The Guardian And Evening Star, with which is in corporated the West Coast Times. SATURDAY, NOVEMBER 27, 1925. THE WAR HAD TO BE.

Hokitika Guardian, 28 November 1925, Page 2

The Guardian And Evening Star, with which is in corporated the West Coast Times. SATURDAY, NOVEMBER 27, 1925. THE WAR HAD TO BE.

In the second volume of his political memoirs Viscount Grey, ot Fallodon, writing in peaceful seclusion Id years after the event, with all the documents on his desk, tells the fateful story of those last days that ushered in the greatest war ill history. This seijuenco of events has been told, retold, and analysed by many pens, some authoritative and others not. But liere we get the story, says a reviewer, set down by the man who was <|ui te familiar with every thread that led uneeringly to the denouement, and who was, himself, the chief a; tor on the side of Britain, and her world-wide Empire, could weigh and estimate with exact knowledge the significance of every move that was made liy those who had the power to make decisions in Germany and Austria, in France and Russia. in Belgium and in Serbia. No need to tread again that trodden track. Yet there are some events of those last days that stand out in a 1 ici.lit so vivid that it illuminates the great gulf that ■separates the German mentality from the British mentality, and makes the most careless reader realise how impossible it was for an agreement to Ire reached by minds divided by such an unbridgeable chasm. Rethmann-Holl-weg’s attempt to buy Britain’s abstention from the war, her condonation of the violation of Belgium’s neutrality and her desertion of France, is one of those events. The bid came in a telegram from Sir Edward Goschen, in Berlin, who transmitted the dishonouring offer of the German Chancellor. It turned the .sonle. The Foreign Secretary telegraphed immediately his reply to Britain’s Ambassador at Berlin. In the course of that reply he

wrote: “It would be u disgrace for us to make this bargain with Germany at the expense of France—a disgrace from which the good name of this country would never recover. 'lhe Chancellor also, in effect, aslt.s us to bargain awav whatever obligation or interest we have as regards the neutrality of Belgium. We could not entertain that bargain, either.’’ Tic showed his replv to Mr Asquith and the Cabinet, and they approved what had been done. The ex-Foreign Secretary discusses the question whether T.ngland c-oultl have avoided being involved in the war if a different polu y bad been adopted while he was in charge of the nation’s foreign policy. Time and again it has been argued by publicists 0) that if the plan of Lord Huberts, for conscription, had been adopted German v would not have dared to attack France at the risk of bringing in Britain with her large army ns an enemy; and (2) that .if the British Government had warned Germany imoquivo-r-nlly on the first signs of her intention to attack France, that such an attack would bring in Britain on the side of France, the war would not have been launched. Viscount Grey Hakes the two propositions separately, and he demonstrates that both are untenable. As to the first, be shows that if conscription had been introduced, as Lord Unbends desired, there would have been a transition stage in passing from the voluntary system to the conscription system. That would have been Germany’s opportunity to attack, and lien- demeanour, both at Algeriras in lOOf! and on the Agadir question in mil, showed that she was ready to attack if the opportunity presented itself. As to the second proposition, Viscount Grey states that the German military chiefs were fully prepared to Britain enter the war on the side of France. In spite of the warnings of the German military attache in London, they persisted in regarding Britain’s expeditionary force as negligible. The Foreign Secretary quotes the German military attache’s statement- to that effect. So little did they think of Britain’s power to interfere with their plan for taking Baris and afterwards the Channel ports, that they actually directed the German naval authorities to make no attempt to prevent Britain’s expeditionary force from landing in France. “Kver.vtliing we know.” writes Viscount Grey, “goes to show that the German military authorities calculated on a war, not of years, bill of months, during which they would not be seriously hurt by anything the British army could do; that they thought they would deal easily with the British expeditionary force if it came- in other words, that they were prepared, and bad made up their minds to take that risk.’’ The apprehensions expressed by German statesmen at Britain’s entry into the

war as exhibited by their “scrap of paper” episode, reported by Goselien were evidently not shored bv German soldiers. This book, therefore, gives British readers the melancholy satisfaction of learning that nothing that British statesmen could have done—in the opinion of the Minister, who held all the ( lues in bis band could have prevented Germany from launching the war for which she had teen so loir preparing, or could have prevented Britain’s necessary narta i| at ion ii it. Of course, even Viscount (trey’s authoritative and elosdv reasoned pronouncement is not the last \v( rd on the question raised. There is a fine passage about the dominions. Viscount Grey writes; “kittle Inis been said oluuii the dominions, 1 eeause <ommiinieation with them vas not carried on t (trough the foreign Ofiiee. The part l bey took ill the war. the numbers that were sent, the si ritieos that they made are on record. The material value of their help i- universally recognised; tlreir deeds notably in Gallipoli are famous. What cannot ho illustrated bv figures or measured by narratives of military exploits is tbe immense moral value of their support. Promptly, spontaneously, without consultation or persuasion they gave their help. Tbe effect in the figliiing line, it was known, could not bo immediate; the contingents from the dominions

must take some time to arrive, to lie organised, to lie trained, hut the moral effect was instantaneous. The shock of being suddenly at war disclosed no faltering or faintness of heart in Britain itself. On the contrary it evoked an independent and vigorous moral. This is true. But the news from the dominions carried it still higher. Those who have watched the sea under the impulse of a great wave urged to a mark farther than the tide has yet. reached, know how another wave following while the first is still flowing carries the Hood forward Iteyond the limits of anticipation. They know lmw essential it is to this result that the second wave should rise and follow quickly upon the first. This simile may serve to illustrate something of the effect upon us at home of the prompt support of the dominions. In the com sc of his work Viscount Grey affirms that the forces that made for dangerous trouble between Britain and the United States were often formidable in the first two years of the war. The Anglo-.lapanesc Alliance provided the intial difficulty. “To explain to an ally,” writes the author, “that her help will lie welcome, hut that you hope it will not he made inconvenient, is a proceeding that is neither agreeable nor gracious; it was. however, not only politic hut essential for us and for the Allies.” Questions of contraband and of interference with neutral trade provided the most difficult and dangerous controversy with the United States. It became the task of the Foreign Office to defend the blockade and contraband operations that had to he carried out by the British navy. After the war Viscount. Grey went to the United States and then heard from a person ol high .standing how narrowly grave trouble with Great Britain and the 1 nited States was averted in 191!.