USE OF CAVALRY.

Hokitika Guardian, 10 March 1922, Page 1

USE OF CAVALRY.

ESSENTIAL TO SWIFT MOVE-

REMARK OF MARSHAL FOGH

LONDON, January 20,

The use of cavalry in future wars was the subject of discussion at the Roy ail United Services Institution, those taking part being General Lord Horne (General Officer Oommanding-in Chief, Eastern Command), Lieufenant■GeneraJ Sir Philip W. Chetwode (De-puty-Chief of the Imperial General Staff), and Lieutenant-General Sir A. J Godley (Military Secretary to the Secretary of State for War). Sir P- Chetwode said there had been a great deal of somewhat acidulated discussion since the war on the question of the utility of mounted troops Tlie vast majority of the officers of our Army now remaining served on the French and Belgian fronts. Very few were left who took part in the retreat or the advance to the Aisne, and there were not a great number who served in Mesopotamia or in Viscount AUenby’s final victory in Palestine. Our officers were 'divided roughly into two classes—those who had seen cavalry work and knew what mounted troops could do, and those who had to all ( intents and purposes (unless they were older men and took part in the South African war), never seen eavalary work in war. The older officers must endeavour to prevent the Army of to-day and the future from thinking that the lessons learned in the trenches were the only lessons of the war, and allowing t-hiis experience to be the sole foundation of their future ideas in training.

FRENCH GENERAL’S PROPHECY.

“No nation and no General Staff,” Sir Philip continued, “will again voluntarily submit to a war of attrition behind barbed wire with all its attendant evils of inordinate length, immense caei ml tries great c-ost>, and probably i n_ decisve results, if they can prevent it. All the best brains in the world—scientific, mechanical add military—arc engaged in the task of evolving a modern divison and a modern army so much more swift-moving and harder hitting than the division of 1918 that o ‘war of position’ will be difficult; if not impossible. 1 do not say that a war of trenches in some form will not take place during certain phases of a campaign, or in certain portions of a large battlefield. Marshal Foch said to Field-Marshal Sir Henry Wilson: ‘No man living knows what the division of ten years hence will be like.’

A FORECAST. “If you agree that it is certain that the army of the future must be quick-er-moving and harder-hitting, for its size, than it lias been heretofore, you will also agree with me that mounted troop are an essential portion of a swift-moving army, and that up to the present nothing has definitely displaced them in war, though certain things have modified their use. For the present, and for some time yet, modern inventions will not displace mounted troops, but that with the aid of mechanical c.r'ossf-country artillery and transport, tanks and aeroplanes, the t mounted arm will be in the next war many times more powerful than it is now. That is the faith that is in mein these days of rapid scientific and mechanical invention a man would be a fool to venture more than that the mounted arm is still essential in the battlefield. If we stand still and think that the training and tactics of 1914 will suffice for ten years hence, we shall disappear from the field, and we shall deserve to do so. We must not think that the performances of the cavalry in Palestine represented the last word in the use of cavalry or that the methods employed here were a pattern for the future. The cavalry put up a splendid show and ns things were no other arm c°nld have accomplished what they did.”

TRENCH WARFARE “ON THE BRAIN.” “The man who would abolish th e mounted branch,” said Lord Horne, “has in m°st cases formed his opinion from the late war, but be has forgotten or neglected to study, the first few weeks of that war, and lias probably a very superficial knowledge of the operations which led to the defeat of t ■ • Turk and the conquest of Palestine.”’ During the latter part of the war there arose the cry, “Cavalry fulfils nio good, purpose. Let us do away with cavalry.” From the end of hostilities to the present day a certain school of thought had advocated the abolition of cavalry. He did not think they would find in that school many soldiers of experience nor many who had borne the responsibility of high command in war. The tendency was to form our idea of war from the experience of the long period of trench warfare in France and Belgium—a period of stalemate, of impotency—when each belligerent recognised his inability to enforce his will upon ! his opponent. The conditions of the period of trench warfare wore unique. Such a situation had never occurred before, and was unlikely to occur again. We must broaden our outlook. We must look at what might be considered a more normal aspect of war, and examine what the British cavalry did in France and Belgium in 1914, and in Palestine in 1917-18, and again in France and Belgium later. We had got the conditions of trench warfare on the brain. We sadly needed to clear ou r mindß; to do some hard thinking. The British Army existed for war of manoeuvre, and for that we must have our horse, foot and artillery, with up-to-date armament, and with every adjunct that science could evolve. Clear thinking would lead to the realisation that the day is not yet when mechanical and other contrivances can take the place in war of either the man with the rifle or the man on the hors®.

THE MAN WHO WOULD “GET THERE.” Sir A. J. Godley described himself as an ardent mounted infantryman, and he did not agree with the view that the mounted infantryman could be ruled out. (Laughter). He looked upon the horse as the best weapon of the mounted infantryman. They might talk about the rifle, the bayonet, the sword, or the lance, but really all that was wanted was a good horse and a determined man on his back. (Laughter) With that combination he did not think it mattered a great deal what the man carried in his hand, because “lie would get there.”