune had up to that date prodigiously favoured and who, tho moment she failed him, lost his head.

SLOWNESS AT THE MARNE. : As the discussion grew more and more painful, Kitchener took French into a room, and there they settled their dispute. The result was good in

that French abandoned his intention of quitting the line. But his confiI deuce in the French leadership had j received a shock which led him to he ! slow in his movements during . the battle of the Marne, and that slowness was in part due to the obscure and contradictory orders issued by Joffre. We may agree with General Huguet that, had Gqllieni been in

.command of the French Army, the “battle of Marne mould have been better fought, and Kluck would probably have been overwhelmed and destroyed. War, however, is always a record of mistakes. A disclosure which the author makes is that in November, 1914, Kitchener considered the recall of French, thinking him unsatisfactory, and meditated substituting for him Sir lan Hamilton. Joffre was strongly against j such a course, and in view of what afterwards happened at the Dardanelles it is fortunate that it was not taken.