HUB OF THE PACIFIC

Hokitika Guardian, 16 June 1923, Page 4

HUB OF THE PACIFIC

ST NO APOR IT’S HUP OR TA NC E. BRITISH NAVAL STRATEGY. LORD JELLICOE’S REPORT. FLYING RATTLE SQUADRON. The decision of the Admiralty to spend U'l 1,000,000 upon the develop ment of Singapore sounds much more formidable than it will actually prove, says Sir Herbert Russell, in the Naval and Military Record. For eleven millions is the total estimated cost of the work to he undertaken, and this will he spread over a number of years. During the current financial year the outlav is about £200,000.

Describing the Singapore decision appeals as an act of sagacious fore sight, the writer says:—The little 's land lying off the .southern spur of the Malay peninsula is, in fact, the natural strategic huh of the great Racine zone, ft is the meeting point ol the limits of three of our overseas naval stations: the China, the East Indies, and the Australasian. Rehind it, considered in the light of ally potential objectives, lies the Africa station.

With thiil rapidity of transformation ! which is characteristic of the changes in naval rivalry, Hie “centre of gravity'’ shifted on the conclusion of l?ic war from the North Sea to the Pacific. The European navies ceased to occupy ! premier place in the strategical vision of the British Admiralty. The Heels ' of the United States and Japan, vt hii-i----hail sull’ered comparatively little dur ing the prolonged struggle, were In- ; two paramount forces in sea power ; The conflict- of interests and ideals bo- | I ween the two milieus lent an enliauej ed significance to the big programmes !of a*'w naval construction upon wbic : j cadi bad embarked. America Irnnsj ferred the hulk of her navy info Ihe ; I’acitic. Australia (idled aloud over [ her vulnerability amid this now irder ! of things.

LORD .JELLfCOE’S REPORT. The Admiralty split, out Lord -Iclii • cue to study and report, upon the strategic situation. He proposed, the formation of a powerful imperial Pacific Fleet. Viewed in the light ol the principles which have always guided our distribution of naval power, lit was undoubtedly rigid. Rut poli'ie.i! considerations had to he taken into account. The Pacific zone is only ni coiiseriuenci' to ourselves owing to ibe activities ol the American and the Japanese Navies. Aliy big colleentrat iott

of mu' warships !n thiil ocean must needs have direct reference to 'no-" navies. A policy which pi<■--111M'-• -> A iiction mi tlu> purl of America directed •asiainst British interests, when there was pm ;i particle ot eviilencc to up-Lto.-'i anyt him! ot tlio sort, wotihl no! have received sanction in this conntrv. .la pun was our very eood Irieiul, nml 'till hound (o us by treaty. Any forinidnhle oroupiiu! of ships infeientially directed aitainst her would have heen purposely provocative. So the Pacific Kleet proposal was quietly slipped into a pipeon-holo at Whitehall. Nevertheless, the Admiralty realised that l.ord .lellicoe was perfectly riyhl. spenkiin! I rum tic viewpoint o! a naval advisor. So they coinproniised. and, m this eoinproini'C wc find the raison d etro ot the Singapore seheine. Also we lind the iontrollin'! factor in the dcsipn of tie' iwo new eanit.'d ships, Nelson him ; \m-iiii. When these vessels are completed we shall posses- a very powerful tlvini! squadron, including: the llood, Itepulse reeoiisi rueied 'inoo the " .ir • land Renown to he recoil'l rtlete I . I Those vessels are all eaiadde m I sicauoue: ,‘l!i knots, and me all armed \\i;!t I Ain. mills 'the two new 'hips w:e prolinhlv mount Ifiin. jitins). '!biuiean- that they eould (jet from linoland into the heart, of the Pari lie- •■.one in shout, tv.a-nty davs. Such mobility is tantaeionni to a pretty eood substitute for the permanent maml eiianc" oi a d el ill (lii.se waters. KASTRRN BASIf KSSRNTJAR. Rut a nowerfitl fleet without an aih' (plate hase is a sure hostayc to tadur" and disaster. In fact, one may tm fin liter, and snv that it is an imnos-i----11; |it v. Ilomha v can dock a DreadSo can I Immle.iiv;. iiul ttn-s place, are too reunite, too much b" j \011(1 l a frin :c (a tin; I’a-. i i-' a me. to II a • (.1 am value in the slriUiu'ie eali cu hit ion... i S'non pore is orom apliieally ideal a!a ua ve.l I 'ue:lie ren lezvotts. More.it ■: jit is lii. lad, endow, d hy iwm I .' j i tic purrui'e. In the shi.dt.civd loci- j | -iito the north-east oi Rliikniio j \faii l-.lntid there i- an avernoe depte lot R) fathoms. Kepn.d hailmiir, witii jits hivakwatoi. affords perfect shelter | aoaiii't anv weather, only ii is not I (!• ep euoii. h fur modern battle-hip-, I and a h;o dreilo.iio selieme is part ol File Admiralty project. Very rich oilfields lie within easy j iR-i auee of the place, and it is oro i p sod to establish all imiin u e lllcl [demit. The old ’l’anioilc! Paccar Docks are too simtll to take anythino beyond ■t liylit cruiser. Imt the new Kino's Due!; can accommodate any exist!!!.!* British warship, with the solitary exeeptiou of the Hood.

SUBMARINES AND AIRCRAFT. Apparently ihe new naval works are In bo of a permanent < Imraeter. That i> to sav. they v. ill consist, ol massive stone quays and masonry docks. This is Hie one feature of the scheme which seems open to criticism. Floating docks are so nnielt more economical and so adequate ill all respects that the general view appears to be they will entirely supersede pennanenl docks in future developments. Singapore offers oNcellonl shelter for iho mooring of su'-ii si mi l tire-. Furthermore, the place lends itself to defence by means of artillery, mines and submarines so oll'oelively that it is diflicnll to believe iluil a, hostile licet would dare to approach it to within aUacking distance. Singapore is the strategic key to the defence of Australia. Tho idea is t.-.

develop it as a great: submarine and aircraft base, but with adequate accommodation to meet tho requirements of a battle fleet in c:t‘-e of necessity So long as wo seel; to maintain our position as a great sea Power, «o long must cur Admiralty keep pace wiib the naval progress of other nations, in whatever part of the world this may be going ~u. li will he only psosiblo to desist from this policy when, in an incredible wave of sanitv. the whole of mankind agrees to heat its war weapons into ploughshares.

Therefore, in view of the great change in the international balance of naval power which lias come about since the war, the .Singapore scheme is c-'eiuially a sound one.