The Guardian And Evening Star, with which is incorporated the West Coast Times. FRIDAY, NOVEMBER 23, 1927. THE CHINESE SITUATION.

Hokitika Guardian, 25 November 1927, Page 2

The Guardian And Evening Star, with which is incorporated the West Coast Times. FRIDAY, NOVEMBER 23, 1927. THE CHINESE SITUATION.

The situation in C hinn was discussed lately by the London Chamber ot Commerce, during which the general outlook was reviewed very plainly. Frederick Anderson, Chairman of the China Section said that was difficult to see even a glimmer of light on the horizon. It was sixteen years since the revolution of 1911 and each succeeding year seemed to have brought China neaiei to the vortex of complete chaos. The latter day politicians in that country had been very successful in pulling down the pillars of state, hut when it came to building up they had almost all proved to he complete failures. The one thing they seemed to ho unable to do was to govern China. Many of those who claimed to be the most progressive had allied themselves with the worst Government in the whole world—a Government, one of whose avowed alms was to create chaos throughout the Far East', and whose hostility to Britain was shown at every opportunity. Through the medium of the China Committee ho had endeavoured to impress oil the Government the futility of trying to placate such a combination by the surrender of treaty rights, hut little headway had keen made. The Government had openly adopted what was called a conciliatory policy towards China, blit be could not- help thinking {that. the effect of that policy so far had been to give encouragement to The worst elements in political life in China, and to discourage those interests which were friendly to us and which represented the more solid portion of the community. The China Committee had emphasised in their communications to the Government that the treaty ports were the only plates of security in the whole country; that in the interests of China herself, quite as much as in the interests of foreigners, the safety and security of those |»orts should he maintained, and that the influence of the Powers should he directed to t.;>holding the treaties as long as present conditions in China prevailed. It was quite misleading to call these treaties unequal. Perhaps the fiscal clauses in these treaties might have become somewhat antiquated, but very important modifications of thsoe clauses had already been agreed to. There was a miniature League of Nations in China which was permanently in session, in the Diplomatic Body in Peking, But although all the Great Powers were represented on it, that body had keen able to do very little to protect foreign interests or to take any steps to prevent disruption in China. One often heard that China must Be allowed to “work out her own salvation,” as if that were the only safe course for the Powers to steer, but after sixteen years of strife it looked as if China were busy working out, not her own salvation, but her damnation, and doing it with both hands. It was doubtful if it was either safe or wise fo stand aside and give Russia a free hand to create complete chaos in the most populous country in the world.

If they were united it would not require a very great etlort on the pail of the Treaty Powers, or even on the part of some of them, to co-operate with the large and influential portion of the Chinese people which was tired of this miserable strife and which was longing for settled Government, for j>oa<*o and security. Ihe Government had saved Shanghai from being drawn into the vortex. After the dreadful experience of Hankow lie hoped they would be careful not to run any unnecessary risks at Tientsin, and that no changes in the treaties would lie agreed to until settled Government bad been re-established in Chinn. Mr Stanley Dodwell, Deputy-Chairman of the Section, then addressed the meeting and said that he had recently returned from China, but that lie hesitated to express any definite opinions on the Chinese question because, owing Lo llie constant variations in the situation, it was difficult to follow affairs closely. One conclusion he had arrived at during his visit- was that nationalism was practically non-existent in China; it was submerged by greed, avarice and the lust for power. ’I he surrender of Hankow bad proved such a iiirout <.l isiistor that he hoped the British Government would not risk any negotiations in regard to Tientsin until an authoritative Government had been established in China. There was a great need for a change of policy by the Government. Their present policy of conciliation and patience was equivalent to a policy of doing as little as possible and the result of it was that our prestige in China was very low. A firmer policy was necessary; we ought to make a definite declaration that we intended in the future to adhere to out- treat.\ rights and not to agree to any increases in the surtaxes which the Nationalist. Government attempted to levy until there was a recognised Government with which to treat, jt

would lie a good tiling to endeavour to secure the co-operation of the Japanese. The time was ripe for co-opera-tion with the Japenese and the China Comm it toe had been pressing the Government to take this step. He considered that the bulk of the Chinese population was tired of Bolshevism. He was glad to see that the Chinese merchants were taking much more interest in the political situation than they did formerly. Through the China Committee, Mr Anderson and lie were pressing the Government to adopt a. firmer policy. to seek closer co-operation with (lie Japanese and to abandon negotiations in Tientsin for the time being.