Why Germany Collapsed

Hokitika Guardian, 29 April 1922, Page 4

Why Germany Collapsed

LI’DENDORFF ON “LOST NERVE.”

WHOLESALE DESERTION

General Ludendorff, in his now work, “Ki ivgfuhi ung anti Rolitik” is principally concerned with delending himself against his numerous German critics. They have charged him with opposing a reasonable peace when one was possible; with faulty strategy; with failing to concentrate .all the German forces in the A\ ext tor the great offensive of ]018; ami with neglecting to retreat when that offensive failed. Mis reply is to carry the war into their camp, to attack the Merman politicians, and to blame in equal degree the Merman Socialists and the Rritish propaganda lot* his reverses. lie fore the war he holds that “on r iMerman) foreign policy alter Lismarek’s time lacked will and vision. Me alleges that Enemasonry and Jewish influence wore enlisted against Germany, which is quite absurd, as Freemasonry has always held aloof irotn politics, lie professes that, war was “forced upon” Cermnny, in face ol the disclosures contained in the “Deutsche!! Dokurnonte ’/tint Kriegsaushruch.” Me repeats, the old falsehoods about Belgium :

Belgium was not violated by us. Ac j had every reason to conclude that in j the event of war Belgium would he on j the side of our enemies. Apart Irom this, long-standing conventions gave us : H e right to pass through Belgian territory, which in aiiy ease was a military ; necessity for us. It is deplorable to find a person of his eminence still unwilling to admit j Ike truth. j .MISTAKES IN THE WEST. ! Of the management of the war hv Falkenhayn, his predecessor in the Merman Supreme Command, Ludendorll has little good to say. Me thinks that the attack on the British at Ypres was ; a grea mistake: Looking hack, it seems sound to conclude that tlu> Supreme Command would have done better, instead of lighting- the battle of Ypres in October Dl l, to despatch to the East all the troops that were not absolutely necessary for a defensive policy in the West. Had this been done, he holds, that the Russians might have been compelled to make peace. Ealkcnhayn’s “attrition strategy” at other points is severely blamed for its enormous consumption of men. Ludendorff gives these figures: Down to November DM merely Dr the infantry 786,000 men were required in drafts; and from that date to the end of August DU (when Falkenhayn was removed) 3,481,001) men, making a total of 4,270,000 men under the first two Supreme Commands (Moltke and Falkenhayn). From September 10U to the end of the war the infantry only received 2,170,000 men in drafts fiuui home (under Ludeiulorfi’s direction). <

These figures are startling—it Drey are. correct. As the Merman Stall asserts that it opened the war with 3,000,000 men in the field army, it appears to have called up 9,500,000 men for service at the -front, in addition to men engaged in home defence. The iclatively small number of men required by Ludendorff for his vast ofi'ensiyes seems certainly to support his point that the offensive in the Great ar vas less costly than defence.

OUR DEADLY PROT’AG AUDA. On the failure of the March 1013 offensive a general Merman re)rent was impossible because the German aypiy had become immobile, ft was short pi motor transport, of horses, and iorngo. It, was already beginning to feel the effect of the British propaganda conducted hv Lord Northeliflc:

The aim was attained of so weakening the military qualities ol the troops and the spirit of the nation that the strength of the army was broken bv the reduction of the capacity of individuals for resistance, and the lowering of the numerical strength ol units by wholesale desertion and skulking. Ludendorlf puts the figures of desert-

<?rs and skulkers, including the men who broke leave,'at “some hundreds of thousands” in October 1.918. In Holland alone, he says, there were 40,000 (Herman deserters. j Tin; gieat British attack of August 8, : 1918, is cited as proof of declining ( moral in the German troops: _ I It was directed against a front which i was sufficiently held. The troops m position there were relatively iresh. As a general rule, since the end of April or early M/.i.v, they had done no more fighting than the British who attacked, i and had received the same rest as they had. , ! Though he contends that the Gei- ; mans did not suffer any decisive do- , feat, Lndendorff admits that _ petrol was’running short, hampering the Get'- j man air service and motor transport, ; and that great confusion and disorder ; wore showing themselves. His final verdict on the collapse is, “Germany lost her nerve five minutes be lore the decisive moment.”