NAVAL LIMITATION

Hokitika Guardian, 22 June 1927, Page 2

NAVAL LIMITATION

THE OPENING SESSION

(Australian A X.Z. Cable Association.)

GENEVA, June 20. The opening session of the Naval Limitations Conference was not an impressive function. The historic feature was that the United States participated for the first time in any Conference held at Geneva since the formation of the League of Nations. The early proceedings emphasised that the conference was breaking new ground. It hail no precedents to guide it. and no agenda before it, lor, though it is the sequel to the Washington Conference, it is unlike it. because only three powers are represented, while the Washington gathering was more embracing, and it assembled in the lace of a clear-cut programme.

The speeches were entirely devoid oi oratory or eloquence, all being carefully read documents. A BRITISH STATE AI ENT. Air AV. C. Bridgenian (Britain) specially emphaised that Britain’s proposals were made with the consent of all the Dominion's representatives, but, in accordance with the decisions of the Imperial Conference, any resulting Treaty would lie made in the names of the heads of the various Dominions agreeing io participate. He also went out of his way to stress that Britain s proposals were formed to make it easier, not hard' r. for France and Italy to join the eontcrence. He added that he believed the success ot the Conference depended more upon pi’ain language:—a statement of what each nation wanted in the shape oi a navy, and why—than in rhetoric. Britain is represented by Air AV. C. Bridgenian. Lord Cecil, and Vice-Ad-miral Field.

New Zealand is represented by Fir James Parr, Lord Jellicoo, and RearAdmiral Beale.

There are lot) journalists present, representing newspapers in all parts of the world. THE. CONVENOR. The Conference has cabled President Coolidge, expressing its most profound appreciation of his humane and wise initiative, and stating that it is hopeful of having satisfactory results. President Coolidge has replied, -stating that an Anglo-Amoriean-Japanese agreement, preventing naval competition. wotti’d lastingly cement present, good relations, and would constitute a definite step towards a general limitation of armaments. America would make the utmost effort to ensure an agreement. After fixing the times for the Committee meetings, the Conference adjourned. AMERICAN SCHEDULE DETAILED. „ GENEVA, June 20. In his speech at the Naval Conference the American. Air Gibson, prefaced his speech with a message front President Coolidge declaring that the LT.S.A. President was only interpreting the overwhelming sentiments of the American people in stating that the United States would do its utmost to make an agreement possible. Air Gibson added that it could be assumed that the conference was starting in agreement on the following points, namely :—That, in the interest of an international undertaking, there shout'd he no competition between the three Powers in naval armaments; that their respective navies should he maintained at the lowest level compatible with national security, and should never he of such a size and character as to warrant the suspicion of aggressive intent; that future constructions should be kept at a minimum.

The methods and principles of limitation set down by the AVashington Treaty, he said, should he extended to all the categories of combatant vessels of the three Powers . The United States hail no intention of maintaining a force as a threat to any power. It did not desire to initiate a competitive programme. The American suggestions were based on the following considerations :

That the ratio principles of the AA’ashington Treaty should lie applied to cruisers, destroyers and submarines.

That any agreement of the three powers to limit the building of auxiliary vessels should he co-torminous with the Washington Treaty, and should contain a provision respecting revision in the event of an extensive building programme by any power not a party to the agreement. That for the purpose of future limitation auxiliaries should he divided into four categories, three of which—namely, cruisers, destroyers and submarines —should he subject to limitation, which the fourth class, of negligent combatant value, not subject to limitation, the cruiser class to include the surrnct combatant vessel’s of from three to ten thousand tons; the destroyer class to include all the surface combatant vessels of from six hundred to three thousand tons, and of a speed above 17 knots per hour.

The United States, he said, recognised that naval requirements were relative, and that if these limits were adjusted for one power, they should he so adjusted for all. If any of the Powers proposed to lower the tonnage levels of the auxiliary craft, the United States would welcome them, to obviate the scraping of comparatively new vessels in one class simultaneously with the building of vessels in another class. -Mr Gibson added that the question of the abolition of submarines must be universal between all the naval powers in order to- be effective.

BBITISH PLAN LAUDED. GENEVA, June 20. An examination of the proposals made by the British naval experts puts them in a different light from that which the actual speeches convey to a layman.

