A FIGHTING FAMILY

Hokitika Guardian, 21 July 1928, Page 1

A FIGHTING FAMILY

WIFE ALLEGES CRUELTY. - WANGANUI, July 17. Mr J. S. Barton to-day gave his reserved judgment in the case King v. King, in.which complainant sought separation and maintenance, alleging persistent cruelty to herself and children. It was alleged that the husband’s attitude to his wife and family had been murderous and that he left a lump on her head as big as an egg; that he punched his daughter on the mouth and loosened her teeth; also that he struck his son and left him with his face covered with blood.

Respondent, on the other hand, alleged cruelty on the side of tho wife, He said that on one occasion the son held him while his wife hammered him with a broom and then struck him with an enamel teapot, leaving a dent in the teapot. The wife admitted this. She said it was the only chance she had to get at him and she laid it on good and hard. in finding.for respondent (the husband) the Magistrate directed attention to tho difficulty in these cases of not having outside corroborative evidence to assist.

“It seems necessary, from time to time,” said the magistrate, “to call attention to the fact that this Court can only grant orders such as tlioso asked for uopn proof of facts alleged. There seems to be a tendency to approach .the Court in such cases, relying on proof of state of deadlock, iucompatability and hatred in the home, a 3 if the Court’s jurisdiction were analogous to that of tho Supreme Court to decree that a dissolution of company on grounds that it is just and is equitable when a deadlock is reached in the relations of the parties. This is not tho case. The Court’s powers are limited and defined liy a section of the Act that sets out three specific grounds on which alone orders of separation may he granted. To hold tho allegations of persistent cruelty proved against the present defendant is to place on him at once a moral stigma, and to raise a position under which, in possible future proceedings, lie may thereby bo treated as the erring party and prejudiced accordingly. For these reasons I must require that the complainant discharge the onus of proof. In niy'opinioii she has not done so and the order asked for is refused.’*