Viscount Bryce on International Relations.

Hokitika Guardian, 12 August 1922, Page 4

Viscount Bryce on International Relations.

Towards the end of last year the late Viscount Bryce visited America and delivered a series of lectures which have now been posthumously published under the title of “Intelnational Relations.” Hi-s aim is fo discuss the principles upon which international policy has been based at different periods in the world’s history, and -to consider how far its authors have succeeded in attaining their var- ( ions objects. While economic rda- , tions between nations have been draw jug closer, he observes, and while personal intercourse between their members is f ;ir more frequent, political friendliness between the States has not increased; the reverse, indeed, is true Whv does ill-feeling continue to be so rife? Why is it that before the clouds of the great war have vanished from the sky new clouds are using over the horizon ? What can be done to avert the dangers which are threatening the peace of mankind ? The 9 | are some of the questions which propounds. Ilis answers to them arc informed by the erudition, d( ‘ ta< ' l ; me.it, and extensive knowledge of public affairs, which always characterise Lord Bryce’* work. Those who believe that man * by nature a bellicose individual can find ample justification for their mo" 111 kisturv. Philosophers have imagined a golden age in which there were no wars, and primitive man. unspoiled by the doubtful blessings of civilisation, lived in haryiony with hi s neighbour. But aetualy no such age ever existed The nearer we approach to a state or nature the more perpetual is the warfare and the more hitter the struggle for life. “When the curtain rises, that curtain which concents the prehistoric past, we see fighting everywhere over the earth. All the races of Europe were fighting—Celts and Iberians and Slavs and Teutons. Each tribe was always at war with othei tribes, so wero the great civilised kingdoms of antiquity. . . Jhe facts which ancient historians report are exactly similar to those which we know from the reports of travellers who have visited the newly discovered countries since the voyages of Columbus and Vasco de Damn. Everywhere war. everywhere the delight ol war. The only mitigations of the all prevailing practice of strife were to he found in the protection that was accorded to heralds and messengers hearing what we should call the flag of truce, and in the recognition of cer-

tain customs u.’gulatiug communications between enemies. . . These are the liifst beginnings of what has ->ecn developed into a kind of international law.” And these habits inherited from our belligerent progenitors have endured. In the history of the world war occupies a very large place. let ever and again man. as though weary of incessant strife, has attempted to devise some organisation, some machinery, some, expedient, through which we can enjoy peace. Olteu he has been disappointed, but sometimes bis efforts have been rpwardejd, and for a spa.ee at least the dash of arms has been stilled.

Viscount Bryce divides the history of international relations into five periods. During the first universal violence was the rule, and the relations subsisting between States were generally hostile. Where they came into contact at all it nils usually Jor purposes of battle. But -with the growth of ltonuin power the gates ol the Temple of Janus were shut, and the Pax Humana was inaugurated. The inhabitants of tiie civilised world were absorbed in the Umpire, and gradually came to regard themselves- as being all Homans, and not as Gauls, Macedonians, Egyptians, and so forth, as the case may he. Ihe Pax ii Oma n a was not a perfect world peace. There was also somie lip'litiing 'on one or other of the frontiers, and aften there were internal conilicts between rival aspirants to the Imperial throne. But still it. was a better time than there had ever been belore or than there was to he for long thereafter. The collapse ol Home was followed by the retrograde dark ages, ages whose unrestricted violence was tempered on occasions by the proclamation of a “Truce of God” or “Pax Kcclosiae.” These spasmodic attempts to promote peace usher in the third period in which an endeavour was made to apply Christianity to the betterment of political relations. The Pope as the spiritual and the Knipcror as the secular head of Christendom, each recognised, in theory at least, that the prevention of war was a duty. But the religious schisms ot the fifteenth and sixteen centuries threw Europe into a‘turmoil which readied its climax in the terrible Thirty Veins’ War. Europe was hied white, and its reaction against war manifested itself in the two developments which marked the fourth period—namely, the formulation of a body of rulers, which would alleviate the worst horrors of war, and the concept ot “The Balance of Power,” which sought to maintain an equilibrium between the great States, and thus to prevent any one of them becoming strong enough to threaten the independence of others. Finally in our own times we have the fifth period, which, says V iscount Bryce, has two main characteristics. The “State” ha* become the people, and is no longer the titular rulers; the co-operation of the people a s a whole is required jf war is to be waged. In the second place this period lias witnessed the growth of certain anti-national movements. On the one hand there is socialism, which is definitely international; Bn the other there are such movements as Pan-Sla-vism, Pan-Turnninnism, and the 1 ilco which appeal to racial sentiment without refernee to existing national boon claries.

