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SIR ALFRED EWING.

EXPERT IN CIPHERS,

THE .MAN WHO AVON THE AYAR

From the facts which have only just come to be public property it wouhl be possible to make out for Sir Alfred E«'ing a stronger oase than most ■ politicians ever had as “the mail who won the war,” writes the London correspondent of the Alclliourno “Age.” A'ou may never have heard of Sir Alfred Ewing; many people knew for the first time of his exis.tepee only a few weeks ago, when Lord Bailfour paid a tribute to bis war-time work on ciphers. He is a professor of engineering at Edinburgh .University, and ciphers have always .been a hobby of liis—a fact that .happened to V known to a few friends at the. Admiralty. It was a tremendous stroke of luck for the Allied cause that at the very beginning of the war—actually on August I, 1911—Admiral Ollivcr, who was thou in charge of naval inteligenee. in the Admiralty, said to him, I know you take an interest in cipher stuff. AA'o don’t know what to make of it- There is nobody in my department who knows anything about it. AYi 11 you take it in hand?” The Admiralty gave instructions that it- was all to go to him. For the first few weeks lie was groping in the dark, hut by and by a light came in the most unexpected way. and before very long lie bad succeeded, not only in classifying all tbo different kinds of cipher, but in reading them, lie bad managed to collect around him a body, small at first, but always growing larger, of friends and assistants, some of whom developed a most, remarkable genius for this voik —work of a very special kind. In fact, he and his colleagues—and it was a very “ bush-hush ” Department—became' the official eavesdroppers of Great Britain. All the wireless “intercepts” which our stations could pickup from Germans were brought immediately to him., mid, though they were in cipher, and double cipher and treble cipher, lie was soon able to read them as easily as could the German recipients with the keys in their possession. It was said that a boat’s crew could not pass across the Kiel Canal. I without the Admiralty knowing it. , Every intended movement ol the German licet—when there was any movement—was promptly known to our Navy and all the instructions sent by wireless from, the German station at Nauen were collected turned into clear German and translated. This, of course, was a tremendously helpful factor to the Allies—more so. especially, because the Germans had the most complete confidence in the ill violiability of their ciphers and poured out the innermost secrets ol their eon- - tiding hearts straight into the ears—without knowing it—ol AAliitehall. 1 Possibly America might never have ' joined the Allies had it not been for Sir Alfred Ewing’s efforts, for it was ■ lie who deciphered the notorious tele--1 gram, from Zimmerman, the German 1 Foreign Secretary, to Renisdorff and • Fekhariit, the German ambassadors in 1 AYashi ngton and .Mexico .City, instruct- ! lug that an alliance should he made ‘ with Mexico and Japan fertile invasion of America. The publication of that telegram - turned the scale ill America, brought, - the United States into the war and enabled a thorough-going blockade on I Germany to he instituted lor the first time. The joke of it was flint every- ; body credited the .United States secret : service with having got hold ol the - telegram, and all the newspapers and I the retired colonels wanted to know why in heaven we did not employ a few alert A'ankees to keep an eye on ■' the Germans’ tracks. The Germans - themselves believed that the telegram I had been stolen either in their AYasii- ( ingtoii or .Mexico City Embassy, and ' proceeded lo "strain” both Rernsdorir and Eckhardt unmercifully by wireless L in cipher, which was duly intercepted and translated by Fir Alfred Ewing ■ and his colleagues. It was a terrible strain 011 the naval intelligence officers in the know to keep this wonderful jest to themselves. But ’ they bowed their heads contritely nn der the storm of contempt which raged at their “incapacity,” and agreed that things might he better when some 1 really alert Americans were taking a hand in the war. This alone was not 1 a had bit of work for Fir Alfred to ) see accomplished before, in 1917, he handed over to other hands the Department lie had made such a very 1 live crmreni. And if you look him up ’ in “ Who’s AYI10,” you will find no ! hint that he ever heard of the war. 1 much less took a hand ill it. Nor. 1 incidentally, will you find that his services were ever rceognsied by so L much as an O.R.E.

Permanent link to this item
Hononga pūmau ki tēnei tūemi

https://paperspast.natlib.govt.nz/newspapers/HOG19260426.2.45

Bibliographic details
Ngā taipitopito pukapuka

Hokitika Guardian, 26 April 1926, Page 4

Word count
Tapeke kupu
797

SIR ALFRED EWING. Hokitika Guardian, 26 April 1926, Page 4

SIR ALFRED EWING. Hokitika Guardian, 26 April 1926, Page 4

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