The Problem of the Pacific

Hokitika Guardian, 30 September 1922, Page 4

The Problem of the Pacific

Strategical and political possibilities in tlio Pacific, have always been a favourite subject" of speculation, but now that the strategical centre of gravity has definitely shifted to that ocean, quite a library of books lias appeared devoted to various aspects of the changed situation. British, Australian, American, and Japanese writers have all discussed the future of the Pacific in relation to the peculiar circumstances of their respective countries, and to this cosmopolitan list the name of a Russian must now lie added. In “The Problem of the Pacific in the Twentieth Century” General N. Golovin deals with the position as it presents itself to a Hussion ,and his point of view is interesting ,although fiis conclusions am perhaps open to some criticism. Gen- • era! Golovin was helped ill his work by Admiral A. D. Bubnov, although .wo gather that the latter’s role was that of a consultant rather than a collaborator. General Golovin is an officer of the Tsarist regime. For long lie was a member of the general staff in Petrograd, and held an important command ion the Kastern front prior to the revolution. Subsequently lie joined Kolchak in Siberia, ' but had to raliuqitisli liis post ill the ■ AVhite army on account of a serious J illness, and went to Japan, where he has since resided. i General Golovin surveys the social j and economic conditions of Japan, i Here is a people in whom patriotism ! is still a vital force, and submission to authority as crystallized in the Emperor as tradition. Any policy which the Government chooses to adopt can count upon the unreserved support of the Japanese as a whole. Here again, is a country which is already overcijowded, which requires to import food and raw materials, and, which above all needs an outlet for its surplus population. It has been suggested that the industrialisation of Japan will relieve the pressure and make emigration oil a large scale unnecessary. General Golovin does not .subscribe to this theory. "The natural increase of population is so rapid that industrialisation can give no permanent relief. Emigration is the only solution. Where ora the Japanese emigrants to go? Some writers have argued that thinly inhabit;!ted Eastern Siberia and Northern Manchuria would offer a suitable field. But the author replies that the Japanese is slow to avail himself of his opportunities in these regions. He docs not like the cold, and will not settle in any numbers in countries north of the forty-fifth parallel. Moreover, he is esentially an islander. organically hound to tlie sea, to its industries and climate. General Golovin quotes statistic© with regard to settlement in Northern Asia which hear out his contention. So, apparently, the Japanese overflow will naturally he in the south. It will not he directed to places which are already densely populated such as Java or Timor, hut to the thinly populated Philippines, where the natives could not withstand Japanese aggression, and would soon he absorbed by them. I lie Philippines have, another advantage from the Japanese point of view. Tiu.ii geographical position renders them of tiuneiise strategical value. If Japan occupied the group her power would extend uninterruptedly athwart. the Pacific; she would cut off Eastern Asia from the ocean, and would thus dominate all t lie* yedlow races. “No 011 c would he able* to compel Japan to make such agreements as the* Gentleman’s Agreement. Japan would bo in a position not only to guarantee tin* full freedom of yellow emigration, but. to open new routes for tiiass emigration.” Hut what is America supposed to be doing all this time? Would America supinely acquiesce in tin* loss ol the Philippines? General Golovin examines Lb<> strategical position in the Pacific in the event of a war between these two Powers, and bis conclusions are substantially those at which Mr B.vwator arrives in his well-known hook, “Rea Power and the Pacific.” At present the Philippines are virtually indefensible. The fortifications are obsolete, and the naval force stationed there is of ncgligildo fighting value. The immediate occupation ol the group by Japan would present no difficulties whatever. Of course America would despatch a fleet to the Philippines, but the nearest American base is at Pearl Harbour in Hawaii, live thousand miles away. The American vessels would reach their destination only to find the

Japanese in possession : their hunkers would be. depleted, and they would have to give battle in unfavourable conditions. America’s only weapon would be a blockade of Japan. At the best America could only develop her strength slowly, the war would he a very long business, with an uncertain issue, and throughout America would be most grievously handicapped by the lack of convenient bases. Even if we assume that Britain and France put their naval stations ill the East at the disposal of America, her plight would not Ik* greatly improved. The harbour

of Saigon is small and has no docks for big battleships. Hongkong, declares General Golovin, would lie an easy nut for Japan to crack. In sup-

part of this startling assertion tin* author quotes Admiral Jellicoe’s propi.sal-. which provided for a fleet hased upon Singapore rather than Hongkong. The clinic;* of Singapore for a base, argues General Golovin, shows that Lord Jellicu© recognised the weakness of Hongkong, lint surely the real reason was that the scheme explicitly envisages the defence of the* Indian and the Pacific Oceans as the (b lance of a single ocean with ,Singapore as its ceil (re.

lhe p: rturhed reader will 'mainre!h he moved to protest. These gloomy predictions might have lad some point a year ago, hut surely the Washington ('(inference has made a difference. Yet General Golovin merely sees in the achievements of that conference an application by tin* Japanese of the principles of jujitsu. Japan, while conserving her own strength, manoeuvres her opponent into a position in which he does himself injury, it was urgently necessary for Japan to arrest the tempo of armaments. Her economic circumstances math* it impossible for her to compete with America, particularly in the construction of bnlliesliips. Limitation was entirely in her liter.‘sts, and it should he noted that He agreement places no restriction on the building of certain ten's of ves* I essential to a naval campaign of the

:ini| which, according to the author, la pa n contemplates. Again. Hie miIcrt k'lig not to construct additional ''orliticatioiis in I lie islands of the lies America's hands without 1 n,, Japan of any right of value '.i I or. In any case slip could not fortify the groups held iind-r lnniidntc, while Formosa and the Pescadores are already sufficiently fortified. Hut the pact prevents America from fortifying Guam, which Mr Bvwnt"; insists is the hey to the Pacific. Incidentally, General Golovin doubts whether Guam could he made impregnable: it is so small, he says, that it could he “shot through.” Tn this contention he is not supported cither by Mr By water’s expert testimony or h'.- naval experience, which shows that even the most powerful battleships

have seldom or never successfully attacked land fortifications of tmj strength and armament. 11l fine General Golovin believes that by the fetters which America voluntarily riveted on herself at Washington she has deprived her diplomacy of any real power in Far Eastern questions. Japan has gained a breathing space in which to complete her economic, and more especially her metallnrgic, preparations for the war while masking these preparations by subtle moves of diplomacy. When they are

completed “she will start a ‘preventive’ war without giving her more powerful and rich neighbours (be clmnee of bringing tlioir armaments to the ne*essarv proportions.” Japan has out-manoeuvred America, and the only problem that now faces her diplomatists is that “of maintaining the outward appearance which will serve best to conceal ' the real objects of their policy. In this respect they have already had plenty of experience in the past.’’ Tf General Golovin’s premises he granted his conclusion follows naturally enough. Rut can they be granted? The whole of his argument rests upon the assumption that Japan *s destitute of good faith and international morality— an assumption which is 11s gratuitous as it is offensive.