THE MYSTERY OF JUTLAND.

Hokitika Guardian, 31 July 1926, Page 4

THE MYSTERY OF JUTLAND.

liOW DID THE GERMANS ESCAPE

(By H. W. Wilson). Ten years ago, on May 31, 191 G, at 2.28 p.m., tho first shot was fired by Lord Beatty’s cruiser in tho Ba/ttle of Jutland, tho greatest and the most unsatisfactory narval battle of modern . times. Before noon on Alay 30, by intercepted German wireless signals, Sir Reginald Hall, the Director of Naval Intelligence nt tho British Admiralty, learnt that a part of the German Fleet was putting to sea that night. It was known that the Germans were bound for the Skagerrack, and it was calculated that they would be west of Jutland at two next afternoon, at a point which tho Admiralty fixed by calculation. This all-important news is said to have been sent to Lord Jellicoe, the Conimender-in-Chief of the Grand Fleet. The essential matter was, then, to be at this point by 2 p.m. ol the 31st. But it will be seen that Lord Jellicoe’s fleet did not reach that point till at least two hours later. Most of the fticts about the battle were concealed by the censorship, and the public came to the .conclusion that there was something mysterious and incomprehensible in naval war H knew that each side claimed to have won the battle, which seemed pretty clearly to suggcsl that it had been indecisive. To-day, ton years later, practically all that there is to disclose about the battle is revealed. We know that the topedo effected singularly little; that mines were not used at all, except by ourselves with no great result; ar.d that not a single submarine took part. Tho danlige was nearly all done by the gun. A COSTLY .MISTAKE.

The Germans owed their success m destroying so many British ships ta three tilings. I'irst, when Lord Realty opened the battle with'his fierce attack the light was against the British gunners. Our ships stood out ckni against the bright western sky "o were pushing in from the west to cut off the German battle cruisers—and the Germans were passing through a patch of mist, with behind them a misty sky. There wero whole minutes when little could be seen of the enemy at the range of 8 to 10 miles at which tho opening stage ot the battle aas fufight. Second, whether through the better light or through a better system ot gunnery, the Germans fired hilly twice as fast as we did. and with tins and the better light, in the first 20 minutes of battle they imde 21 bits with big guns on our battle cruisers against our own 4 bits. Third, from tho inflammability of our ammunition and tho defective protection of the magazines in the British battle Guises "the German hits were much more effective. Three of our battle cruisers were sunk because they were hit by salvos of shells on turrets; the explosion of the shells set on fire ammunition in the turrets, 'and the flash pissed down the hoists into tlio magazines, which then exploded, shattering the ships and wiping out the crews.

Vet this danger to the magazines bad been pointed out after the buttle cf the Dogger Bank. It was easily remediable, and was in lact remedied after Jutland. The steps taken then ought to litvc licen taken in 19Lo. that somnolence cost the lives of 4.090 or 5,000 men. POO© BRITISH SHELLS. Another handicap on the British Fleet was the comparative inefficiency of its shells. After Lord Beatty had lost two battle cruisers bis ships began to hit the Germans, and to hit them hard, as the light improved and the enemy could bo better seen. Ibe Van del- Tann, for example, was struck by three loin, shells, each weighing close on a ton, from the Barham. Tf those shells had been of the same deadliness as the German shells there would have boon no Von der Tann left. Instead of which she survived the battle. Yet with all our heavy losses the first part of the battle was magnificently fought by the British battle cruisers and the sth Battle Squadron. I hoy guided the Germans northwards towards Lord Jellicoe’s main battle fleet. 24 dreadnoughts strong. Tim Germans bad not tho slightest .(lea that this tremendous force was at sea and was rapidly closing on them. Their cruisers screen was driven in before it could make ally effective signals by the swift .attack of Admirals Arhutlmot and Ifoml, who both perished a few minutes later.

Moreover, ns the British battle fleet came down towards the tight the light(■hanged in favour of the British. Patches Of mist hid the great array from the- Germans. A situation had ■arisen such as seemed to promise certain and overwhelming victory to the British. But the minutes passed and the great array of British battleships did not deploy. It came on groping for the Germans, waiting to learn what was the exact position and formation of the enemy ; and when at last it did open out into n battle formation it was is one long, stiff line beading away from the enemy. None the less the British fire on tbe Germans was now most efficacious. Three of the German battle cruisers were Severely hit; two of them had to sflop for several minutes. If the British had closed resolutely there would probably have been a German catastrophe, as the Germans could not see our ships or make out. any thing but a flicker of flame from our heavy guns Tunning -along tlio northern horizon. The German Fleet, however, was most ably manoeuvred by Scheer; its ships turned simultaneously and managed to get awav in the- smoko and mist. A TACTICAL DEFEAT.

Shortly after this Scheer executed another turn, being still completely in the dark about the force that was facing him. He actually headed towards the centre of the British Fleet with the battle cruisers in front of him and ordered them to ram. So terrific was the British fire that a German officer admitted “we were completely in the soup.” The German battle cruisers were brought up sharp and fearfully battered. Lutzow bad some 6.000 tons of water in her; the Derffinger had 3,000 tons; the Seydlitz had probably even more. The German Official History speaks of the “extraordinary favourable position” of the British Fleet. The German line was hunched up; the British appeared to be all round it; a. resolute movement against the enemy by the ships at the rear and head of the long British line, and another Trafalgar was perhaps within reach.

No such movement was made. The British Fleet did not possess the manoeuvring power which the Germans showed ; and hence the turns-away from the Germans, which it made to avoid real or supposed destroyer attack. enabled the Germans to disengage. Again, after the encounter between the big ships when the night came down, no orders to attack were given t.o the British destroyers, which veto instructed to take up defensive positions; and were not even told where the enemy was. This was a most surprising omission and it the British destroyers at- a cruel disadvantage,

The British loss was the heaviest our Navy had ever suffered in action at sc a,—G,o97 officers and inch killed, CIO wounded, and 177 taken prisoners, Against a German loss of 2,551 killed and 507 wounded. The result in the light of present knowledge was a tactical success for the Germans, who escaped disaster and inflicted much heavier loss than they sustained.