The Guardian (And Evening star,with which is in-Corporate the west coast Times.) SATURDAY, AUGUST 18th. 1923 THE WEEK

Hokitika Guardian, 18 August 1923, Page 2

The Guardian (And Evening star,with which is inCorporate the west coast Times.) SATURDAY, AUGUST 18th. 1923 THE WEEK

Turku has been much information broadcasted this week regarding the Ruhr situation. There v.us the comprehensive British Note which in such definite, logical terms, reviewed the whole position, and the trend of events resultant, from t..e joint action of France and Belgium in occupying the Ruhr in the capacity of bailiffs. Next, there was Mr Lloyd George's trenchant icviow of the position, which, side by side with the British .statement, lent considerable point to the Note. Following, came the newspaper comment of the world. The whole position summed up is that there is general agreement that France and Belgium have erred seriously in the methods adopted to enforce or extract payment- from Germany. Italian comment (which may be considered impartial) is favourable to tile British attitude as expressed in the Note, and goes so far as to say that the occupation of the Ruhr is a violation of the Versailles treaty. Naturally French comment is bitter, but behind it all there seems to lie a conviction that Franco C-. not 011 the high road to the attainment of her desires, and if there were an easy way out, without loss of dignity, the French nation would be glad to adopt it.

Britain in her Note oilers to be* as magnanimous to her Allies as ever she was. She "ill remit their debts less the amount she is now bound to pay to Ameiiea. She had offered to remit the debts altogether, if the United States would do likewise. But America had her own views, and declined to net similarly to Britain. \\ hether the American policy towards the Allied debts will be modified by President C'oolidge remains t-n be seen. There is as yet no indication of this. The late President Harding was adopting a noncommittal course wherein "safety first” from embroilment in possible European complications was the determining factor. But it lias been urged upon the States again anil again that America was a principal partner in fixing tile peace conditions, and should continue in that role till adjustments were possible ultimately. It- is recognised on all sides that a settlement of the inter-Alliod debt question is the stepping stone to the economic recovery of Europe. This is sure to lie put up to Ameiiea again. The British Note indicates what is possible and Italy seems to urge that possibilities should lie attempted. The question is not one of Franve v. Germany,—it is an international problem—but. France so places herself as to defy international notion.

France has made the Ruhr problem her own and by her military occupation and .stand, reserves the final decision for herself. France occupied the territory ostensibly for her own material advnn. ta«e without the favor of her Allies support other than inactive acquiescence. As one writer lies put it, there is always one question a German cannot logically answer. ]f you ask him why Germany defaulted in her deliveries to France ho will say she could not help it. She had got to the end or her resources. Sho could not pay any more. Then if you remind him that the first fortnight of passive resistance to the French occupation of the Ruhr cost Germany more than it would have cost her to make the coal deliveries she defaulted upon, and that immediately her industrialists found themselves able to buy enormous quantities of coal for cash in England, ho says, “But we had to do that. We had to resist. We had to take care of our own in the Ruhr. We had to have coal.” And that is a.s far as- you get. To everyone else it. is clear why the Germans defaulted. That it was a technical default is proved by tho amount involved which was relatively* 1 itiro. 1 hat it was a wilful default the Reparations Commission found upon the evidence. Why did sho do it? Because if she had gone on making payments according to the schedules, the treaty calling for 132,1X30,000,000 marks would have solidified hy observance. So long as she paid she would have to go on paying to the end. This she never for a moment intended to do. not even when she signed tho treaty. Sometime, therefore, slie would have to default to force the issue. Her creditors would neves- voluntarily reduce their claims. Nothing ever happens in that fashion.

Purscino that line of thought tlio writer further reviews the situation in this fashion : “The industrialists had the German Government and the German people and all unoccupied Germany behind them. Food and moneypoured into the Ruhr from unoccupied Germany. Thinking at first only to control the canals and railways in order to divert coal in transit, tho Frencn presently had to take over the task of working thorn, because the Gormans wouldn’t. The Germans not only would not. work them; they tried to make them unworkable by deranging vital mechanisms. To feed themselves, the French had to seize hotels and restaurants. Germans ivotild not serve them. On the part of the Germans, passive, resistance led to acts of sabotage and private revenge. Tho French, on their part, in spite of themselves, were obliged to answer with military moagurefi, Their occupation became daily

more costly. The amount of coni and coke they were nble to capture outside tile Stinnos-Thyssen-Honiel walls cost almost its weight in francs. And passive resistance was at- tlio same time costing tlio Germans more than reparations payments. "What an ul>surd muddle!” one says to tlio Italian engineer. ‘‘lt is,” he says. “You see tho French uro quite right. The Germans can pat'. Tho question is how to make them pay. It could very easily bo settued on an economic basis. Tho French need Ruhr coke. The Ruhr needs Lorraine ore. But nothing can over bo settled rationally between France nnd Germany. They liato each other too much, It is very silly.”

