JUTLAND BATTLE

Hokitika Guardian, 16 March 1927, Page 4

JUTLAND BATTLE

JELLICOE’S TACTICS. Oceans of ink and torrents oi words have poured out in the interminable controversies about the Battle of Jutland, but according to a participant in the action, Commander A. Marsden, the story and the battle can bo told in a very few words. Commander Marsden commanded the destroyer Ardent at Jutland. His vessel ran into a German battleship division during the night of May 31st, 1916, and in less than five minutes she was destroyed by the enemy gunfire, Commander Marsden being the sole survivor. Before the Ardent met her fate, however, she sank a German battleship with a torpedo. There was no mystery about the battle, said Commander Marsden. Acting cm advice received by the Intelligence Department, the British Meet actually put to sea the night before l he battle, and on the next day the two forces were closing on each other diagonally cm opposite courses. As the Grand Fleet started out the night before it was much nearer Germany than the German Fleet was near Eng land. About 3.30 p.m. on May 31st tiie battle cruisers came into collision when about 50 miles in advance of their battleships. Lord Beatty, who commanded the British battle cruisers, had the superiority at the outset, but, in a very short time two of his ships blew up, leaving him in a position of inferiority, consequently he began to retire on the main battle fleet, a thing which the German battle cruisers bail themselves been doing. The destroyer Ardent was ahead of the British flagship Iron Duke, and towards 6 p.m. the sound of guns could be heard and flashes seen. 'The mist, however, prevented anything being seen for more than about four miles. Jutland really never was a Lallio fleet action. It had been principally an affair of outposts—battle-eruiseis—-in winch the Germans inflicted more damage than the British. When the Germans saw the British battle tlcei, however, their whole idea was to escape, and to effect that they twisted and turned, made smoke screens, and delivered destroyer attacks, eventually being lost sight of. All that could be soon in the mist was a shadow, a glimpse of a funnel or mast, or a wisp of smoke, but even witji such poor and indistinct targets to aim at the British gunners inflicted such heavy damage that many of the German ships were laid up for weeks and even months.

“There was no secrecy about- it,” added Commander Marsden. “ There is nothing more to he known than v hat l have said. We met the German Fleet, and from the moment of meeting our battleships they endeavoured to escape, and they effected their escape. 'That is the German side of it. T l oin our point of view we had our Great Elect out and it enabled us to hold the seas for two years afterwards. In other words, we had the command of the seas, ft was an extraordinarily lucky thing that we had in command of the Elect a man who appreciated his responsibility. He knew lie had command of tin' sea. that command he was going to hang on to, and lie was not going to endanger that freedom being in any way weakened. People may discuss Lord Jellieoc’s tactics. 'The answer is that for the rest of the war we retained command ol the seas. . . . Ilisforv "ill prove that

he carried out the very thing ho was sent to command the Fleet to do—to retain the freedom and command of the seas.”

•TUTSAND DIEUKRENCKS. j Australian & N.Z. Cable Association.! LONDON. .March 14. The controversy arising from Mr ( liurc-iiill’s comments on Jutland, and Evan 'Thomas’s rejoinder that he, with the Fifth Battle Squadron was unable to follow Admiral Beatty’s battle. (ruj.sers when lie turned towards the Germans on 31 st May. 1916. because Beatty’s signals did not reach him, cropped up in the Commons. Mr Rcllairs asked if the details ol the signal was recorded on Thomas’s flagship Barham that day. Mr Bridgoman replied that the signal referred to in pages 12 and 106 of tile Official narrative of .Jutland, was recorded in the Barham’s signal log as received at 2.30 in the afternoon, by a •searchlight from the Lion: “ Take up position now to form submarine screen, when course is altered to S.S.E.” The executive signal to turn is recorded in the Ruihum's signal log as received at 2.37 in the afternoon by flag from the l.icni: “Alter course, leaders together, remainder in succession to S.R.E., speed iwenty-two knots.” Between those units the Barham signalled to Ter own destroyers at- 2.34 : “'lake up position lor screen oil altering course to S.K.E.” 'This signal appears in the log of Flotilla Leader Fearless.