THE GALLIPOLI CAMPAIGN

Hokitika Guardian, 7 April 1924, Page 4

THE GALLIPOLI CAMPAIGN

CONCLUDING INSTALMENT,

IUSXRALIAN AMD N.Z. CABLE ASSOCIATION , LONDON, April 2. Lord Wemyss, Admiral of the Fleet at Gallipoli, in 1915, writing on October 22, mentions that Coinmander Koves had gone to London with Admiral Do Robcck’s consent to submit a plan for rushing a squndron through the Dardanelles, though do Robec-k actually did. not regard the project favourably on the military situation and recommended immediate evacuation. The deteriorating health of the troops induced this view, though their morale was unimpaired. Lord Wemyss believed that a new offensive would have an electrifying effect. Kitchener arrived on November 9. and telegraphed a fortnight later recommending the evacuation of Suvla ' and Anzac, and the retention of Hellos. Lord Wemyss, who had now succeeded De Robeck, pressed afresh the fleet project, from which Monro strongly dissented. A long exchange of views ended on December 8 with the decision to evacuate Anzac and Suvla. Wemyss thought that the decision was a disastrous mistake, but says that evidently the military view prevailed and the Western school gained the day. The Admiralty arguments against the ’fleet project were overwhelming. but indicated it favoured the holding of Holies and the mouth of the Straits as beginning points if future attacks were decided upon. Lord Wemyss counter proposed the capture of Achi Bal>a, but the military opposition triumphed. “This was the last effort on m.v part to shape the course of events,” he says. “My only choice was to how to the decision of the Government.”

Recapturing too history of the events leading up to the launching of the first attack, Lord Wemyss mentions that Fisher opposed it and contemplated resigning, hut Kitchener dissuaded him against his better judgment. Fisher even maintained a hostile silence in the War Council discussions, which Churchill interpreted as assent. “It must remain a matter for surprise that a man of Fisher’s autocratic temperament and outstanding position did not make greater efforts to give expression to his disapproval of the project which the Council of Defence had previously pronounced not feasible. The blame for the failure must he attributed to a system which places the direction of naval operations in the hands of persons devoid of all knowledge and experience necessary for the task, and moreover immune from the consequence of their action.”—(Copyright-, Curtis Brown).