Interviewed, one expert declared: “The British proposals are far more comprehensive than the American scheme. The proposed extension of the life of capital ships alone would effect an important lessening of the burden of naval armaments on the taxpayer. AVe suggest a definite limit to the number and jxiwer of cruisers, and we favour a clear statement from every nation of its actual requirements in cruisers, destroyers, and submarines. America does not pro-

pose to reduce the power and size of the capital ships. While the suggestion for the maintenance of the 5 —5 —3 ration for cruisers, destroyers and submarines leaves a wide range of sizes, theoretically. It allows smaller Powers to build according to their capacity. Judging from their experience after the Washington Treaty, the size permitted would become the

standard. A close examination shows that the maintenance of ratios is only in the total tonnage, instead of in the numbers of vessels. It means that America would be enabled to add considerably to her cruiser tonnage. Britain would have to reduce hers, and Japan would remain unchanged.Vet the effect would be that Ameri-

ca. would he able to scrap many of her old, worn-out cruisers, and replace them with now and more powerful ones. America’s programme would he really to increase, and not reduce, naval armaments ; because her proposed reductions do not apply to new ships. Our concrete proposal to limit the number and size of ships constitutes a real step forward in the direction of disarmament. America’s does not. Similarly, Japan proposes ;i

shorter life and quicker replacement of ships than we do. Under the Japanese proposition, Britain would havo sixty-two cruisers of all stizes; tho United States fifteen; and Japan 29. The figures for destroyers would he; Britain 173, America 280, Japan 101; for submarines, Britain 01. America 11 1, and Japan 71. The United States is unlikely to accept these. Fortunately, Japan has intimated that she is willing to view sympathetically our suggestion that the Powers should openly state their actual requirements in the various categories of ships.’’ Replying to a question, the expert said that France and Italy would be welcomed with open arms if they were willing to -join the Conference, oven now. In any case, Britain was anxious for their adherence to any agreement that the three Powers might reach.

BRITAIN'S STANDPOINT. GENEVA. June 20 The British proposals fix the life-of —j tlio eight inch gun cruisers at twentyfour years; that of destroyers at twenty years: and that of submarines at fifteen.

Mr AV. 0. Bridgem.au (Britain), in t, hanking President Coolidge for his invitation, mentioned that the British Admiralty proposals were actually in the hands of Air Baldwin before the invitation was received. He regretted that- France and Italy were absent. Tho time was ripe for an extension of the AVashington principle of limitation. He thought the Conference would be successful if each country franklv stated what naval force was wanted by it; and why, based purely on defensive considerations. He defined the British Empire’s position according to the following factors:— Firstly: The insular position of England, being dependent for raw materials and food, and for its vers existence, on the free passage of the seas, which rendered the discussion of naval disarmament more difficult for her than for any other country. Secondly: The length ol her trade rentes.

Thirdly; The extensive coastline of the British Empire and the long lines of communications to he protected. Mr Bridgenian emphasised that he spoke with the consent of the Dominions’ representatives. Whatever treaty might result from this Conference would he made in the names of the heads of the States participating, the several parts of the British Empire being shown by appropriate geographical entities, in lieu oi plenipotentiaries. Tils' object of Britain, lie said, was economy, but she made a reservation, namely, that owing to the position of Britain in relation to Europe, it was _ necessary to guard against any increase of naval strength of non-sig-natories to any agreement relating to the United States, Japan and , the British Empire. Therefore, provision for reconsideration would be needed, hut he hoped the European Powers would adhere to any agreement reached.

DEFENCE OF BRITISH PROPOSALS. GENEVA, June 20. It is pointed out that under the AVashington Agreement, Britain and America must lay down fifteen new capital ships during the decade commencing in 1941. The British proposal reduces this, hut it retains the 5 5—3 ratio, lowering the first cost of the maintenance charges. AVhile fixing the life period of the auxiliaries, it reduces the cost of replacement. Aloreover, a reduction of the battleships from thirty-five to thirty thousand tons, and of the guns from sixteen to 13.5 inches, are logical curtailments, not affecting the relative strength, while aircraft carriers of twenty-five thousand tons are fully practicable, as also a reduction of their guns. It is logical to apply tho 55 —3 ratio to the ten thousand ton cruisers which operate with battle fleets. The possibility of producing seven thousand five hundred ton vessels, with six inch guns, with the ~ lifiealions of cruisers, will be ered, also the checking of the increasing size of capital ships or cruisers it is thought desirable, while submarines are retained, to introduce two types—one for harbour defence and the other for more distant operations.

NEW YORK PRESS OPINION. NEAV YORK, June 20. Editorial opinion here expresses satisfaction at the frankness with which the programmes have been advanced at Geneva, and shows the confidence that an important agreement will be reached. The New York World says: The proposals contain few surprises, but the frankness shown promises a. businesslike dispatch. The British suggestion to cut the battleship tonnage may he objected to, as it means reopening tbc AVashington Treaty, but it reopens it in the right direction. The New York Times says: The hope that the second Naval Limitation Conference will end in a harmonious satisfying agreement is not unwarranted. Each delegation will contend for what it believes that its own national interests require, but the cause is so important that a working agreement will he found.