THE MADNESS OF RUSSIA’S CHINESE POLICY.

Hokitika Guardian, 29 April 1927, Page 4

THE MADNESS OF RUSSIA’S CHINESE POLICY.

(l'y Edward Foord, in the “London

Weekly.") For better or for worse we have been forced to send troops for the protection of British subjects and interests in China, and there is a possibility that our garrison at Shanghai may become involved in the internecine warfare of the distracted Middle Kingdom. Whether that he so or not. 11 is clear enough that in China itsell North is arrayed against Soutn —not for the first time—and it is interesting lu consider the situation and its possibilities, especially from the militaic standpoint. There is in this country a rat hoi 1 00 strong propensity to cousidei "tofu, rc in which Chinese are iuvohed as

something in the nature ol a joke. The impression dates hack to 0111 experiences in 1810-12 and in 1857-00. when, as a general rule, small wellequipped detachments of British and French troops gained easy victories over the miserably armed and uttoih untrained Chinese provincial militia. But even in these campaigns, though contemporary chroniclers made somewhat unfeeling mirth with Chinese matchlocks, “barbarian-frightening’' helmets and gaudy banners, there wn> nut infrequently afforded proof that the half-armed or unarmed Chincsi militiamen could fight bravely enoiig!

at need. General Gough, aitemaid Lord Gough, of Punjab fame. wh commanded the first- Chinese Wai mure than once testified to the braver, of his opponents, and Gough was man almost fearless. In both conflict cases occurred in which Chinese XOl them troops stood their ground t the death.

CIIINA’S WARLIKE RECORD

The truth is that, thong!) China ha-iievi-r boon an aggressively conquering military Power, the Chinese pea-ant at any rate in the North, makes an admirable soldier; and. upon the whole. Chili’s warlike record is as good as that of any country. In the first centuries of the Christian, era she waelearly the greatest military Power it. Asia. and. despite her generally nonajitfrossivil policy, ou one occasion ({)() a. 0.) a C’liinose army marched westward to the Caspian Sea. Stull an event is to-day ol antiquarian interest. lmt the complete dei'ent ol‘ the warlike Gurkhas in 1792 by a Chinese army, which penetrated to the very heart of the Himalayan fastnesses of Nepal, is an event sufficiently near our own times, and does not indicate that the warriors of the Middle Kingdom had degenerated in the eighteenth century from wli.-it they were in the first. The French in the early eighties in Tong-king certainly did not find the Chinese regulars and ‘‘Black Nag' levies contemptible adversaries. I Inresistance opposed to the invaders was very obstinate; the French suffered a good many minor reverses and one considerable defeat.. Often the Chinese displaced real lieroi>m ; the story of the “Black Flag” soldier who died at his post ;it the gate of Sonia, calmly doing his duty in the lace ol 3.1)03 enemies, i» an epic episode—it reads like the Lay of Horn! ins and his friends at the P uis Snhlii-iiis. THE “BOXER" TROUBLES. The Japanese are a martial race, thoroughly capable of appreciating bravery in friend and fo -. and their opinion was that in the disastrous war of 18!) 1-95 the Cliine-e often showed (liemselv.'- worthy adverse* ies. ( -r----mption was rife in the Chinese unitary and naval administration ; hi t there were generals who were not afraid to light; and the men themselves. ill-armed, ill-supplied, olten illfed, more than once made a good stand. They fought well at Ring-yang, and very steadily on several other occasions, showing that they needed only adequate training and lair leading to he worthy opponents ol the warriors el Japan. Xi.-i- did thev do badly in the “Boxer” warfare oi 1909. The forces which opposed the advance ot the Japaiitse and Europeans on Peking included only a single division of regular troops, about 10 660 strung, under General Nich. The effectiveness of Xieh's division was much hamj ered by indecision in the ilig' l C out a: aml ; it was surrounded and eicumb-’r-■l! by crowds of ibar ' V-.-ies. Yet under - : I i . s. trnips, by n: 1 (, i ina, loughl ste.-i-h,;. , their artillery practice was stated to lie quite admirable. To-day there is no lack of trained soldiers in China—there are for too many for the peace of the country—and they possess any amount of munitions of war. Against Europeans they are at a disadvantage by reason of their lack of aeroplanes and tanks; hut they seem to have an abundance oi artillery and plenty of machine gulls. How many men of one sort, and another there are under arms is utterly uncertain; but the total number is unquestionably large. flow the conflict will go is a question difficult to answer. The Soiith-

enters have gained at the outset a considerable advantage, hut hardly by reason of military strength. The success at Hankow was due to treachery ; the victory over Sun Cliunn Fang.

