NAVAL DEFENCE.

Hokitika Guardian, 28 August 1925, Page 4

NAVAL DEFENCE.

LESSONS FOR AUSTRALIA. NEED FOIL BASES. 15y John Siuidcs in “Sydney Herald.”) As the people of Sydney saw the light great battleships slowly turn into urination, steam in line down the hariour and out through the Heads, hound ior Auckland, many of them must have reflected upon the impossibility of Australia possessing such costly ships of war. Admiral Lord Jeliicoe, in his report to the Commonwealth Government an naval defence, set down the cost of one new battle-cruiser at C 1,000,000. and the annual cost of maintenance and depreciation at £.714,000. He estimated the total annual cost of maintenance of the cruisers, destroyers, submarines, minelayers, and other vessels that he recommended the Commonwealth Government to build as Austratralia’s contribution to a Pacific squadron, at £4.024,000. Partly owing to the quadruple treaty signed at Washington—which, according to Senator Pearce, the Australian delegate to the Washington Conference “ almost certainly ensures peace in the Pacific for 10 years at least,” and partly owing to incurable antipathy of the Australian democracy to expenditure on defence—the long list of ships recommended by Admiral Jeliicoe six years ago has been cut down to the two 1(1, 000-ton cruisers ordered by Mr Bruce's Government from the Clyde, which are to be paid for not from taxation. but from surplus revenue derived through Customs. Those two 10.000tonners will assuredly he fine ships of their class, hut if they should ever meet one or more of the 27,500-ton battle-cruisers, carrying S 1 -(-inch guns and steaming 2d knots, which will scour the Pacific as soon as peace comes to an end, there is not mnen doubt as to what would happen. The truth is that Australia cannot afford to possess capital ships, and even if she could afford it she would not be allowed, under the provisions of the Washington Treaty, to acquire another battle-cruiser until 10J52. Consequently, the wisest method of expending whatever money can he extracted from a reluctant Parliament for naval defence will probably he to build one or more of the naval bases which two admirals—Admiral Sir Reginald Henderson and Admiral Lord Jellicoe—have recommended as indispensable for the security of the Commonwealth. Lord Jeliicoe in his report confirmed Sir Reginald Henderson's recommendation that there should be an eastern base at Sydney or Port Stephens. and a western base at Cockhurn Sound. A vast amount of money was spent in dredging the approach (e Cockhurn Sound near Fremantle, before it was definitely ascertained that in consequence of a heavy scour of the tide it was impossible to keep the channel clear. The work was thereupon abandoned. As an alleruativi King George's Sound at Albany has been examined by other naval ollicers but nothing has been done in the matter of providing the powerful fortifications, the mine defences, fuel supplies duel; accomniodatioii. and other essentials of an effective base. SYDNEY AS NAVAL BASE. Tile late Colonel liepington was :■ strong advocate for establishing r great naval base at Sydney in preference to Singapore, but his propose found no favour with naval officers, who pointed out that a base could mil usefully be established at sin h a large population centre, and also that tin port of Sydney would lie needed lr time of emergency for the merehanl shipping. The chief defect, however is that the position uf Sydney is gen graphically unsuitable for a base frnn which protection might, lie given tr British trade and possessions in eastern waters. The position of Singapon is ideal for that purpose. As a sub-id iarv base on the coast ol eastern Australia. I’orl Stephens was rernmmcndei as an alternative In Sydney by Su Reginald Henderson, and also by Admiral Jeliicoe. Rut the years have rolled by and successive Governments turn omitted to carry out the reeommetnialion. Great works should have to hi established and powerful del' es installed at I’ort Stephens before it could be made useful as a naval base. .Admiral Sir Frederick Field, of 11..M.5. Hood, urged, in u public utterance in .Melbourne, that the spacious harbour at Darwin should he equipped as a naval base, hut the Government found substantial reasons for declining to accept. bis advise. Bn-sibly tile most useful place of all would he Rabiuil, with its magnificent harbour and excellent strategical situation, but unfortunately Rabaul is in mandated territory, and therefore non-fort iiiahle both by I lie regulations applying to mandated territories and by the Quadruple Treaty, which expressly applies the prohibition to those territories. Il will be seen that llie neglect id successive Australian Gnvermin in s to equip any serviceable subsidiary naval base in .Australian waters with the dock accommodation, oil reserves, fortress guns, mine defences, and essential supplies for ilw use of naval forces. is absolutely in line with the neglect of the American people through Congress lo provide adequate naval ha-es lor l heir licet in the Western Bacilie. For the lasi L’O years Congress has been a-ked again and again to aiirl’ori-e the expenditure of the amount necessary inr inking the island of Guam, in the .Marianne Group, impregnable, so that the powerful array of American battleships might he in a position to operate from Guam for the support uf the national policy. It was estimated I hat an expenditure ol Cl ,-Yt II).(H )< l twiidd suffice, hut. Congress put off spending thni relatively small amount on such a distant outpost, although the people’s representatives cheerfully voted enormous sums for the construction of battleships which cannot operate in the Western Bacilie without a ha-e. The result is that American national interests in the Philippines and at Guam are now seriously imperilled because the time has gone by in which that strategical position might have teen fortified. The delegates of the t'nited States to the \\ ashingon ('onterenee, signed an instrument on February !i, Ifjoo, by which they undertook that the United States would not add to the fortification or naval equipment of any of its insular possessions in the Western Pacific—including, of course, Guam. In that respect America is worse off than Australia. because it is expressly provided n the treaty that the prohibition in •egnrd to the further fortification of tavnl bases .should not apply to “ the fomtnomvealth of Australia and its erritories, and Xew Zealand.” It diould be mentioned that before the iVashington Conference was held Japan lad already completed the work of esablishing a powerful advanced naval iase in the Bonin Islands, and could (Ford to accept the stipulation of the ’ status quo ” with equanimity. Although much valuable time has een wasted it is still open to the 'onimomveahh to carry out the vitally ecessary work of preparing one or lore adequate naval bases in Austraiin waters, so that the warships of ustralia. may have a harbour of reige to which they can retire, alter a engagement, for repairs, and for ipplies of fuel and ammunition, and her stores necessary to enable them 1 keep the sea. Fortress guns, booms, ine defences, submarines, and airaft will all be needed to make such

