SECRETS OF THE NAVAL WAR.

Hokitika Guardian, 1 February 1922, Page 4

SECRETS OF THE NAVAL WAR.

— BRITISH ESPIONAGE SUCCESS.

HOW FALKLAND FOLLOWED

CORONEL

(London Daily Mail)

(Continued.)

The British Admiral Cratlock was dead, having fallen like a hero fighting to tlie last, a victim of bad staffwork at home. Eight hundred officers and men had fallen with him off Coronel to no purpose, except to prove that all ranks and stations in the British • Navy were worthy of the unswerving 'faith which the British people placedin them. The end of Monmouth had , yet to come. She had vanished from Spee in- the darkness. About 8.15 p.ni. of November 1, 1-914, the German cruiser Nurnberg sighted a vessel which did not reply to her recognition signals: “After playing on her the searchlights at short distance she was made out to be Monmouth, still carrying her flag, but without her forward Admail searchlight was running on* board her forward; her engines were working; her steering was apparently not affected, as she turned to the very last quickly. Her flag was not lowered, and at 8.50 Nurnberg opened fire. As the fire was not returned, Nurnberg suspended her fire and turned off her searchlights. When Monmouth did not lower her flag but turned towards Nurnberg, as if to ram her, Nurnberg opened once more, tearing open the unprotected sides and deck of Monmouth. That ship heeled more and more, till at 8.58 it slowly capsized and sank with flag still flying. The commandant of Nurnberg could not think of rescuing the crew, as the approach of clouds of smoke was reported to him from two different directions, and the lowering of the boats, which had been filled with water for the battle, swung inboard, and placed on the deck, was impossible in the flfeavy sea. UNHURT GERMANS. This passage again is to be kept in mind. It may have been entirely true, but it is not true, as Capt. Raeder asserts that tlie officers of Glasgow and Otranto all thought rescue out of the question owing to tlie heavy weather. Capt. Bingham reports that Glasgow’s crew stated the weather had moderated about the time when Monmouth was lost. Tho presence of possible enemies is another matter, and a better justification for the German conduct.

Tlie results of tlie battle were tragic. The German ships sustained no damage of any importance.

“Scharnhorst was hit only twice and Gneisenau four times. Scharnhorst Jiad no otic wounded; Gneisenau had two men slightly wounded-; the small cruisers suffered no loss or damage. Within fifty minutes the German armoured cruisers, in unfavourable weatlier conditions, had put their opponents out of action by gun fire alone, without themselves suffering the slightest real injury. Such a transcendant success cannot be ascribed to the material superiority of the Gorman ships (50 per cent advantage in weight of broadside). This extraordinary success must be ascribed to a whole series of factors, tlie superb tactical leadership of the German squadron and tlie exceptionally good training of the whole crews in gunnery for battle.’’ In actual fact, let it once more be remarked, sixteen heavy guns were pitted against two, for the British medium guns could not attack the German armour, even where they were able to fire at all. The success of Spee might therefore have been predicted by any thinker, the more so when the heavy odds in his favour in number of powerful guns were increased by the excellent shooting of his gun-crews, which was known to everyone, as Scharnhorst and Gneisenau liar carried off the German Battle Practice Cup in 1913 and 1914 respectively.

Glasgow and Otranto finally escaped, and the Germans returned 'to Juan Fernandez to plan new operations, which were to bring their own doom, when the British Admiralty, now under Lord Fisher, had made its preparations with a daring and decision that sprang upon Spee one of the most terrible surprises ill history. LORD FISHER’S TIGERS.

Before Cradpck went to his death, efforts had been made by Mr Churchill to save him, but lie passed out oi reach of messages before those efforts could take effect. Even before the Battle of Coronel Lord Fisher had been summoned to the Admiralty as First Sea Lord, and when the terrible news reached him he took instant measures of the boldest character to avenge Cradoek and restore the honour of the flag.

The most important of those -measures was the despatch of the two British battle-cruisers Invincible and Inflexible to find and destroy Spec—tigers to deal with wolves. What resistance he had to overcome befoie he could send those ships is known to his friends. And he took enormous risks. Through this detachment and others the British battle-cruiser force in home waters was reduced to 3 ships against the German 4. But he counted ,on secrecy, determination, and swiftness. To the Falklands these terrible antagonists were to proceed ; but something else was necessary. Spec had to Ire attracted to that point by a suitable bait. The brilliant work of Hie First Sea Lord was backed up by equally brilliant work of the British Intelligence Department, of which there are indications in Capt. Raedcr’s new volume of official German naval histoiy. Spee was misled by his own intelligence service. A German agent reported from San Francisco on November 5, 1914: “I have urged on the Admiralty staff a raid by battle-cruisers of Seydlitz type into the Atlantic take pressure off the Cruiser Squadron (Spee); this operation has apparently begun; the extremest secrecy is necessary.” The reply of the german staff , that such a raid was impossible, never reached him. There was real risk of such raids, and the British Intelligence Department had obtained information which led it to believe that the battle-* cruiser Von der Tnnn might be sent into the Atlantic, “coming from sources that could not he ignored, as the Official British History reports. On this Capt. gander comments; *

“It must be concluded that the information was obtained by espionage, through the betrayal of official reports. On November 6, 1914, the commander of Vop der |?ann, in a detailed memqrandum, had proposed to attack shipping in the Atlantic with battle-crui-sers.” ! If so, almost before the report was sent in, the British Admiralty knew of it. . (To be continued).