VISCOUNT GREY’S MEMOIRS.

Hokitika Guardian, 26 November 1925, Page 3

VISCOUNT GREY’S MEMOIRS.

SOME DISCLOSURES. A reviewer in a recent issue of the Landau “Daily Mail” says that Viscount Grey’s book, “'Twenty-Five Years, 1892-1916.” is of extraordinary historical importance and deep personal interest. Every line in it. by its frankness and sincerity, will increase the respect in which the author is held by bis countrymen. “1 do not know that I ditl well, but- I did honestly,” he wrote to bis wile after his conversation in 1906 with the French Ambassador. explaining what the attitude of England would 1; 1 it Franco were attacked bv Germany. 'These words are characteristic of the spirit which animated him. and explain why the Allies placed such absolute confidence in him. New light is thrown on the Agadir affair in 1911 when in bis belief Germane* really meant to make will on France : “Had the crisis led to war. this would have come at the very season that we know was favoured for the purpose by German military leaders in 1870, and that was selected for the menace to Prance in 1905. and that we believe was decided by the military authorities for war in 1914.” One reason why war did not come then may, be suggests, lie found in the famous speech which Mr Lloyd George made, telling the Germans we should fight! if they persisted in their action against France.

’ That the military party in Germany willed the Great War Lord Grey is certain, and this deliberate judgment by a man whose career is a living record of truthfulness and fair dealing will convince any doubters, if such exist among honest men. DISHONOUR OF NEUTRALITY. When the German Chancellor suggested that England should leave France in the lurch and remain neutral. Lord Grey says; “The proposal made to us meant everlasting dishonour, if we accepted it. If Britain did remain neutral, people would expect tlie Government to stipulate terms for our neutrality. I had contemplated resignation if war came and we declined to stand by France, and I had therefore thought nothing as hi making conditions for our neutrality.” This fact that Lord Grey would have left the Government if it had deserted France is a political disclosure of great importance. Bui he states that (as was well known at the time), until the invasion of Belgium a large party in the Cabinet was against giving any promise to help France, and he adds that Mr Bona!- Law told him that lit- doubted whether the Conservative Party “would lie overwhelmingly in favour of war. unless Belgian neutrality were invail j ed.” I

Lord Grey meets and demolishes the impudent German allegations that France or Russia provoked the war: “Franco dreaded war and did all she could to avoid il. French minds were probably more preoccupied with the awful fear of war to France than with the dread of war as a general catastrophe. The immense growth, and strength of Germany had smothered all French intentions to attempt a revanche.”

As for Russia: “That the Tzar or Sazonof or anyone who had a decisive word in Russia was planning to provoke or to make war I do nol believe.” .But in Germany : “The one constant organised authority was the military tine; and there can he little doubt that high military opinion held that war must come and that in 11)11 tlie time for war had come This crisis was to he forced to the point oi war. If France abandoned Russia and offered to remain neutral, that was not to suffice; France was to he required to cede, as pledges of neutrality, the two fortresses of Ton I and Verdun.” LORI) HALDANE AND THE B.E.F. One ol the now facts disclosed is that when war did come. |,ord Haldane “alone among the civilians was, from the first, for giving authority at once to send all six (instead of four) divisions of the Expeditionary Force) to I-ranee in the shortest possible time.” \ iscount Grey thinks none the- less that the replacement of Lord Haldane hv Lord Kitchener at the War Office was a sound change. Kitchener, it is true, knew nothing of the Territorial Army and its value, Imt “lon-saw In an extent that no one else did at first, the need for raising

a great Army, larger Ilian anything that, hail yet been contemplated. lie bused his demand for men on the rnn’nion that the war would last for three years. I hat seemed to most of us unlikely. it not incredible.” But Kitchener never foresaw trench warfare. When it came, "‘I don’t know what, is to ho done.’ lie suit! to me more than once; 'this isn’t war.' ” One good p-iinl in Kitchener's war policy was his haired of ‘‘side shows.” “My own particular regret,” says Lord Grey, “is that I did not rosnlutclv Minport every resistance he made to them.'’ As to the most dangerous “side show” of all, the Dardanelles opera I ions, Viscount Grey makes the startling disclosure (hat, far from pleasing Russia, il ■‘came near to impairing nor relations” with that Power. The Russian public became afraid that we meant to seize Constant inople. HAMPERING THE BLOCKADE. Another point of great importance emphasised by Lord Grey is the incessant diplomat ie opposition of the United States to th" Allies’ blockade of Germany early in I lie w ar. Good Americans, such as Page, llie Ambassador. and Roosevelt, the ex-Presidcnt. feared that President Wilson mi'dil force a quarrel. Thus the British loss and suffering were augmented, a circumstance which Americans seem to have forg'd ten when they exacted Ihe

ononnmis navuioni that in- arc now making 1-- the United Stales. Tn a pathetic nass-igc the author reminds all that “I Mis hook has been written under one great disadvantage

--tlie disability ot impaired sight. . . Mv sight, wl-.ich still enables me In write, is not. equal to the sustained reading of long tracts of manuscript. or 1 even print. Revision and the correction of proofs have therefore been left in the main to better eyes than mine."

In such circumstance, to produce so admirable and accurate a work is n remarkable achievement.