The Hokitika Guardian SATURDAY, OCTOBER 7th., 1922 THE WEEK.

Hokitika Guardian, 7 October 1922, Page 2

The Hokitika Guardian SATURDAY, OCTOBER 7th., 1922 THE WEEK.

Jr was good news to learn on 'Llpusda.y that the Allied-Turko Conf<jtenco at Mudnnia had reached an agreement. This was confirmed later h,v the an* nonneenient from British and French headquarters that the Conference had plroved! satisfactory. The conference was organised on military lines and very properly the pre-s was excluded, thus precluding the colored reports that invariably are circulated about Rurni can alfairs when a eonllict of views is in progress—its was the case in tli-s instance. The French authorities tnhuted ‘•both sides” for the conciliatory attitude taken up ‘‘Both sides” in this instance would be represented bv British and Turkish interests. Tt was dear from the outset that the Turks were to gain materially on the Sevres Treaty conditions, the Turkish demands being tantamount to a revision of that “peace” settlement. The Creeks are the losers. They had the substance, but wanted tlm shadow of something greater and now they have lost even the substance and in addition wrecked their hopes for foreign expansion. The British attitude was to maintain treaty conditions, and on that point (treat Britain took a firm stand even though deserted by France and Ttnly in regard to the maintenance of the neutral zone to sure the Dardanelles for world traffic. Franco and Ttnly. even though there he an amicable settlement and war is averted, eannol he the gainer. They will both sacrifice much sympathy all over the British Empire and it does not appear they can afford to do that for any passing advantage they might gain by promised favors from Turkey. 'Neither France nor Italy can do without British .support in times of stress, and as the alliance or entente could hardly bear the strain of the Turkish situation when the protection of the neutral zone in a far off country was endangered and other circumstances more intimate with home defence might arise in which the Allied relations would he equally a disadvantage. It will nd he surprising therefore, if rs an outcome of Britain’s handful of soldiers being left alone at the Dardanelles to face the hordes of Turks. British feeling towards her allies will become F ardent, and there will grow up a desire to reveit to the “splendid isolation" which at one time was Britain’s attitude, or whether an alliance written or understood, will grow up between tbe English speaking races, who could become tin- dominant, masters of the world, so far as the application of force or the threat of a. salutary boycott- might he necessary to ensure the peace of the world.

The terms of the Mudania agreement reported to fie satisfactory, are not yet fully disclosed. There is the assurance that Turkey will get Thrace back, bait at the time of writing it is not clear whether the western, as well ns the eastern portion is included. Tile preliminary terms indicated eastern Thrace would lie returned to Turkey, but it is the western section where the Greeks are mostly in force, and an Allied Commission had been sent there to investigate the local position. The fact that Constantinople is to have a mixed form of government, permitting Allied interests to lie represented, suggests that the neutrality of the Straits from the Dardanelles to the Bospliorous will he further confirmed, and an international sea highway free from naval defence secured. This lias an important hearing on Roumanian and Rusisnn interests. Tt will tend to safegun id the former more and will heln to jojd fhe jatj.il piVVe p check,

should dire meessity arise again. The compromise which lias been necessaiy and the material concessions made to the Turks are due to the Allied deferences, and it is hoped will be an object lesson for better co-ordination in the future. Certainly, it is veil that war lias been avoided, and if Britain has secured her point in regard to the neutral zone, and the free highway, all that, was most essential has been obtained. For the rest, Britain can afford to look on somewhat passively.

Tub League of Nations has rather missed its opportunity in the Near East situation. An Australian writer in reviewing the position arising from the recent course of events in Asia Minor touches on the subject fil the •League very clearly. He said: iho Geneva Assembly met under rather favourable auspices. The prestige en-

