SINGAPORE BASE.

Hokitika Guardian, 1 August 1923, Page 4

SINGAPORE BASE.

LORD JELUCOE AS ORIGINATOR OF SCHEME. ADVANTAGES TO NEW ZEALAND AND AUSTRALIA. In tlej< 1 inlc with tin 1 problem.-* before mo (wrote- J«nrd Jcllicoe) 1 considered it- necessary to review the whole naval question in its relation to Far Eastern waters from tho Indian Ocean 10 Canada. Tlio waters between Africa, to the west and America to the cast must be taken as a whole. All portion-, of the British Empire situated in these waters are equally interested in their security as regards sea communications, and the inevitable conclusion is that the defence of these communications should he entrusted to one licet composed of units from those parts of the Empire which are directly interested. Till, question of the control of the Far Hastcm Fleet in war is of the highest importance, and alter much consideration and with ihu experience of the late war before me. I have formed the conclusion given in chapter 1... viz., that the fleet should bo directed by a Hag officer of high rank, located at Singapore, and assisted bv :i strong staff. My reasons for this conclusion are fully istated in that chapter. A considerable amount ol work is necessary in Far Eastern waters in the immediate future in .such matters as the provision of docks and naval bases suited to the needs of a modern fleet; flip organisation of an administration for the constituent parts of the fleet; the necessary arrangements for providing reserve stocks of fuel, and the provision of proper measures for the defence of important commercial ports and naval bases.

NAV AI j REQUIREM ENTS. "While the final decision of war must depend on the result in the main theatre, wherever that may be, the presence of strong naval forces in Far Eastern waters is necessary to ensure the safety of the sea. communications fi'c’.n the outset, and to act as a. deterrent to other forms of attack, should the conditions render them possible-. as might be the case. The in-

evitab'e nunierieail weakim-ss of thy miliun.i forces due to the small population increases the importance cl naval defence.

It is not possibly to consider the naval requirements of New Zealand without irking account also of the naval requirements of the I’acitic and Indian Oceans as a. whole. The qttosi.nu is one of co-operation between the naval forces of the Kutpiie stationed in Far Eastern waters. Sea commtmications in Indian and Chinese waters, as well as in the remainder of the Fai die, are matters of concetti to the people, of New Zealand and Australia', and conversely , the saW-ly of sea enmU!oni.- -11 ions in the Seiirli I Medio and in {"sina are of interest to I lie people ot India. Similarly the safety of the lia-es at Colombo, and Singapore is vital 10 New Zealand ami Australia; and the safety of Sydney and other naval bases in the South I‘acilie. and of Singapore and Colombo, is of the greatest importance to Tndna. Even the prosperity of South Africa is associated. though in a lessor degree, with tills question, whilst Canada is greatiy concerned in the matter. It will be seen, therefore, that the Far Eastern naval problem is one which concents the Empiie as a whole.

Only one conclusion can be drawn —via,, that the Far Eastern Fleet .should lie provided by those constituent parts of the Empire, including (treat Britain, for which it is a vital necessity. and that- there should be the closest- co-operation, with unity of direction in war, between the various .squadrons composing that fleet.

QUESTION OF STRENGTH. If ho question of the necessary strength of the Far Eastern Eleet k discussed Beyond remarking that the glowing naval strength of nations outside European waters, and Ihe disap. pearanee of the Dorman and Austrian Navies, suggest a- reconsideration of nations outside European wafers, and the disappearance of the Berman and Austrian Navies, suggest a rci nnsidi-ra-tion ol the slrategieal distribution of British navai fortes, it is sufficient in tins chapter to give the figures that are arrived at, and to dismiss the method ot providing the fleet.

In this connection the effect of the formation of the League ol Nations, and th" inlluence on the question oi' limitation of armaments, (annul- be ignored; but as no decisions on the subject of such limitations have yet been announced, it is only possible in this report to deal with matters as tli ■ v exist at the moment or can be forecasted for the near future. It is considered, then, that the naval interests of the Empire may require

within the next few years a tea-going Ear Easton Fleet comprising vessels i f every class, and for the purpose of this i banter it is assumed that this fleetwill he composed ef the vessels mentioned in pariigranli 19 of Veliime lfl.

Til is Hoot, comprising ships of the Koval Navy, the Hast Indies Squadron, the Koval Australian Navy and any vessels stationed in Far Eastern waters furnished or maintained l>v New Zealand. Canada, and the Malay States, should, together with the vessels repaired for the direct protection of trade by convoy, be organised to net under one single direction in war. and far the general safety of British Far j Eastern possessions and sea coinnuini- i cations. OVERSEA DOMINIONS. In considering means for the pro- ■ vision of the ships to form the Far Eastern fleet mentioned in paragraph 11, and for the necessary convoy work, it appears to he logical to put forward the following suggestions:— fa) That Canada's share might Iv that necessary to provide and maintain a small force of light cruisers on her western seaboard for the protection cr her trade ia those waters, as well as a. naval force on her eastern seal.oa id.

