JUTLAND AGAIN.

Hokitika Guardian, 7 November 1925, Page 2

JUTLAND AGAIN.

R.USSIAN OFFICER S-FEAKS. LONDON, Sept. 17

Commodore G. von Sclioultz, Com-niai:der-in-(-liief of the Finnish Navy, who was Russian Attache with tire

Grand Fleet- from the spring of 1915 to that of 1918, has written a hook entitled “With the British Battle Fleet.” He was on hoard the Hercules during tho Battle of Jutland, and lie declares that Jutland might have ended iiV a decisive German victory.

“Of the two sides” lie writes, “the German leadership in this battle (Jutland) displayed the greater initiative. The manoeuvring of tire German Fleet was more varied, -anil its battle formation more pliable. The British Fleet bail to suffer from the clumsiness and stillness of its battle line, and lacked mobility and initiative. The had visibility and short range at which the action was fought were practi-

cully advantageous to the numerically inferior German Fleet. At tlic.se ranges the employment of the torpedo arm was possible, and in this respect the Germans were superior to the English. Therefore, had greater decision been exorcised on the German side, and the British Battle Fleet, at this moment, still occupied with its deployment. been at once vigorously attacked ; had the Germans shown the necessary stuhlKirnness anil determination to carry through t-liis attack regardless of any unavoidable losses to themselves; if. in short, the German command had at once thrown in the Fleet, and carried out what Admiral von School - several times during the course of the evening and night fighting meant by his signal ‘Durchalton’ (drive through) - then the Battle of Jutland might have ended in a decisive. German vietorv.

HER MANY'S CHANCE. “The German Fleet, which hail opened tho Battle of Jutland so successfully. had not sufficient staving power to force a decision, did not take advantage of the mistakes of its enemy, anil so let slip what was perhaps its one opportunity during the whole war of inflicting on tlie numerically superior Fleet losses serious enough to af-~ feet the enemy’s general strategic situation. The German Command was ignorant of their definite technical superiority risk of a night action at close quarter. 4 not only acceptable for the German Fleet, lint thorough - propit imis.”

Commodore von Sclioultz mentions many remarkable cases of defects in British ships, anil of British sinking and attacking British vessels. He quotes the late Sir Dovelon Sturdeo as saying that the Grand Fleet had not shown itself to the liest advantage at .! nt la ml.

RELATIVE STRENGTHS.

“The British Fleet.” states the modori', “numerically half again as strong as the Germans, was in reality weaker, nr at best only equally strong. Tlie battle of Jutland and many minor engagements proved that the German ships and their guns were qualitatively superior. The British were aware of this, and therefore avoided a decisive battle.”

Ho added: If Germany had hold out another year or two. without allowing herself to be influenced hv internal and external propaganda and tlie dubious pi utilises of President AAilson and the, Entente, it is impossible to sav how the war at sea would have terminated. The initiative in naval operations slfppeil from the hands of the Admiralty, Anil passed to the German submarines, cruisers, and torpedo craft. ,