REPRESENTATION.

Hokitika Guardian, 18 November 1922, Page 4

REPRESENTATION.

THE PROPORTIOXAL SYSTEM

(By P. H. Jones). Written for the “Lyttelton Times.”

Proportional representation is based upon a frank recognition of parties as indispensable in free government. This very 'recognition, instead of making partisan government all-powerful, is the necessary condition for subordinating parties to the public good. Proportional representation is. advocated as a means for supplementing party responsibility with the individual responsibility of law-makers to the people. It will do this first by bringing into legislative assemblies able and experienced men, the true leaders of their parties and the people. The aica of choice is widened, and a party leader need no longer he excluded because lie happens to live in a district where his party is in a minority; all the money or influence of an opposing I party could effect nothing unless his i own followers become disaffected. It is well known that, when a party leader has achieved prominence, the entire resources of the opposite party are i thrown into bis limited district to compass bis defeat. Neither oould factions and interests holding the balance of power dictate nominations; compromise candidates—dark horses—would lie unknown. With proportional representation frequent elections would be combined with life-long service, provided the representative retained the confidence of a single quota of tlio \otcis. The manipulation of elections would not engross him. Ilis only thought would be to know that in his legislative duties be truly represented his quota of supporters. Frequent elections would give the people power quietly to drop him if he ceased to represent them. XJnder the district sys-

tem, frequent elections are dangerous to both the good and the bad. Under proportional representation they endanger only the bad. It is easily seen that this increased

power to reject the nominees of a party must react strongly upon the character of the nominees. The latter arc nominated to be elected. I ndei> the present system very inferior

men may be elected, bcausc the voters have no other choice. Let them have, however, the wide freedom of choice which proportional representation gives and the party leaders will lie forced to place before them a much higher grade of candidate, who will be suited to their wishes. The secret of this freedom of the voter springs from two facts; first instead of requiring a majority to elect a candidate, a. nfueli smaller fraction can do so and second, n wide territorial area is given for combinations of voters of the same opinions. Under the present system, independent voters who actually place a

ticket in the field are usually in the minority. If- however, we count those who stay at home, as wo should do to a large extent, the number of independents is very great. But proportional representation allows them to combine within their own party organisation without promoting the success of the opposing party.

Proportionnl representation would go far towards bringing out a full vote. It is only the fear of wasting their votes on good men who have no chance of winning which deters the people from voting against the had candidates, who arc forced upon them by the party organisation.

So crude a measure as compulsory voting could not change the results of the present system. Compulsory voting does not furnish an outlet for independence. It would rather tighten the control of the party leaden© Tlio margin of mobile voters who change party is seldom -1 per cent of tlio total vote. Compulsory voting might possibly change this slightly, but it oould do no more than substitute one party for another. The real problem is not how to com pel unwilling electors to vote, but how to give effect to the votes of those who are willing.

The objection against proportional representation on the ground that it abandons what is called “party responsibility” proceeds from the assertion that it gives no party a clear majority. Under proportional representation parties if defeated would lose hut a small proportion of their representatives. No matter how close the votes of parties a popular rebuke would usually lesson its vote not more than o per cent. except in cases where disaffection within the party has brought out an independent ticket. Under the district system a reversal of .5 per cent, is catastrophic; and an entire party, good and bad, go down together. Thus the idea is unduly prominent that the people reject the party as a whole, and the fiction is fostered of “party responsibility.” The weightiest popular objection to proportional representation springs from that partisan sympathy with the spoils system which denies the right of to minor groups of voters not included in the two dominant par tie*.

With all parties fairly represented by their ablest leaders, legislatures would become d.elilreratc assemblies, instead of arenas for party strife. The objection against proportional representation has just been cited that it would nullify party responsibility. It is said that it would do this by giving a small minority the balance of power and enable it to dictate legislation. This would weaken the Government ami prevent a consistent policy. Wo have frequently noticed the very close popular vote as between the two great parties, neither of them receiving a majority. Third and fourth parties, therefore, if given their proportionate weight in legislation, would often hold the balance. Of course with the existing system they already have this advantage, but with proportional representation the same, would more frequently happen.