(M That .South Africa’s share might ho that necessary to nrovidc and maintain a squadron stationed at the Cape of flood Hope. and having the primary duty of Uees>ing open tlie trade route round the Cape and protecting the trade on the nest coast of Africa, leaving the trade to the eastward to the protection of the Far Eastern fleet. ; (el That India might provide a certain fixed sum annually in relief of the estimates —such a sum. for instance. as would provide for the defence of her harbours, and would pay for the upkeep of the East Indies' squadron of five light cruisers, six submarines. and one aircraft carrier, without. perhaps, paying the first cost o! the ships, or for their replacement t'm the reasons given in paragraph 17, The sum required would he approximately £2.*200,000 annually. FAR FASTERX FLEET. Since Xew Zealand Australis would hear no part of the expenses oi naval defence in the Atlantic, it isuggested that their share in the Pacific should he more than is shown ill table 111. The suggested proportion oi the Far Eastern fleet is. then, approximately : Croat Britain To per cent. Australia 20 per cent. Xew Zealand o per cent. If these suggestions are accepted, it remains to formulate proposals for the best method of using the total sum to he spent annually on the Far Eastern fleet by the United Kingdom. Xew Zealand. and Australia. The method suggested is to ascertain the annual cost of maintenance of the Far Eastern fleet when it reaches the strength mentioned in paragraph 11. and the annual sum that should be set apart for the depreciation due to the necessity for replacement of the ships after a certain period; and then, having obtained these figures, to divide the cost, in the proportion given in table IV.

THE COST. The initial cost ami effective life of the various types of ship, for the work required of them in the fighting line of a striking force, is taken as:—

Note.—As the various typos ot vessels become ineffective for front rankwork they nitty he of use for subsidiary purposes.' Thus light cruisers could he used for trade protection until at least, twenty years old. and destroyers and submarines for harbour defence for the same or a longer period. Owing to the ever-changing conditions in tho cost of labour and material. and to the alterations in the pay of officers and men, ami in the designs of ships, it is almost impossible to arrive at an accurate estimate of the pay. pensions, etc., and of the stun required for the maintenance and depreciation of the fleet. The best figures available are made use ol.’ and indicate a total annual cost of £19.704,790. THE CONTRIBUTIONS. Taking the percentages mentioned above the nmlrilmloi's would he:— United Kingdom 75 per cent., equals l'l-1,778,525. Australia. 20 per cent., equals £3.-9-10.1)40. New Zealand. 5 per cent., equals £985.235. IN TIME OF WAR. QUESTION OF CONTROL.

Til Will' it. is necessary that the whole Elect of the Empire should he placed under tin* single l control of the British Admiralty. It is highly desirable that, llie same procedure should he followed when danger of war exists. It. is also necessary that the l units comprising the Far Eastern Fleet should pass under one command if they are to he employed in Ear Knsleni waters. Obviously the main strategical situation should govern the employment of

such a Heel. TF the main theatre of war were situated in European or Atlantic waters, some portion ol the fleet might he required in those waters.

Ohviiiuslv the main strategical situation should govern the employment ol sueli a Meet. If 1 lie main theatre of war were situated in European or Atlantic waters, some portion of llie fleet might ire required in those wafers. The question oi" dfreetion and control of the operations of the Far Eastern fleet is of great itiip.irianee. Whatever improvement- takes place in the methods of eommunii alien between the British Admiralty and the Far East, it is inevitable that the great distant e niu-t result in difficulty and delay. A point of still greater importance k the lack of such intimate know bulge o! the Admiralty of far Eastern quest ionspolitieal. naval and military as will

be possessed by those on the spci. It was very clearly exemplified during the late war that it was difficult In visualise and realise, in -. distance ef even some three thousand miles, the conditions existing in the theatre ei war. Tt wiil he far more difficult to realise these conditions if the theatre of war were (sa.v) ten thousand, miledistant. For this reason 1 am i r-n----vincod that the British Admiriify would find it necessary to deceitlr.tlise the direction of the operations ol the Far Eastern Meet to a very considerable extent, and "the question arisj-s as to (lie authorily to whom the tli.tc--1 it'll should be given. In my view an Admiral alloat sir i id not be the central authority. lie cannot take the same broad view of the whole situation as an officer in shore, who is kept in constant touch by land wire and wireless telegraphy with the situation in all parts of the thentre oi war. Incidents arise which do no' directly concern the commandcr-i.i . 'del afloat, or of which he may me. be in e position to realise the import euro. ’I lie eoinmamier-in-chief afloat, again can never have the same facilities for sifting the value of information re- cit ed.

THE NAVAI. BASE. COMMAND EROM SINGAPORE. I. am. therefore, of opinion that ihe general direction ef the opera' imi> of tl: • Ear Eastern Fh ot weld he best curried out by a Hag-officer of high ran!: residing on bore at Singapore, and assisted bv a strong Mali'. Th 1 i inimandei'-in-ehiel' afloat and the Hag officers comma oiling the units of the Far Eastern Eleet should all mine under him in war. although, except when placed under his command for the purpose of Hoot exercises, the Dominion navies would not. come under him in peace. The Admiral in chief command at Singapore should visit such places in llie Pa.-ilic and Indian Oceans as are ot imparlance for naval purposes in war. in order that he may have a very ini: male knowledge of the general situation. It would also he most desirable that he should visit the Dominions so that be noav become familiar with the problems which ronf-nil them. He should lie assisted in his duties by informa ure ' furnished to him by the Naval Boards of New Zealand and Auslarlia and the naval authorities in oilier dominions; and he should. of ipurse, hr in constant touch with the Admiralty and the officers commanding the British squadrons in China and the East. Indies.

Kff acClass of Vessel. Initial Cost. tive life. £ Years. Battleships 3.000.001» 15 Battle cruisers -1,000.000 15 Light cruisers 500.000 15 Flotilla loaders 200,000 12 Destroyers ICO .000 12 Submarines ... . 150,000 15 Depot ships 200,001> 25 Repair ships — •200.000 25 Submarine Parent ship (large') •200,000 25 Submarine Parent ship Ismail) 132.1 mV) 25 Mim-s weepers . 70.000 21 * Mine-layer 150 .nun 2- 1 Aircraft carrier 200,0! * > (sinaJi) 150,000