BRITISH PARLIAMENT

Hokitika Guardian, 28 July 1927, Page 3

BRITISH PARLIAMENT

BKITISJI VIEWS. STATK.MENT IX COMMONS. (Australian it N.Z. Cable Association.) (Received this day at 10.15 a.in.) CONDON, July 21. In the Commons, Sir A. Chamberlain replying to a question said, alter a lull discussion, .Mr Bridgeman and Lord Cecil had returned to (lonova. Cabinet trusted the conference would reach a successful conci'usion. In the circumstances it would be improper to make a detailed' exposition of the British position or to comment on the other Rowers’ proposals. Instead he proposed to read a written statement designed only to remove a misunderstanding, which, if not corrected, might impede the prospects ol success. Despite all British elForts in Ceneva. serious misapprehension as to Britain's aims prevailed in some quarters. Britain was even charged with desiring

to destroy the. equality of sea power of the United States and the British Umpire. There is no foundation for such a suspicion. Cabinet understood Mr Coolidge’s invitation was based on a desire to develop the 'Washington Conference by diminishing yet further naval expenditure and maintaining national security. Cabinet was in complete agreement with that two-fold aim and desired to measure the merit of every proposal by a degree to which it furthered a two-fold purpose. On this principle Britain desired to diminish the size also of the armament of battleships, not altering the numbers fixed at Washington. For the same reason it suggested the limitation ot the number, also of the armament of large fighting cruisers, on the principle that this would greatly diminish the national expenditure without endangering the national security. Questions connected with small cruisers were more complicated. The strengths of fleets could he tested in figures and compared in the precison of their primary functions to fight other fleets. Speaking broadly they could be com-, pared to each other, but there was no such simple way of looking at the subject in the case of small cruisers employed for police purposes in peace time, and for protection of lines of communication in war time. Geograpicnl consideration could not rationally ignored. It would hardly be denied, as was clearly stated in Mr Coolidge’s invitation, that such vessels were of vital necessity to the widely spread Empire whose most populous parts depend for their daily bread on sea-borne trade, which might perish if they failed to defend external routes. LONDON. July 27.

Sea routes upon which Britain’s existence depended lay largely in the narrow waters of other States. That was not the case with the United States, whose most important lines lay either on land within her own frontiers or lay by sea along her own coasts or in the great oceans. Those considerations received due regard at Washington in 1922, and had not since then lost any of their importance. While urging the special difficulties due to the geographical position, Britain was far from claiming the least right to dictate a smaller cruiser policy for other powers. She accepted the principle which she understood underlay Mr Coolidge’s policy, that no maritime power should maintain a larger navy than was required for her own security. To translate that into figures was for the reasons given more difficult in the case of small cruisers than for the larger type of service vessels. Anything resembling a quasi-permanent formula adopted for battleships at Washington was quite inapplicable and inadequate for vessels designed for the purposes which of necessary varied with the geographical and economic position of the several powers concerned. It became even inapplicable when the strength was estimated in terms of gross tonnage without reference to numbers or armaments. I.wo nations which possessed a hundred thousand tons of battleships might ho regarded without serious error as so far equal in fighting power hut no such statement could reasonably he made about two nations, one having ten ten-thous-and ton cruisers and the other twenty five-thousand tenners. Ail depended on the circumstances, though naval experts would probably agree that if it came to fighting the more numerous but smaller vessels would stand a poor chance against fewer but more powerful ships. If this be so the country which for any reason was obliged to distribute her available tonnage among smaller units, would be at a permanent disadvantage compared with one which was able to adopt a different scheme. There would be a nominal parity but a real inequality. This of course was merely an illustration, but it sufficed to explain why in the Government’s opinion no provisions open to that kind of criticism should be given. That international authority was already possessed by those parts of the treaty of 'Washington which dealt with strength in numbers. LONDON, .Tuly 27.

Sir A. 'Chamberlain continuing, said that in the Government’s opinion there need be no difficulty in arriving at a temporary agreement about the immediate future of cruiser building, but the Empire could not bo ashed to give such a temporary agreement the appearance of an immutable principle which might be treated as a precedent. Any other course would inevitably be interpreted in the future as involving a formal surrender by the Empiie of maritime equality, the consummation of which the Government was well assured, was not part of the present policy.

Mr Cl.vnes ashed whether an opportunity would be given to discuss the question when the House resumes in November ?

Sir A. Chamberlain said: “I will undertake on behalf of the Prime Minister that such an opportunity will 1m given.” Replying to Mr Kenworthy, Sir A. Chamberlain said the Government regarded it as inexpedient and almost irp proper to enter into any detailed discussion while the Conference still was sitting.

Mr Thurtle ashed: "Ts it not a fact that each power is going to insist on its own national security, making an agreement utterly impossible. In the circumstances should not the protracted farce end at earliest moment.’’ Sir A. Chamberlain: “I regret such a tone words. The Government must itself expressly and immediately from such a reference. The whole basis of the Conference is to reconcile the limitation of armaments with national security, and that is the only basis whereon a Conference for limitation of armaments can over lie brought to a successful issue.”