The Hokitika Guardian WEDNESDAY, APRIL 5th, 1922. THE TANK IN WARFARE.

Hokitika Guardian, 5 April 1922, Page 2

The Hokitika Guardian WEDNESDAY, APRIL sth, 1922. THE TANK IN WARFARE.

A Fiikncu soldier, Commandant Laura, in a recent work on the late war to which General Uuat has contributed a preface, gives a most interesting and valuable account of the the work of the French operations Division under Marshal Detain in the closing period of the war. It is not only a record of Commandant Dame’s personal experience, but also an analysis of the “directives” issued by retain and of the general doctrines reach ed by the French Staff as the result of the lessons of th e war. The paths of a staff officer in the French Army were not always smooth. When one instruction was issued by Detain, ordering a new system of training for the troops, it was received by the gmierals with manifest annoyance. ‘•General Castelnau invited me to his table and gave me certain hints, the meaning of which I had no difficulty in grasping. ‘Take care,’ he said to ni e , ‘you are oil the verge of going too far lit G.H.Q. Don’t try to transform the Army into a subject for pedagogues, or train for us too many professors and too many pupils.• The first battle of Cinbrai (1917), in which Haig used the tanks for the first time on a large scale, gave rise, ic appears, to great hopes in the French Army, as it did in England; and though those hopes were not fulfilled, it was yet one of the great events of the. war, inaugurating new methods. It demonstrated the possibility of .surprise; thanks to the minute camouflage of the artillery positions, to the scrupulous secrecy of the staffs and to the omission of preliminary preparations on the flout of attack, the enemy’s command was not given the alarm.” As an example of the aecrecy maintained by Haig, it is stated that until the day before the attack took place, the French Operations Division >vas i not informed. It at once took steps to move French troops toward the point of attack, so that they might

hi' ready to support, if a great- victory resulted, and this work was brilliantly carried out. When the great Herman offensives came on Maroh 21, UHB. the anxiety of the French Staff was extreme: “During the early part of tlie night air raids multiplied. Then in the second half of the night, we to {lie north heard a thunder which made us nervous. Wo, learnt nothing precise till 9in the morning, when we wore informed that tlie Hermans were attacking on a front of (10 miles." -All March 28 and 24 French reinforcements were hurrying to the field of battle towards Rove the convoys of motor lorries with troops moved two lines abreast, with two more liiies returning empty. Such was the uneasiness such the burden of work that: Colonel Dufleuv refused to take any rest from March 21 to 2b. He remaiiieii at his maps and his tables showing the order of battle, refusing to be relieved; taking at his work hasty meals; and never going to bed.. For a moment sleep all Imt overcame him as he was in the midst of telephoning his instructions, but he recovered himself stimulated b,V an energy which seemed to be superhuman General Boat, hOwef-ei', with his experience as head of the Operations Division states that such a. prolonged vigil as this was altogether exceptional The last part of th c book is devoted to an account of future tactics as worked out by the French Staff. They are thus summed up by General Boat; ‘Tt is not rash to predict that the battlefield of vho not distant future will se c not one single mail fighting exposed. The unit of battle will be shut up behind a protective and mobile shell of armour about its automanc weapons." It will, in fact, be the era of the tank. The old kind of infantry will disappear. As for the artillery: ‘'The problem which lias to be studied is that of providing mobile armed and protected machines, with ail armament varying from machine guiis to guns of the largest possible calibre, with a protective system giving hover from fire iii all directions or with only a shield giving cover in one direction.” In fact, another kind of tank. As for tanks of the present type, they should lie reduced to two patterns: A light tank to fight with the infantry, easily capable of transport in motor-lorries and able to manoeuvre and move quickly over the country or along the loads. They will lie armed with pow» erful machine gulls or automatic guiis of small calibre. There must also he a heavy tank, to move in front of infantry and clear the way, turned either with a medium field gun or with a howitzer,” The battle bf the future ; "Will not be with tlie eiieiiiy’s ill fantry, but with the eiieiiiy’s infantry behind armour: The automatic weapon intended tb kill the man will be replaced b.V an automatic, wdapon to kill the tank.” Tlie future is thus to he the tank.