WHY GENEVA FAILED

Hokitika Guardian, 26 November 1927, Page 3

WHY GENEVA FAILED

RAMSAY M.irDOXA ID’S PLICA. (Australia,/ & N.Z. Cable As.sociati.~a.) I.OXDOX, Xov. 24. Mr Ramsay MacDonald, submitting; his disarmament motion, expressed the opinion that the Genera Naval Conference was bundled from beginning to end. Rritain failed to scout the field before joining the battle. The only chance of an Anglo-American agreement, and an American agreement with the rest of the world, was for Britain and America to come together and remove the chance of war. The Conference failed because war methods, instead of peace methods were followed, experts being allowed to politicoes’ functions. Britain was pledged -under every peace treaty to promote peace and disarmament, but no real Disarmament Conference had yet been held, only discussions how to reduce armaments in order to save money. He was not interested in disarmament as an eeoJP*'., noinic move, but as a means of removing the world’s trust in arms. The world must be got into a frame of mind of taking security for granted, and pursuing arbitration by ordinary civilised methods of settling disputes. Lord Cecil’s statement of the manner in which he was hampered whenever he came to a proposal of practical disarmament was unanswerable. Parliament’s duty was to compel the Government to carry out the country’s palpable intention and go ahead quickly towards disarmament, arbitration and security, ff the Government faced the problem of security, there would be no difficulty from the viewpoint of the Dominions. As Russia Was joining in explorations for security, they could proceed. Sir Austen Chamberlain’s duty was to bring the Empire as a united, powerful force into the councils of Europe, and contribute a scheme of pence. Sir Austen Chamberlain appeared to be setting up the Empire against the League. He was quite mistaken. It was true T that under the British Government’s prompting, the Government of Australia and Canada rejected the Protocol of 1924, but the Protocol was only the first draft. Mr MacDonald believed the Empire could find a form which was not merely words. Sir Austen Chamberlain, replying, said Lord Cecil’s reasons for resigning' were, firstly, Mr MacDonald’s own rejection of the treaty of mutual assistance; secondly, the present Govenment’s opposition to the Protocol; and thirdly, dissatisfaction with the -Naval Conference. The Government found an attempt to amend the Protocol would necessitate an entire recasting. The Government was charged with not making diplomatic preparations before the Naval Conference. Hitherto the Opposition bad at. tacked him for sticking to l lethods of old diplomacy, instead of openly facing the world without ; back-stair understandings. He accepted some of the blame for diplomatic preparation, but the Conference was held at the invitation of the United States, and the British Government refrained from seeking a preliminary understanding lest it should appear to America to be seeking to evade acceptance of the invitation. The debate was interrupted by the electric light in the whole of Westminster Palace suddenly going out. Sir Austen Chamberlain said he thought the lesson of the naval conference was that diplomatic preparation was always necessary before con. ferences. It would also be only after great preparation that there could be any hope of the League Disarmament Conference succeeding. Who wanted to hurry and press matters before the

{'round was prepared ? They were likely to be confronted by the same as was the experience at the Naval Conference. Sir Austen Chamberlain said he did not pretend there would be no further trouble in Europe, but they could meet difficulties, in a more cheerful spirit and with greater confidence since Locarno. The Governments of the states ol the Empire who had not signed the Protocol, had their own reasons therefore. “ 1 have no reason to believe any of them have changed their minds.” Would Mr MacDonald be prepared to place Britain and all her resources at the mercy of the League’s machinery, without our people having any control. If not, Mr MacDonald would he more usefully employed definI ing how much of the Protocol he would adopt; what new obligations he would undertake, and how he would fulfil them, than in talking vaguely of raising hopes he could not fulfil, spreading uncertainty instead of confidence. The common argument against signing was that unless all went in the proposals could not be carried out. Mr Lloyd George thought Sir Austen Chamberlain had dealt most inadequately with disarmament. So long as there were huge armaments in the World arbitration and conciliation would impossible. The first step therefore was to reduce armaments. At the present moment, fifteen million men in Europe could be called up for slaughter with equipments such as the world had never seen for horror and destruction. The League’s Disarmament Commission had made no progress the last two years because conscription was outside its scope of inquiry. Other countiies complained that Britain and Ameiica, who did most of the blathering about peace, were increasing naval expenditrue. Risks must he taken for peace as they were taken for war. lie did not see much risk. There was no enemy on the horizon. During Disraeli’s and Lord Salisbury’s time the defence of the Empire cost two per cent of na- ___ tional income, now it was costing 3.1 • per cent., though the German fleet was at the bottom of the ocean, anc! ours at present could engage and sink all the fleets of Europe. The Government at the beginning of its regime formulated a naval programme which involved expenditure of from 65 to 70 millions on new ships. Me were the pioneers of arbitration. Now the feeling at Geneva is that we are bolding back and stopping the way. Mr Lloyd George hoped Sir Austen Chamberlain at Geneva would use his influence for disarmament and arbitration, “Without which, I think, in the no distant future, there will be such an upheaval os the world has now

seen.” Mr Duff Cooper, in moving bis amendment, said: If the United States want ttg_Jiiggest navy in the world, let them have it. We should protect our shores and commerce from every menace, but I do not include America as a possible attacker. '1 hat i only wav of beating the big navy party’ in America. Mr Buxton said the pillars of Labour’s policy were disarmament, arbitration and security. Sir Austen Chamberlain professed great friendship for the League, but was always attempting to check its activities. He was like the hen who was continuallv Warning the ducklings not to take to the water. Mr Bridgeman opened up the debate on behalf ofThe Government. He pointed out the Labour Government was. the first to lay down the ten thousand ton cruisers authorised by the Washington Conference. In his opinion it was the best thing they evei did. it was useless to pretend there was a warlike spirit in Britain. The whole country was in favour of peace.

Even the League of Nations sometimes looked towards the British Navy to control the peace of the world. The Labour motion was defeated by 318 votes til 103. Mr Duff-Copper’s amendment, "That tbe House, recognising the Government’s efforts had been constantly directed to tbe maintenance of peace and a reduction of armaments and the advancement ol the authority of the League, remains opposed to Britain assuming extended dangerous obligations embodied in the Protocol of 1921. and approves of the Government s policy, was carried l»v to GG votes.