even if it were indeed a military success counts for comparatively little, for the troops of Glieh-kiaiig have never been counted as more than mediocre. The ability to break up one j. ill-organised force by treachery and to e rout another of inferior quality does not necessarily connote the power to defeat the formidable armies of the North. THE PRESENT CONFLICT. Always supposing that treachery is not at work among his generals an ! , soldiers. the balance of warlike , strength is probably 011 the side of , Marshal Chang Tso-iiti. As far as fighting quality is concerned. the j Chinese Northerners have always surpassed those of the South. The material of Chang’s rank and file is i really the best. The people of the seven northern provinces are physically a splendid race of men. strong, hardy solver, able to subsist on very little, stolidly brave, indifferent to death. Their martial superiority ha? always been marked ; they have invariably furnished the best soldiers to I the armies of the empire ill the past. In our first Chinese War it was more than once noted that the “Tartars” (i. 0.. Northerners and Manclms) fought better than the Southern provincial militia, with whom we had for the most part to contend. Man for man. the average Chinamen of the north arc hotter than their southern countrymen. It is probable, also, if not certain, that the Northern forces are much superior in organisation, armament, and training. They may perhaps be outnumbered, but this is not very probable; and in fair fight their undeniable superiority in other respects should give them the victory. Treachery among his subordinates the Northern Dictator may have to 011- . counter, but so far lie has grappled , successfully with treason in his forces; , and it seems that they are much less , likely to he disintegrated than the army of the amiable but unfortunate Wu-Rei-fu. Apart from this consideration. the chances of success appear to tie in favour of the Northerners.

'l]he strangest factor in the situation is the position of the Soviet Government of Russia. 111 order to embarrass Britain it is coquetting with and aggravating an aggressive spirit

lining the Chinese Xationulists. N’i imjrtinl observer, much less one win hits nay acquaintance with Chinese history, can lail to sympathise with a reviving spirit of patriotism. It is net in the least prohnhlo that, in the end. the Chinese, ns a people, will develop any savagely cggi'c.-siva anti-inr-eign sentiment. Hut lar the prevent tie l-'oviet emissaries are doing their hast la fcsijr j a tinunt. a'd. shonid tlay s;:eit . there may he a somewhat : njileasi nt ye .'atio’.i ahead. ;!• ! tine prim ' s', in r . a ill not l.r 11 m.:.. ii.it Ka- n■ . • • p t e e in.' i. i .in inly. ( liina is i.t. and never has teen, a great naval Power; and without naval power she can make no effective attack on Brilain's empire in the Past, for invasion of onr Indian possessions hv land are without the hounds of practical strategy. Very much the same reasoning applies to Japan. Frame is. mi doubt, rather more vulnerable to land attack, but sihe should normally he able to defend her possessions in Cochin China. Hut the Russian Asiatic Umpire—huge, weakly defended. and to-day thoroughly disorganised marelies with China on a line of some l.nO miles. The easternmost provinces on the Amur, are in a peculiar manner exposed to invasion at the hands of an aggressive China; and it is hard to see how under such conditions they emit! he defended. They are isolated at the end of a single badly-maintained niul poorly-equipped railway line several thousand miles in length, along which all r?inforcenients and supplies must he passed. Russia v, as unable to hold her ground in 1694-5 against Japan, though the Island Empire had to bring t’>.'ry man and every pound of supplies Iran her base by sea. A teorganised China, bent on aggression, will he e.Mifrouted by no such difficulties us those which beset Japan, while as regards. man-power she has at least double the strength of Russia.

China has no reason to think well of. or be grateful to, her northern neighbour, which has either filched or seized hundreds of thousands of square miles of former Chinese territory, and, but for the events of 1901-5. would lane

appropriated much more. As for Russia, the lesson of history is plain for all who have eyes to see. It has always been Russia (or perhaps we should say the territory now hold by Russia) which lias been the first and sorest suflerer at the hands of attack across | Asia. It is a matter of geography. I Russia must suffer because she lies J across the patli of a. .Mongol advance. The Chinaman is not the Mongol of the thirteenth century, hut lie has | twice the millions of Russia, and if lie once became aggressive Russia would again, as in the past. fare hadl.v enough. In plain truth, if China deliberately arm and organise for a war. of conquest there is no land Rower in the world capable of resisting the impact. And of all the world's land Powers Russia is perhaps, in proportion of her vast extent, the least capable of resistance. She might see her Asiatic Empire fail back into Mongd hands. It is not at all an impossibility as far as regards the easternmost regions. it is an unpleasant probability. Vet the purblind intriguers at Moscow, in order to gain a momentary advantage. are deliberately provoking a recrudescence of conditions which in the thirteenth century for a time obliterated Russia from the map of Europe.