THE STORY OF ANZAC

Hokitika Guardian, 24 November 1921, Page 4

THE STORY OF ANZAC

In Jlr C. E. AV. Bonn’s “Story of j Anzac”, tho first volume of the .Austi n- ’ linn official history of the war, Air Bean has examined the vast mass of material at his disposal with extraordinary thoroughness, and a feature of his classic is the amount of information, hitherto unpublished, that it contains. This relates not merely to the operations on the Peninsula but also to the organisation and despatch of the Australian forces. Thus few realise how close Australia was to having no A.T.F. nt nil. To be sure m o.n would have gone, hut I 1 ■ would have been merged in Imperial units, and would not have preserved their Australian identity. On the apparently minor question of the composition of our contingent hung an issue all important for Australia, and of immense 'influence on the development of the Empire. When our offer was first made the Australian staff feared that the Imperial authorities would prefer the Australian force to be organised in small formations, so that each unit ~,,1,1,1 1,0 separatee] and incorporated in a British division. From the point of view, of a British staff officer, the Australian troops were unlikely to be as efficient or as disciplined as tho.se trained in British depots, while the capacity of our “amateur” officers had yet to lie proven. These fears were realised, 'flic acting Australian C.G.B. had drafted the cable so as to hint that Australia was caisihle of organising a division, hut the reply of the Army Council suggested that a force consisting of two brigades of Infantry, one of Eight llorso and one of Artillery, should he raised. Tt was clear that this force would soon ho dismembered and its national character lost. Fortunately at that moment General Bridges, who had been in Queensland, returned to Melbourne. Tie saw far ahead and understood what ft would mean to Australia that her men should go as a national unit. “He was determined that Australia should send to this war an Australian division a compact unit, to lie kept and foughtas aU Australian unit, wherever it might go.” Tn the stand that 1 - lie took he was actuated by entirely disinterested motives, for he had not- the faintest idea, that the division he advocated would he commanded hy himself. Tlis representations carried the day. Bet fi»i his state-manlike foresight., the part played by Australia in the war must have been very different. “Had I lie Australian force gone to tho war in (.lie form which the Army CYnmci| advised.-there would have been no Anzac corps. Australia would have had to its credit no ‘Banding,’ no Tame Pine, neither Pozicros nor liroodseimb■to Fillers Bretomieux. no Mont St. • loontiii. neither Bomani nor Patnaseiis no battle of (lie Hindeuburg line. The \llies would have lacked an element w liuse enthusiasm was not without- it s • till iieneo up»ui tint war. The AusI ■ alian nation would not have cxi.sf--d in the same sense as to-day.” C'on--idor the effect on enlistment. Cm men would have gone no doubt, hut •■mild as many have gone had there I: tii no A.I F. Tt-s record, its tradition were a splendid spur to recruiting. When Bridges died, it is said, his last words were: “Thank God T have commanded an Australian division.” Mr Beau's account of tho organisation of the A.T.F. invests those words with gron te r sign iftca nee. Thus to Bridges the A.T.F. owed its existence as sunk. He also baptised it. At one of the earliest meetings of his staff lie asked for suggestions for a name for the new force. About a dozen titles were put forward. “Too long.” It,, said bluntly of some of these proposals, and lie would not hear of the term “expeditionary.” “Tls not an expedition.” he said. “I want a name which will sound well when they call ns by our initials. That’s how they'll speak of us. AT',, don’t want to he called the ‘B.:B. t’.FV!” “Austrnljinn Imperial Force” was his own suggestion. and. like most strong men ho adopted his own proposal in the end. Tile day had not. arrived when every military institution was called by its initials, but here again his prescience was justified. The name “Anzac” emanated fioin the headquarters staff, Cairo, where a rubber stamp “A. and X./.. A. 0.” was used for registering correspondence. A codeword was wanted for the corps, and one of the clerks (aocording to mast accounts, an English officer Lieut. A. T. White) remembering the stamp, suggested Anzae. But the word did not come into general use for some time; indeed, many of the “original Anzaes” never heard of their title until after the Banding, Bridges had intimated to the Army Council that lie expected to cmhaik early ill September. The departure of the A.I.F. was. of course, delayed by the fact that German warships were at large, and their whereabouts was not known. These wore anxious days for the authorities, and Mr Bean throws much interesting light on the discussions that went oil between tho itiqx-rial authorities anil the Australian Government. The latter firmer and wisely insisted that it was hotter to postpone the sailing than to run any risk. The hiss of a few days or weeks would lie of small consequence compared to the loss of a transport. Ft is not generally known that after the A.I.F. set off it was within an ace of being diverted from Egypt. On October ‘Jo the British Cabinet decided that the convoy must go to Europe l.v way of South Africa. The revolt had broken out; the extent of the disaffection had not yet been ascertained, and the Australasians were the only troops by whom Botha could quickly he teinforeed. On October 2S a conference was held on hoard 11.M.5. Minotaur at Albany, and new arrangements were made. But hy the 110th Botha had defealed the rebels, and on Hie very eve of departure the Suez route was again adopted. This decision, made til the eleventh hour, determined the subsequent, history of the Australian and Xew Zealand forces. Had Botha experienced greater difficulty in suppressing tho revolt there would have been no Gallipoli. Mr Bean draws some admirable ponIxirtrniUi of Australian leaders. There is a fine appreciation of General Bridges, the key to whose character was to lie found in his intense shyness and his sense of duty. He was not popular; he spared neither -himself nor others, but he was a great soldier, to whom Australia owes a lasting debt. There is a tribute tn H. N. MacLaurin.

who, had lie lived, must have gone very far; and to General Sir C. B. B. White, whose self-effacing devotion to his work, and complete, subordination oi his own personal interests to those ol any General he happened to he serving, for long kept him out ol the public eye. And finally we quote Mr Bean s estimate of General llirdwood :“A rare leader—undoubtedly one of the greatest leaders of men possessed by the British army during the war. Though of good general sense and ability, he was probably not outstanding as a tactician, nor had he the east of mind peculiar to an organiser. Tlis delight was to he out in the field among his men, cheering them hy Ids talk, feeling the pulse •„f them, ile would come hack from the front apparently far more interested in the spirits and condition of Hie troops than in the tactical situation. . . Ho wrote personally to every officer who was decorated, and his correspondence with anxious and distressed relatives ill Australia was enormous. . . . His staff was strongly atached to him, and ho leaned upon it heavily for till organising and office work. He wanted t o "he out of doors, finding out for himself what his men could be asked Li) do. lie knew well how to ask them to do it. His power of leadership sprang from an exceptionally kindly nature, which looked upon men as men. He was reallv interested in them, and his memory.of their affairs, when once Hie knew them, was extraordinary. I’erlmps no commander on the tront attached men to him so closely as Birdwood did. llis possession of those indefinable and attractive qualities which make a leader of men continually suggested a comparison with that gio.it soldier of a previous generation—land Huberts.”