The fifth period readied its culmination in the great? war and in the ■treaties which ended it. Viscount Bryce ranges himself among the critics of the settlement, although he is less acrimonious and more inclined to give its authors their clues than are many. Comparing it with one framed by the Congress of Vienna after Napoleon’s fall, he* points nut that while Metthernich, Casflereagh, Talleyrand, and the rest of them may have been cynical and unscrupulous reactionaries, at any rate they knew wlint they were doing, and gave effect to their principles. The work, after all, bad

as it was, bestowed upon Europe a c tolerable peace which lasted for more d than 80 years. But the unfortunate thing is that at Versailles the Allied statesmen did not know what they n were doing; it is doubtful indeed „ whether they knew exactly what they (( wanted to do. Viscount Bryce i s not r; unwilling to credit them with honesty j of purpose, although he hints that in r his opinion some of them did not with , sufficient steadfastness resist the temptution to play down to their eonstitu- n ents. But, apart from that, the bus- [ iness before them was one of unprece- j dented difficulty. A task so great t, needed not politicans of the usual j type, but supermen, and the supermen did not appear. In the upshot “there is not one of the treaties of 1919-20 which is not already admitted to need amendments. Some are utterly condemned by results already visible. Some are said to be leading straight to future wars. One bears people say all over Europe: “1 he sort of peace that these negotiations have given us is just as had as war.’ Is, then, the solution to be found in the democratic control of international policy? Viscount Bryce devotes j a very interesting chapter to a discussion of the feasibility ol this. Ibe (question i s by no means so simple as some of the advocates of popular control would have ust believe. In domestic affairs the people can act directly by way of reierendum or indirectly through their representatives in a.. legislature. Either method is suitable in matters which can be dealt with b.v legislation. But foreign policy is a different-kind of matter Ike facts with which it is contented are in a constant state of ilux. they change from week to week, almost from day to day; 1 bey change at borne, they change abroad; and through the changes new issues are continually emerging. I low can the expression ol the popular will. b\ a vote, or even indirectly through the legislation, keep pace with these rapid transformations? Again, are the people qualified to direct foreign policy? Have they the knowledge upon which to base a sound judgment? The average citizen is not particularly interested in foreign questions, save hv fits and starts; they demand an acquaintance of history and geography, and various conditions allecting a loreigu country which are outside his range; lie is inclined to lake hs views readymade. Surely the experts who have made foreign allairs a life-long stmlx are more reliable guides than the uniformed multitude? Lord Bryce admits tliis, hut argues that from time to time certain broad and comparative])’ simple issues arise on which the j temple ought to bo consulted before liny irervocablo step is taken, and on which the judgment of the people is as likely to he right as that of the "Ministers who are conducting uegotia tioiis or that of the Opposition lead ers who are denouncing their course This is particularly the ease where tin

issue i> a moral one; there is ol ton a certain soundness and fairness in the popular mind whose promptings may be wisdom of a sot, of privileged persons. That may lie conceded, hut Vis count Bryce acknowledges the force of the other difficulty. Granted that the public is qualified to direct foreign policy, how fs it to make it s control effective in matters which, from the nature of the case, require unremitting attention njiid swift decisions? In the last resort some sort of delegation would seem to he unavoidable.