joyed by the League of Nations has been considerably enhanced by its achievements. The Assembly had met twice previously and had set its house in order. Subsidiary organisations had Peon established and had done useful if unspectacular work. Powers swell ns France, which had originally been rather sceptical as to the value of the League, had begun to take it more seriously, and even to advocate an extension of its authority. 'But while it would he wrong to say that the prestige of the League has lieen in any way lessened, recent events have direetd attention to its limitations. These arc in part inherent in the constitution ol the League; in part they are due to the fact that in so composite a gathering some members must inevitably possess an imperfect appreciation of the peculiar problems and circumstances of others. Thus the strictures which the Mandates Commission passed on the administration of mandated territories by the States responsible aroused a certain amount of resentment among the latter. It was felt that- the commission did not fully understand the position, and the represent'ative of New •Zealand has bluntly accused it of exceeding its proper function. So, too, at one time it seemed as if the Assembly were going to turn itself into a burro immigration bureau and attempt to' inundate the dominions‘with hoa'ds of expatriated Russians. It was only when the Australian delegates pointed out that Australia’s capacity to absorb immigrants of this typo was very limited that the idea was dropped. Again the League has been criticised for its inactivity during the present crisis in the Near T'last. Here surely, if ever, was a fitting ccvnsTon for it to intervene. But the League did not move of its own volition, and if a settlement is reached it will net be through its offices.

The invocation of the League by Australia and other members was prompted by the conviction that no method of securing a peaceful solution should he left untried, lint even if the League had seen fit to act it would have been a mistake to build too confidently on the result. Let us assume for a moment that the League had decided upon intervention. What powers precisely does it possess to deal with such a situation as has arisen? Hie dispute is between members of the League on the one hand and on the other Turkey who is not a member of the League. r l’he Covenant provides for such a coiltiugeuev. Article 1, declared that the noii-member “shall lie invited to accept the obligations of membership in the League for the purpose of such dispute." If the non-member accepts the invitation, the provisions of Articles 12 to 111 apply automatically. The dispute is submitted to arbitration and Ibe parties to it are pledged not to resort t.i war until throe .months after ihe award. If Turkey had accepted the invitation, well and good; a breathing space would at least have lioen gained. But suppose that Turkey, as she might quite possibly have done, bail refused the invitation. What measures could the League have taken then? Here again the Covenant supplies the answer The League can declare an economic boycott of the recalcitrant State and the Council “recommend to the Uovei nments concerned what military and naval force the members of the League shall severally contribute to the armed forces to be used to protect the covenants ot the League. In certain circumstances these measures might well be effective, but was that probable in the ease of Turkey? Tt is quite on the cards thaat certain of the Governments concerned might not have been prepared to act on the recommendations; Italy, indeed, has already intimated that she will not participate in any military operations in the Near Fast. Again, even if the fifty four members of the League had loyally enforced the boycott it would not by any means have isolated Turkey. With Russia and Germany to fill the economic and financial breach. Turkey would not suffer greatly from being sent to Coventry by the others, and doubtless Russia and Germany would see in

smell a boycott a golden opportunity

j The crux of the matter is that the inj Huenee which the League can exert j is still merely persuasive in character, j The League has not the material powi er to compel a dissident Stale to suli--1 illit to its jurisdiction or to obey its decrees. This is recognised even hv those who believe most firmly in its future. It may lie argued that, even if ; the League had attempted to compose j the present dispute and had failed, (its failure should not he regarded as a conclusive proof of its ineffectuality. , For. although a ease for intervention I could be made out. and although the efforts of the League might conceivably have been successful, as they were in the Upper Silesia dispute, the situation nevertheless is not actually one for which the League was created to deal. This aspect of the question was em- , phasised by Earl Balfour at Geneva a fortnight ago. The League had been 1 twitted with its helplessness in the face of the war in the Near Fast. I Earl Balfour replied that the criticism j was unfair that the League was supj posed to start, off with a clean sheet. I Its function was to preserve the peace j which its founders imagined had teen j established, and not to wind up the j war of which the Greeco-Turkish con- ! diet was practically a continuation. The purpose of the League was to concern itself with new disputes and not j with struggles which are essentially ! part and parcel of the Great War. The j-oqg'trt \yafi not ojined with iwwWwrj'

for ending the Great War: it had neither men, ships nor money. Earl Balfour argued that it should he invested with greater powers, hut that would not eliminate another possibility. The effective strength of the League in the last resort consists in the strength of its four most puissant members. Where they agree all is plain sailing. But whore they do not sec eye to eye, as has happened to-day, and may happen again, the endeavours of the League are liable to be stultified. Perhaps in time the evolution of a moral sentiment among nations will enlarge its authority, hut meanwhile we must recognise that although within its sphere the League has fully justified itself, that sphere is circumscribed and the endeavours of the League to promote peace may be frustrated by its inability to coerce the disputants.