HOUSE OF LORDS.

Hokitika Guardian, 18 November 1927, Page 2

HOUSE OF LORDS.

LORD CECIL’S STARTLING DISCLOSURES. (Australian & N.Z. Cable Association.) LONDON, Nov. IG. In the Lords, as nn outcome of reforenee to the question of foreign policy, by Lord Parmooil. Ibrd Cecil made a personal explanation regarding his resignation. He said it was the culmination of .a series of events such as the Labour Government’s rejection of the Treaty of Mutual Assistance followed by the Conservatives rejection of the 1921 Geneva Protocol. He went to the naval conference, conscious that his instructions would cause serious difficulty, and exactly what he anticipated, occurred. He was repeatedly put in the position of situations, seemingly ,w|bolly indeuwlsihle. thereby creating tlie impression that Britain was lukewarm on the subject of disarmament. Lord Cecil narrated several instances of what he described as departmental obstruction. Indeed representatives of the Admiralty scarcely concealed their indifference, if not hostility to the whole proceedings. He did not infer that this was the attitude of the whole Cabinet; nevertheless ho was unable to convince Cabinet of the importance of taking a stronger line, with technical advisers owing to the harmfulne;s of many incidents. He had asked for a free hand personally to decide minor matters. This was declined. He trusted Cabinet hail now seen the result of too great a deference t oexpert advice and would give Lord Cushendum (formerly Sir Ronald AlcNeil) greater support than it felt able to accord him (Lord Cecil). Lord Cecil said that when lie returned from Geneva, he was exhausted and discouraged, and felt that though not a complete failure the advance was not commensurate with his objective. Above all he felt the fundamental difference between his and the Cabinet’s views on importance of international effort to disarm. He referred to Air Churchill’s declaration after the breakdown. when he (Air Churchill) Raid: “England is unable now, and T hoi" never will in the future embody in the national agreement words binding us to the principle of a Mathematical Party of naval strength.” Lord Cecil continued: Though he did not agree, he was certain Mr Churchill was convinced his warning was essential for the safety of England. He was equally sure that if t’’" ‘ persisted ,it would hang lolt and bur the door against nnv hope of agreement with American on naval disarmaments. There was no doubt that the moment Mr Churchill realised that H" delegates agreed on parity, even though ho received an express telegraphic sanction, to do so, he began to press on his Cabinet colleagues the necessity of avoiding what ho regarded as a disastrous concession. The culmination of the many te’egraiiM, was the recall of Lord Cecil, who traced at length the subsequent negotiations, and added that the Government had taken a course which lie believed caused the failure of vital negotiations. If he had remained in office lie would have had to take the responsibility for that as well as to defend it. That was impossible. Lord Balfour regretted that Lord Cecil thought it necessary to level serious charges at liis late colleagues. He did not .see how the course of events at Geneva justified the extreme course adopted by Lord Cecil, who it appeared to him (Lord Balfour) had allowed its inevitable difference to accumulate to a point at which his temper gave way. He did not believe that two great pacific countries would fail to reach a friendly agreement on the point at issue Britain did not object to America building as many small crafts as she thought necessary, hut we had duties to perform to Empire and to the people_ of the Homeland. “Lot us say to America—do not ask us to diminish small craft beyond the point we deem necessary for our safety. Surely that lino of policy was not so inherently unreasonable that America will even refuse to listen.” Lord Balfour regarded the Geneva conference as interrupted and not ended. Compared with the great issues, the differences that had arisen wore small and petty.