And so tho writer comes to the conclusion that it followed that when the occupation turned out to lx* immediately a costly business causing more gold francs to go out than gold marks to come in, many expectations wore disappointed. It followed, also, however, that for tho first time in more than fifty years every Frenchman went to bud at night with security under his pillow. He had it. So long as France was in the Ruhr the nightmare of German revenge could not rise. As this feeling of security becomes a habit, n.s it crystallises, will it not be increasingly difficult for Franco to lot go of tho Ruhr? Under the treaty she may keep it until Germany pays 13d,000,000.000 gold marks. Nobody has the power to put her out. Nobody can oblige her to scale down the sum of reparations. The world is still asking,

"What does France ultimately want—reparations or security?” The French say nothing final on that point. Why should they? Have they not gained control of circumstances? Though thei r programme may seem ambiguous, it is nevertheless the only aggressivo programme in Europe. No one can say what they will do with tho Ruhr, or how it will profit them to keep it. But there is no doubt about what their taking of it. did to tho Gormans. It wrecked their programme. Tho German economic programme had tho weakness of a Prussian military campaign. It was inflexible. One disaster destroyed it. They are fatalists really. Everything hung by a thread ol assumption, which was that when they had defiantly pleaded bankruptcy to force a revision of the treaty, the liberal opinion of the world would restrain France. After all this time they know not France; and to their geometrical minds the. political wav of tlio world is a foolish enigma beyond all comprehension.”

This statement of the ease emphasises the dilemma, of Great Britain at this stage. Britain's Note reviews the position very logically, hut France occupies a position in Germany which cold logic will not affect. The future is In the lap of the gods, and no doubt France realises that Britain will not do anything overt to seriously affect France. But- the future:, with Germany still a growing nation and nursing a wrath against France, who can tell? France has a measure of security with tho Ruhr as a bulwark, but that is only building on tlio assumption that France is preparing for tho next war- -as Mr Lloyd George has warned tlio world. But with tho late war “to end war,” snould there have l/con the necessity for France to take the provocative step, and persist in it r That is, in the end. the weakness of the French position. Germany has national advantage in technical skill ami applica tion which are her greatest assets a.s tending to her final recoveiy. France might recognise this inevitable fact betimes. Probably the only immediate hope for a settlement ot an intricate international situation governed by the personal armies of tho patties, would be the intervention of America, which, siding with Britain might find a means whereby the present hopeless outlook could he cleared away and a way out found, giving su:o ] cace with honor.

As regards the lio|ie for American intervention. it is of interest to recall that it was towards some sort of iiiternation al association for prevention of war and legal regulation of conflicting international interests that the late President chiefly bent bis energy in the last years of his life. A lofty sincerity of purpose illuminated that energy, however nebulous may have seemed to outsiders his temporary policy. The objection to scrapping the present League Covenant lies obviously in the difficulty of bringing tlk> parties to agree again to another covenant of similar nature; just as the common fault with most idealists is reluctance to make the host of something short of perfection in this imperfect world. The weakness of the Republican policy shows up strongly by reason' of the violence of what may est be described n.s the nervous reaction in a people to whom lias been given the chance to compel the whole world to peace. Wo saw it. after Versailles ; wo saw it, again after Washington. The same reaction is study accountable for the later features of the remarkable Volstead Act directing the administration of the prohibition law and the penalising regulations against foreign shipping. President Harding’s health bad been undermined by the strain of riding a succession of whirlwinds; and it seems unlikely that lii.s health was in a state which would have permitted hint to embark on a long and arduous campaign among bis people. For so Herculean a task—and it is a Herculean task—-neither he nor l)r. Wilson before him had the vigorous constitution which enabled Mr Roosevelt to undertake it and pul! through. There is something keenly distressful in watching men like Page. Wilson, and Harding going down one after the other in the seemingly tremendous work of arousing American democracy to a sense of national duty and opportunity, especially where a great mass of popular sentiment in that democracy is to all appearances favourably predisposed.