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Hokitika Guardian, 20 May 1924, Page 2

Okikiai. and semi-official historians labour under two grave disabilities. Tliov have to examine a vast mass of material, despatches, orders, reports, letters, and what not, and the pro-

cess of sifting is necessarily a very lengthy one. Hence their work appears long lifter the events described, where tlie actors in them and the unofficial

historians have already said their say, and interest in the subject lias to some

extent abated. Moreover, the official historian must he absolutely detached. Jle niiiv not pass judgment; his role is simply that of recorder, and in coiisei)lienee his narrative niav ho rather colourless. But, despite these handicaps, the “History of the Great Mar; Xavat Operations." hy the late Sir Julian S. Corbett, the third volume of which has just been published, is, says a reviewer, an engrossing production. This volume is the last which we shall have from his pen. for he died a few hours after completing the final chapter. The period covered I rom May, llllfi. to the conclusion of the battle of Jutland is rich in incident. There

were the naval iterations at the Bar

dandles mill the evacuation of Gallio) li. The Konigskerg was run to earth and

destroyed in German East Africa. There was river lighting in several minor theatres, including the Balkans. The German raider Moewe made her daring cruise, and the U boat campaign was instituted. And. of course, there was Jutland, of which almost a third of the hook is devoted. Sir Julian Corbett makes it clear that Admiral Jclli-

coc was detei mined to force an issue, while Admiral von Seliccr was as determined to avoid it. The latter’s disinclination was perfectly justified in the circumstances. Ife had been taken hi surprise, and had inflicted some damage on the British battle cruisers. But he had suffered severely himself, and if he engaged the battle fleet lie would

have been annihilated. Von Srhoer handled his fleet very skilfully, and aided hy some extraordinarily good luck he got away. He had saved the High Sea Fleet —hut only that it might take part in that ignominious procession into Senna Flow.

From Scapa Flow to the Tigris is a far cry. But the navy did its hit in the Mesopotamian campaign, the first volume of the official history of which, hy General F. J. Moherlv has now appeared. This deals with the operations down to the occupation of Kilt. General Molierly discusses exhaustively tho genesis of the campaign. M hen every man, every gun, every pound of munitions available were urgently needed on the Western front, what induced tho authorities to embark on this adventure. In a theatre far from the nearest base, with a terrain that bristled with difficulties and a lethal climate? The entry of 'Turkey into tho war had complicated matters. Turkey was in P. position to do Britain a good

deni of linrm in the Middle East. Sho might inalco trouble in Persia, and incite the Afghans to mischief. She might, in particular, seize the oil pipe line to the Shut-01-Arab, the protectio:i of which was all important. Accordingly. Basra was occupied in Xu vomber, 1011. But Basra and the pipe line could he even better defended from more advanced positions. The command acted oil the principle that attack is the best form of defence. The early successes prompted the leaders to attempt, too much with the forces at their disposal, although it is only lair to say that some of these ojierntions were undeitaken against their better judgment. The capture of Kut led to the pyrrhic victory of Chesiphon, which was followed bv the return to Kut and its disastrous sequel.