THE NAVY LEAGUE.

Hokitika Guardian, 17 May 1924, Page 4

THE NAVY LEAGUE.

The following statement has been circulated to all branches of tho Navy League throughout the world, as cmbodying the League's considered opinion on the necessity for a naval base at Singapore:—

The reported decision of the Government to suspend tho construction oi the naval base at Singapore compels the Navy League once more to warn the public of the grave danger to the Empire involved in this neglect of our Imperial interests. The decision of the Government to proceed with 'Sir Samuel Hoare’s schemes for increasing the Air Force shows that they are not entirely indifferent to the claims of national defence and not entirely victims to the delusion that the way to security lies through helplessness. The Navy League, of Course, applauds their decision to render the heart of the Empire immune, if it may be, from devastating air attacks. That is a primary duty. But how aro wo benefited by this security if wo are left liable to have our essential supplies of food and raw materials cut off by attacks on our commerce in distant sens which we are left helpless to resist ?

The paralysis of all industry at Home and slow starvation through the cutting off of our supplies of wheat and meat would he no less painful an end than extermination by high explosives or poison gas.

Defence against air-raids and defence against flow strangulation by raids on commerce are not alternatives, but complementary one to another. Has the Government forgotten that it has a double danger Lo meet: —

(1) Tho danger of air attacks against our cities and ports. (2) —The danger of the destruction of our seaborne commerce.

If, despite the assumption that the best defence is defencelessuess, they still are convinced of the possibility of danger from the air, how can they appear to believe that there is no danger of attack on the seas? Why should they imagine—it is certainly not the ease—that France will see no menace in our air preparations, and that Japan will see a menace in immobile defences at Singapore? A dockyard can make no attacks, and the .Japanese, who, for years, have viewed our position at llong Ivong with equanimity, are not likely to be disturbed by our providing ourselves with an alternative Fleet base over 1,100 miles further from their coasts. The pica that the construction of a naval base at Singapore is likely to create an atmosphere inimical to disarmament is specious, but not unconvincing. We have, every week, to import about six million tons of food to the approximate value of C 0,500,000, and about twenty million tons of raw material to the value of over 08,000,000. To enable these supplies to be brought to our shores, we have every day at sea 1,100 British merchant skips of 0,000 tons anil over scattered ovet trade-routes 80,000 miles in length. In addition to the ships actually at sea, there are over 1.100 other British ships loading or unloading in harbour in various parts of the woild at the same time. At any given moment there are at least C 150,000.000 worth of British trade afloat east o! Suez, of which C 157,000,000 are in what may he caled the Singapore sphere of influence. From the area we draw OH per cent of our suplios of ten, 07 per cent of our jute, 00 per cent of our zinc ore, 00 per rent of our rubber. SO per cent of our wool, 77 per cent of our hemp, Off per cent of our rice, .57 per cent ol our tin, 52 per cent of our cheese, IS per cent of,our butter, and a large proportion of our frozen meat, oils for foods, etc., and also many other necessary materials lor peace or war. Every ship on the eastern trade makes on an average live voyages out and live voyages Homo oven veili? limn the 2!b ships trading in the India area alone may be said to have an annual limiting worth of C'dK),0(11),00(1, which it is the business of the Navy to protect. What the effect Would be of leaving this trade unprotected we may see from the experience of the late war. I lie Eimleii in under two months sank 1. ships whose lidlls and cargoes were valued at 1:2,21)0,(1(111; the MoeWe rank 22 ships on one cruise and 12 oil another. This, too. happened at tv time when there was a large number of rmisers, not only British but also Japanese amt Kivneb, guarding the t rade-routes.

Is the sum of Lll Jlllii,Dill), spread over a period of years, lor the construction of the Singapore base—which is equivalent to about one larlhing per annum on the income tax —ton great a premium to ask for the safeguarding of these vital Imperial interests? In a conflict in which the enemy fins not only cruisers and .submarines, hut also a battle fleet in the contested atea, our light cruisers would be powerless to protei t filiating trade, unless they, in their turn, bad the support of heavy ships, and they cannot have such support unless there is a base in that area where heavy .-ships can dock and repair, and obtain the necessary stores. Expert naval opinion has selected Singapore as the best base for the purpose, since it closes the route to the West and Hanks that to the Australasian Dominions. No other position can so completely meet the needs of a fleet operating in the Pacific and Indian Oceans, and, if Singapore is not made available, the Heel will have no base nearer than .Malta, which means that it cannot operate 111 Eastern waters at all. Moreover, we must not look on the question narrowly as a matter of our seaborne trade alone. 11 the Royal Navy cannot operate ill Eastern waters, the Australasian Dominions are left defenceless, an easy prey to the attack of any enemy possessed of a battle Heel and bases within striking distance. The most profound belief in the goodwill of the Pacific Powers does not justify us in this act of desertion. Next to the " golden link oT the Crown.” the Navy is the strongest link in the ties which bind the Dominions to the Mother Country. Hitherto, it has sheltered them, more or less completely, from attack, even though its main strength lias been thousands of miles away, because it lias stood between them and the main force of a potential enemy. If tho potential enemy !»o nearer to their doors .than the protecting naval force, and if that protecting force be paralysed for lack of a base within covering distance, the most profound anxiety must be aroused in the mind- of our fellow citizens overseas which no pious belief in tile force of a good example will allay.—(Signed Cyril S. Coli'i. chairman; Gerald Fiennes, vice-chair-man; on behalf of the executive committee of the Naw League. 11th March, 102-L