WAR IN THE AIR.

Hokitika Guardian, 4 July 1924, Page 4

WAR IN THE AIR.

FROM THE GERMAN SUM

VON HOKBBNER’S BOOK

Cloncral von Hueppner acted during tho greater part of the world war in the position of Chief Air Marshal of the German Air Forces, and the competence of his direction is generally admitted. Jlis book on tho war history of his service is not an exciting, blood-curdling or sentimental volume. It is a plain and rather cold narrative of the facts so far as von llocppucr knew them before his death took place. It is not the less interesting oil that account, even, if it is curiously reserved u|x>n the General’s own share in the really line work accomplished by the German Air Service. The individuality of the author-, in fact, almost completely escapes us, and the book reads as though it were a compilation of reports from his subordinates, Bat it shows very clearly the immense tasks with which the elYiefs of the German Air Service had to grapple, and the I're.sh difficulties which were encountered at evorv stage of the long struggle. THE A Kill A G IIATTBE.

This hook contains, not. indeed, abstruse technical revelations, but all the data l'crpiircd to show the extraordinary complexity of the work and the tips and downs of aerial fighting when one side or the other invents a better type of aeroplane, better ballons, better dirigibles, better field organisations, or bettor tactics, strategy, and methods of surprise. All were more or loss beginners in 1911. The Allies made a great advance in 19K5, find the story of the Somme must be understood. Tlie Germans replied in the spring ol 1917 by a great advance, ami gave us many unpleasant hours. They turned out nearly ‘J9.oli:> aeroplanes that year, and their types were excellent. To the last the question of air supremacy remained subject to some novel invention oil one side or the other, but the slow pressure of the lighting and the blockade did its work, and the excellence of the German air fighters lost its fine edge in the campaign o f 1918. TIUIsrTKS TO BRITISH AIRMEN. Von llocppucr pays many tributes to our airmen, tie extols their courage and spirit of self-sacrifice, lie admits frankly enough that the German airmen on the Somme were completely knocked out. and attributes this. in pyrt—though the excuse is rather thin —io the refusal of the German High I'iimiimtid to abandon the attack on Verdun in time. He allows thill wo

gained almost imeoiitcsteil air supivliiao.v in I!) 10. ami that the inoral olivet df «iitr Inw-llying attacks was great, lie •'rants, that the Allies put down six out ol’ nine Herman balloons on the lirst day of the Somme, and declares that tlte centre of gravity ol aerial activity moved in 1010 to the A nglo-Oernian front- and there remained." “The Knglish,” he says of 1017. “continued to he our most clangorous antagonists, and the knglish I rout continued to immoholiso the greater part of the German aircraft.” I’KXKTI GATING KXK.MV DKSIGNS. Through the disemharkation of our Kxpedit ionary horeo in Trance. and Bvng’s first attack at Camhrai. esea|scd the notice of the German airmen, the claim is made that most of the Allied attacks were foreseen by German observers long before they look place, and details are given. Camhrai certainly in light- the Oernmns a lesson, which they improved upon in 11118. Von lloeppncr's remarks upon the manner in which the Germans veiled their attacks of '.March tilst. and May •J7tli. are interesting, hut perhaps the Allies knew a little more than he gives them credit for having known. Tn any ease, the role of air forces. in penetrating an enemy's designs and in shielding their own. is one still capable of development, and the last, word has not been said on that subject. Von Iloeppner admits that lie was aware of Allenhy's preparations for Arras in IHI7. and attributes the German defeat to faults of the German artillery. : Alll 11A! lIS ON KNOT. AND. . There is. of course, a great deal about their raids on I'higlnml. In pint, tliov arc attributed to a desire to ease the air pressure on the- German linttlcfrniil. which to some extent they did. hat the claim that the German airmen selected military objectives in Knglauit for bombing cannot, lie accepted. and the claim can only he acplnined on the supposition that night raiders did not know where they were, mid gave in reports deficient in accuracy. \Ve are told that, of 111 bundling attacks made ly German dirigibles, half were directed against Russia, and the oilier half against Knglnnd. France and lielgiuni. In these raids Illi.oSH kilogrammes of honihs were dropped upon F.ngland. It is admitted that ot the fifty army service dirigible's used twety-tive were* lost, including seventeen by enemy action.

There are many interesting details of the (lennaii aiui-aireral't armament which is alleged to have put down lo'-.'s Allied aeroplanes and two dirigibles during the war. This service, at the Armistice had 207 f! guns. <IS searchlights, and oT.SIK) men till ranks. The claim thitl the (ierman airmen brought down lirdd Allied aeroplanes heiweeu •Tanualry anil September, 1!)IS, and only lost I1)<l!h in list he compared with the Allied estimate, which probably dili'et's widely.