The Guardian And Evening Star, with which is incorporated the West Coast Times. WEDNESDAY, OCTOBER 19, 1927. NAVAL PROTECTION.

Hokitika Guardian, 19 October 1927, Page 2

The Guardian And Evening Star, with which is incorporated the West Coast Times. WEDNESDAY, OCTOBER 19, 1927. NAVAL PROTECTION.

The question of naval armaments recurs very frequently. The cable news brought the .subject up very pointedly recently. According to a critic who can claim to speak with same amount of professional authority and expert knowledge, “the Navy is no longer equal to the task of the defence of the trail© of the Empire.’’ Much of Mr Spanner’s indictment of the Admiralty seems to he taken up with technical details, and it is noteworthy that ho condemns the building of large battleships and cruisers altogether, on the ground that they ar© and must always be vulnerable to attack from the air. But the question of the adequacy of tlio British Navy for its duties, as has been remarked, is a matter of grave Imperial and national importance, and it should not he confused by association with subordinate or irrelevant issues. Still the general question will recur, and not necessarily in regard to the style of armaments only. There is the matter of the general policy to he considered. Limitations have been discussed and it was rather remarkable that while Great Britain and Japan were in mutual agreement, the United States was not disposed to agree to the limitations on the lines suggested. The issue has been put by an exchange in the following way: What Britain and the other great Powers have now to decide in regard to naval policy is not so much what type of warship they ought to build, but whether they should enlarge or limit their building programmes. This is apparently a simple question, yet so far it lias nob been found possible to discuss it solely on its own merits. At the recent Naval Conference, for example, Britain and America were undoubtedly anxious to arrive at some definite conclusion on this point, but they failed. As the “Round Table” puts the case, Britain woulc\ not accept the American proposal to build a few more large and heavily-armed cruisers, as against her own number of smaller cruisers, “because it might bo interpreted as a foral surrender of naval equality”; while the United States was equally determined not to allow Britain a small excess in naval tonnage, in the form of small cruisers, “because it might be interpreted as a surrender of the sacred doctrine of parity.” And so the Conference dispersed without effecting anything of moment, and a great opportunity for reducing the world’s expenditure on navies and war preparations was lost. It seems most unfortunate that so much stress has been laid, both by Britain and the United State, on bis question of “parity” or equality. On one side it is impracticable and on the other unnecessary. The “National Review” is certainly not to be regarded as pro-American, but it deprecates strongly any suggestion of naval rivalry between the two Powers. As "Britain knows quite well that the Americans are rich enough to lay down ten warships to our one, if they feel inclined, where is the sense in talking about parity? The Americans will in any case build the navy that they think they need, and Britain similarly will consider her own requirements. Of course this means that conferences on the subject must be, on the whole, ineffectual. But cessation of war will depend mostly upon “the will to peace,” and the chief use of such discussions is not to reach formal agreements, but to produce an amicable understanding. Great Britain and the United States are not likely to be war-time enemies, sq tha£ with the many expressions of

good will between the nations, it should not be difficult to come to an understanding as regards “the will to peace.” The conferences serve their purposes best on matters of this nature where there is not too much prominence given to the expert and the politician. When the politician is an expert his position at any conference table is a foregone conclusion. It is clear that the two nations must provide adequately- for their own naval protection. Their individual requirements differ to a groat extent in the type of warships required. In considering “parity” or “equality” that condition should have more prominence. However, we may expect, the good sense of the leaders to recognise the facts in their right perspective, and the people as a whole will he content to leave matters at that knowing full well that behind all the diplomatic utterances is “the will to jieace.’’