This objection, the most serious yet presented against proportional representation, overlooks the principle of equality and justice in representation. It may prove here, as elsewhere, that justice is the wisest expediency. It is a curious anomaly, showing confusion of thought regarding democracy, that a. people who insist on universal suffrage should deny the right of representation to those minor political parties whose existence is the natural fruit of this suffrage. J'lic argument against proportional representation is that i,t would give too great influence

to the socialists and other “dangerous” elerpgnts. Possibly universal suffrage is unwise, and the franchise should he restricted, hut haying grantecl it, the dangerous elements become more dan-

gerous if they are denied that hearing wljieh the suffrage promises. Vice and corruption thrive by secrecy. Nothing is so mortal to them as exposure. It

is suicidal to come out in the open, and defend themselves in their nakedness. The serious faults with the present system is its rich opportunities for underhand work on the part of the corrupt classes. They alone have no political prin ciples, and can therefore take sharp

advantages of the party divisions of the people. By their very corruption they have far more than their proportionate representation. Proportional representation would give them a hearing, for they are entitled to it, but it would deny them supremacy. The argument, however, of thoso who fear that third parties will hold the balance of power is not based solely on a dread of the corrupt classes, but rather o fthe idealists, the reformers, faddists and cranks sq-callcd. They would retain exclusive majority rule and party responsibility in order to prevent til? disproportionate influence cf these petty groups. They overlookof course, the weight of the argument already made, that individual responsibility is more important for the people that the corporate responsibility of parties. Again, a strong government, so called, is needed mainly in the administration of foreign affairs; there is no public question which so thorough ly extinguishes party lines as a serious complication. Proportional representation could only exist with a spoils system because it would end in deadlocks and incapacity; hut this surely cannot he a serious objection to the reform.

There are deeper reasons for believing that a just representation of the people by their recognised leaders would guarantee an efficient and stable Government, freed from ’ the dictation of extremists, who hold the balance of power. The majority of the people arc not extremists. They will not consent to radical departures from existing , institutions. The points of agreement between political parties on principles 1 and measures are therefore far morn numerous than those of divergence Par ties differ only on tile fringe of polities. "When the outs come in, they do not radically reverse the policy of their predecessors. The late Viscount IViyce (“American Commonwealth”), has pointed out the community of interests which exist between parties on ’occasion of independent reformers. They arc also in u more or less per- ; manent coalition. | The fundamental nature of legislators is compromise. But compromise seems to compound with evil! “No question is settled until it is settled i right.” True indeed; there is a base | <|'miiroin’ise burn of 'pusillanimity, I which fortifies and strengthens the evil. But true expediency plans for the ultimate extinction of hoary wrong [lt recognises, however that right is ! not all on one side. Historical con- ! ditions, inherited privileges, legal enactments, of themselves create rights. , The district system prevents compro- . miso by keeping new parties out of . representation.

It must not he supposed that proportional representation by increasing compromise, would prevent reform, fndeed, it would forward the day <f t genuine reform. And this not liv erratic jumps or civil war, hut like the steady processes of nature. Reform movements would have a hearing in , their beginnings, legislation would prepare for them and The minds of men ripen for them ; only in this way could they provet reactions. i By means of proportional represen- i tation present-day reforms would show themselves inside party organisations. At present our parties are grown over with a crust of tradition. They do ! not respond to the growing body within. New movements being unrepresented, the leaders run to extremes. These have not the advantages of responsibility, of conference and friction wHth the representatives of existing conditions. Hence they become visionaries instead of practical reformers and the public learns to distrust them. .1

The first effects of every innovation are always viewed with alarm, for we fail to perceive that a far-reaching reform brings with it a series of changes harmonising with it a series of changes harmonising with it. ,Tt does not follow that, with proportional representation. third parties, composed of socalled cranks, faddists, impraeticnhlcs repudiationists or what not would increase in size, and continuously hold the lalanco of power. A few able men of noble humanitarian though “visionary” ideas, in every assembly, would bo an actual gain. But if their views are truly impracticable and unjust nothing .will so demonstrate the fact to them and their followers as the responsibility for practicable legislation, and the hard contact with other views uphold by men of ability in legislative halls. There are many sensible citizens who to-day would gladly see political and industrial conditions improved. hut who find no place in the dominant party organisations, and are distrustful of the extreme reform or-

ganisations. so are therefore enrolled in flint army of voters -wlio stay at home. These would take an active interest in politics and modify lry their new-found influence the personnel of both t.he new parties and the old. In these ways the balance of power would bo held, not liv faddists, blit by the solid, patriotic, disinterested/ citizenship of the country.