THE GENEVA FAILURE

Hokitika Guardian, 25 March 1926, Page 2

THE GENEVA FAILURE

DEBATE IN COMMONS. FOREIGN SECRETARY REPLIES. [Australia & N.Z. Cable Association,] LONDON, March 23. In the Commons, continuing, Mr Lloyd George said that they were entitled to ask whether Sir Austen Chamberlain knew beforehand that Franco and Poland intended to insist on the simultaneous entry ol Poland to the League with Germany. He declared that instead of using influence to secure the admission of Germany nlone. the Locarno Treaty Powers had intrigued, land own threatened, In order to .get somebody else in. Sir Austen Chamberlain followed Air Lloyd George. He said that he wished to pay a debt that was pressing on him strongly. He said that, as tho League Assembly was meeting simultaneously with the Council, there were representatives of the Dominions and India at Geneva. He was in the closest touch and consultation with them. The whole seven nations met almost daily in his room, and confidential communications passed more than once daily. He desired to express his debt to them, for their sympathy and support in one of the most difficult—or the most difficult —task that it had ever been liis lot to confront.

Sir Austen categorically denied that when he interviewed M. Briand, on return from Italy, he had entered into any engagement regarding the Polish claims, or in regard to anything else. Neither had lie instigated nor encouraged M. Briand to press the Polish claim.

Sir Austen Chamberlain said that Mr Lloyd George professed to conic to the House as an open-minded, distressed enquirer, but he did not await oven his (Chamberlain's) arrival from, Geneva. before he (Lloyd George) telegraphed to tho American press his condemnation of the speaker’s (Chamberlain’s) action, and at his suspicion of his (Sir Austen Chamberlain’s) honour. Sir Austen Chamberlain said that it was a strange thing that a charge of disloyalty against Germany should bo laid by a compatriot of his own, and not by the Germans themselves. As regards the feeling prevailing in America, Air Lloyd George had dono his share to create that by the articles he had published in which ho openly insinui|lied what he dared “not say openly in the House to-day.

The instructions wherewith he went to Geneva, said Sir Austen Chamberlain. were subject to his discretion, to make the best arrangements that were possible, in accordance with the development of the situation. His instructions were that the British policy should ho based on the following principles :—Firstly, that no change in the League Council would have the effect of preventing or delaying the entry of Germany. Secondly, that it be best that Germany should, as a member of the Council, 'have full responsibility for any further change in the Council beyond her own admission. Thirdly, that the rule that only the great Powers should he . permanent members of the Council should he maintained in principle. Fourthly, that Spain was in a special position, and therefore might require exceptional treatment. Fifthly, that neither Poland nor Brazil should have permanent seats at present, but that Behind should he given a nonpermanent seat as soon as possible. He had acted according to his instructions, am! he declared that no pressure of any kind was put on Sweden to act as she did. lie also declared that the public discussions throughout tho world had made Germany’s position impossible. Sir A. Chamberlain intimated that if the vote on the motion were adverse, then lie would resign, lie did his best to persuade tile other nations not to raise the question of tho enlargement of the Council at present. Ho had urged them to get Germany into the league, and not to complicate the discussion by introducing other issues. He emphasised that .tho League was an association of mutual relationships and if any British representative had attempted to dictate its policy, he would have the reprobation of the whole League as his guerdon. Britain’s part was, he said, her accustomed ipa.rt, that of moderator and conciliator. He stated that Brazil had contended that she had notified Germany of her intention to claim a permanent seat. He was of opinion that that ought to have put Germany on her guard. France and Britain laid it,down that Germany’s request for admission to the League should be unconditional. He declared that there was no ground for a charge of bad faith agaisnt anyone, hut there was a misunderstanding. It had never bedn hinted at Locarno that Germany attached any importance to her being the sole entrant to the League. Sir Austen Chamberlain next emphasised the difficulties that were caused by tho publicity that was given to the Polish claim by arousing the national feeling of each country. He added that unless in the future tho nations that were members of the League and especially members of the Council, were prepared to 'attain their ends without making a positive stand hv means of publicity, the League could •not work, and its whole purpose would ho destroyed. Sir A. Chamberlain explained that he had informed all tho panties concerned, before tho discussions at Geneva, of the exact attitude of tlio British Government. For example, lie told the Spanish Ambassador that if the candidature of Spain would impede the entry of Germany, lie would vote against Spain. He concluded by claiming that the Locarno accord had withstood the great strain at Geneva. The spirit of Locarno had persisted, and it had inspired the policy of the seven nations who signed the treaty. The influence of Britain now stooil higher than at any time since the war. While he had been the spokesman of his country in foreign relations, nobody wherewith lie had dealt in that capacity had questioned the honesty of the British policy, nor had anybody doubted British good iaitli or Britain’s worth -Mr R amsay -MacDonald declared that Sir Austen Chamberlain’s attitude resulted in the most lamentable failure of British diplomacy for many years. Britain had got mixed up in diplomacy which was hostile to the League. He has left the League in confusion and sadness, while the cynicism abroad in Europe was such as had not been known since the war.

Lord Hugh Cecil said that there was nothing in the events at Geneva which was harmful to peace. He declared that Sir Austen Chamberlain had answered his critics with manly and convincing candour. Air J. H. Thomas said the Opposition were suspicious that Britain had lieen committed in advance. They joined issue with the Government on the ground that a serious blow was struck at the League’s prestige. He declared that if the League failed, the workers would forge another instrument that would bring about international peace. Air Thomas added that Sir A. Chamberlain had had one chance and missed it. The House of Commons tried to give him another. He said lie had not taken it. They refused to give him a third. AD Baldwin, replying, said that the new commission would confront the now situation free of all engagements of any kind, to consider the future composition of the Council, and Ger-

many had been invited to take a seat on equal terms with equal rights of speech and voting on this commission. Mr Baldwin expressed the Cabinet’s confidence in Sir A. Chamberlain, who had come through difficult and trying times, having done his best in the circumstances. Sir A. Chamberlain in a few months would bring to fruition tho efforts wherein he had so long been engaged. AH Lloyd George’s motion was rejected by 324 votes to 136. PRESS COALMENT. LONDON, March 23. Comment on the Geneva debate mainly follows party lines. “The Times” regrets Sir A. Chamberlain did not permit himself similar freedom and direetoness of speech before the' conference. It adds: “It remains truo that some of the worst troubles at Geneva and the most vexatious misapprehensions of foreign countries might have been avoided if the British position had been clearly {indicated at the proper time.”