a base impregnable. Compared with tho cost of building cruisers the expenditure would be relatively small, while the establishment of one or more such bases might well influence a decision in favour of sending a British or allied fleet to these waters when, in the absence of such provision, that course would he considered impracticable. In considering naval bases the Commonwealth’s outpost in Torres Straits must also be kept in mind. Thursday Island commands the passage of the straits, and properly, fortified, it could make the Straits impregnable. “One gun ashore is equal to a fully armed ship ” was a dictum of Napoleon, who was well aware of the superior range and accuracy obtained by firing from a fixed gun platform on land, as compared with practice from a moving platform on shipboard. The armament at Thursday Island has been allowed to fall into disuse, along with other branches of the Commonwealth’s defence. A notable object lesson displayed to the people of the Commonwealth was seen in the aircraft carried by the American battleships. The ease and certainty with which they were launched by the “catapult ” invention, made a complete revelation. The speed of (he sea-planes and the accuracy with which thev kept station in a combined f’ight gave the impression of readiness and usefulness for defensive service and ns “ eyes of the fleet.” If Australia cannot have capital ships of he own, she can make it possible for British and allied capital ships to operate in these seas by providing naval bases at which they can he cleaned, repaired, re-fuelled, and provided with necessary stores. The sight ol the American airemit that soared daily over Sydney harbour ought to stimulate real progress in the construction of Australian aircralt, seeing that Australian airmen have hitherto porlnr.ite j flights unequalled by those of any other nation in the world.