WAR-GUILTY TIRPITZ

Hokitika Guardian, 3 April 1926, Page 4

WAR-GUILTY TIRPITZ

GRAZE FOR NAVAL SUPREMACY. That Admiral Tirpitz was the man mainly responsible tor the Great War appears very dearly from the new six volumes of the immense “whitewash book” (“Die Grosso Politik Dor Enropaisehen Kabinette.”) which have just been published in Berlin by the German Foreign Office. The object of this work, which already extends to 99 volumes, is to give the important German diplomatic documents between 1870 and the outbreak of the Great War, and to show from them that Germany was really a sheep in wolf’s clothing—not, as most people supposed, a formidable tiger. The new instalment covers a period of great danger to Europe when crises recurred every few mouths, Irom 190 S to 1911. Among its most interesting chapters are those dealing with the naval panic which occurred in this ctiuiitrv in 1909. 58 CAPITAL SI 11 IS.

Germany at that date was building a stupendous fleet of Dreadnoughts, which was eventually to bo 58 capital ships strong (the present strength of capital ships in Britain is 21 by wav of comparison), and the construction of this enormous armada everywhere caused great uneasiness. The German Ambasador, Count MeUernich. appears in these pages .as constantly warning the German Government that if it persisted in building this immense fleet the result could only he war with England. The civilians in the German Government became uneasy. They euidtl not quite understand what the Kaiser and Tirpitz. were building this gigantic fleet for and creating new enmities. Prince Billow, then German Chancellor, wrote to Tirpitz: : “lt is /indisputable that ever-in- , reusing classes in England, not merely among the ignorant populace but among people ol insight, discern it grave danger for Groat Britain in I lie increase of our Navy.”

And therefore lie asked I irpitz whether it would not bo possible to build fewer battleships and more sulimnmioK. destroyers and cruisers. As with every proposal which would havediminished friction. Tirpitz avoided a favourable answer to IVinco Billow s question. He was building submarines, lie declared, ns fast as motor could he provided for them; and he. personally, was “for arming with al! our strength." TERRIFYING SITUATION.

MeUernich was confidentially told by Sir Edward Grey ill .Tamtarv 10(41 that the British Government bad information that

“material for four (German) Dreadnoughts which are now under const ruction were got ready at. the shipvards six months before the date when they were officially sanctioned. If similar procedure was followed in the case of the next 4 Dreadnoughts (Germany was building 4 each year), we might have D Dreadnoughts completed. If wc utilised our full building capacity, without regard for cost, we might in April. 1912, have 21 Dreadnoughts readv.” This was a terrifying situation, for England at that date had only 12 Dreadnoughts built or building. As the date approached in March. 1909 when the British Navy Esimules would lie brought, forward. Melteniicb reminded his Government ol ilic alarm which, was felt in England. “More and more,” he wrote, “the convict ions gains ground here (in London) that Germany means at her chosen moment to fight the English for supremacy at sea.” KAISER’S SNEERS.

AYilliam H. commented on th.is belief as “a pathological condition fit for a lunatic asylum” tjaul sneered at “poor Met .tendril,” adding: “He can't understand or endure our Fleet.” But it appears that the British Government's alarm, after all, bad serious foundation.

The German naval attache in Loudon, Commander AYidemmuin, report-

"Mr McKenna (then First Lord of the Admiralty) said that “one of his own private friends one winter night had walked over the ice to the Seri eh mi yard (one of the Great German shipyards) and examined the slips.”

The British Government, convinced that it was being deluded, proposed to lay down ai once -I Dreadnoughts and to take power iT necessary to begin another 4 later in the year, making 8 in all. The German Government had to admit Hint there had boon some ordering of battleships before the date fixed. Mclternieh mentions that :

"f was empowered to stale that two .ships of our 1900 programme had been put; mil to contract with private yards.” On this slatcmeni the Kaiser comments that he knew nothing of theordering of flies - shins in advance, li

looks, then, as though Tirpitz had key: him also in the dark. William 11 was in a state of extrem fury with Mottornirii because th British Government was in a state i. panic. Act he took not effective step to stop Tirpifz’s immense programme. 1 though in April, 1009. he admitted t Bulow :

“A collision with England would be a disaster. Tic wished for no competition. of armaments with England.” In June a conference of leading Gorman auhorities was held at Berlin to consider what should he done. Some were for proposing that an agreement should he made with England on the principle that Germany should lay down three ships to each British four (Austria at this date was building Dreadnoughts and no one mentioned them though they would have given Germany and Austria every chance of victory at sea). Tirpitz declared that “by 19]-I.” with the fortification of Heligoland and the completion of the Baltic Canal, the danger from England would be over. PEACE plan thwarted. Moltko, as chief of the German Army stuff, was present and maintained: “We (the Germans) have no chance of victory in a conflict with. England. An honourable understanding on the basis of reducing the pace of ship construction therefore seems worth striving for. Everyone ought to understand that failure to reach an understanding would mean war.” Tirpitz effectually prevented any agreement- by declining to put forward any formula that would bo reasonably satisfactory to the British nation and that would not threaten that nation’s existence.