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Hokitika Guardian, 20 October 1924, Page 2

Tkl'tii is proverbially stranger than fiction, and although many novels have been written about espionage during the war, none of them have a more amazing tale to tell, says a review of the hook, than ‘‘True. Adventures of the Secret Service,” by .Major C. E. Bussell. The service in question is the American. The book was published a few mouths ago, and achieved a third edition before more than a few stray eopics reached Australia. The author explains how an ingenious scheme w here) y (ierman prisoners almost succeeded in burning the docks at La l!o----clielle was detected, how dope-smug-glers were, frustrated, how three, ladies who were betraying the secrets of llio great artillery camp at Arcaclmn were laid by the heels, and how many otliei dark conspiracies were unmasked. The most striking story relates how two American officers virtually won the waiter the Allies. A sprat was sacrificed to catch a whale. The Americans bellied iTince Joachim, one of the Kaiser’s sons to escape from a French prison. Having thus won the confidence of the Ormans, they manager to secure plans of the great offensive, which were duly presented to Marshal Eoch. The latter, it seems, placed great reliance upon the. American Intelligence Service. Whenever he was in difficulties it was apparently to Lite Americans he turned rather than to the French. The stories are certainly exciting, hut they would he more convincing it they had some sort of an official imprimatur.

Some weeks ago the cablegrams gave . a very condensed summary of the ‘ Official Narrative of the Battle <>f Jutland,’’ and of an attached memorandum hv Lord Jellicoe, who contended that the Admiralty version contained inaccuracies. The hook is now to hand in Australia (says a review) and makes one realise what a vast amount of toil has gone to its preparation. The principal sources of information were the ships’ logs and signal records during the action. With most of the ships concerned the signal volumes alone number at least three or four. T here were 10l British vessels engaged and the mere physical labour involved in the arrangement and custody of the material is, as the introduction observes, a considerable item of work On the merits of the controversy that has arisen over the battle, the layman, of course, is not qualified to express any opinion. But one point suggests itself. It is easy to lie wise after the event. The losses and disposition of the two fleets at any given moment during the battle are now known. The expert can envisage the misty North Sea as though it- were a chessboard, with the pieces in situ. They can say with confidence that had such and such a move lieen made, had such and such a course been pursued, certain consequences would inevitably have followed. But at the time the commander I

had no such advantages. His knowledge of what was happening was fragmentary and unconfirmed. Reports were conflicting. He may have felt that if ho went on he might administer a coupe do grace to the German fleet which would shorten the war. On the other hand, the British Navy stood between the Allies and defeat. He might sustain such damage that

war would he shortened by the Allies being rendered incapable of offering further resistance. It was a grievous responsibility. 'Weighing the risks ho took his decision.