The Hokitika Guardian WEDNESDAY, NOV. 23rd, 1921. JAPAN.

Hokitika Guardian, 23 November 1921, Page 2

The Hokitika Guardian WEDNESDAY, NOV. 23rd, 1921. JAPAN.

Ecu nineteen years All' George Gleason, author of ‘What Shall I think of Japan?” has been secretary of tho Y.M.C.A. ill Japan, and in that post had excellent opportunities of learning what tho Japanese youth is saying and thinking. He is aware that a good deal of suspicion exists in the outer world and particularly iu his own country, America, with regard to Japan’s intentions. He believes that for some of this suspicion Japan has only to thank her own indiscretion, but that some of it is founded on inaccurate information and some is due to an inability to appreciate Japan’s peculiar problems and difficulties. This book is a very fair statement of the ease for and against Japan, and though Mr Gleason breaks little new ground, save in his chapters oil Manchuria and Korea, he lias given a useful resume of the main issues in the Ear Eastern question. He reminds us that Japan s position presents certain analogies to that of Britain less than a century

j ago. Hdv i- ;m i -1 .11 u 1 naiiim, with a limited territory. a considerable proportion of which is unsuitable fur cultivation. The imputation is increasing and tan no longer Iced itsell. The nation lias become a great manufacturer and looks to its exports to pay for iu im|>urts of food and raw material, Britain formed a solution in emigration and trade. Her children llocked to the colonies and America and her nierehants, without very much competition exploited the markets of the ;;lobe. Rut many of the most congenial fields of emigration are closed against •! npan. In trade there is nowadays an acute rivalry. Japan thinks of China as her natural commercial sphere, hut others demand liter share and insist upon the open door. Japan has a right to self-development; she is conscious of urgent necessities, which must he satisfied if sin l is to fulfil her destiny. How can they he reconciled with the rights of other nations? Critics of Japan are apt to forget that she is in a sense not a free agent. She is acting in obedience to the law of solf-presor-valioii, a law which, in the last resort, ■over-rides all other laws. Cabin’d, eribb’d. confin'd in her islands, she must suffocate, lienee her complaints 1 that she is misunderstood and misjudged. She merely wishes to do what other nations, in similar circumstance* have done. Her aspirations are legitimate; she aims only at peaceful trade expansion. While she must havo access ! to the markets of the mainland and is entitled by virtue ul her geographical and economic situation, to assert special interests therein, aggression has no place in her schemes. Air Gleason admits, in general, the justice of Japan's reasoning, hilt points out that for the -‘misunderstanding” which Japan deplores her own policy, especially since 101-1 has been responsible Her disclaimer of aggressive designs is inconsistent with her conduct on various occasions, which was capable of only one interpretation, namely, that Japan was bent on taking advantage of the Western Powers’ .pro-occupation with the war, and of establishing herself on the mainland in order siibsoqiiojntly to confront them with an accomplished fact. Mr Gleason holds that Japanese statesmanship has been guilty of five serious diplomatic blunders which have done so much to antagonise Western opinion. In each ease its fair pretensions havo been lx'lied by its deeds. First came her evasive and equivocal conduct after the surrender of Tsing-tau. Again and again Japan announced that she would restore the colony to China ; as often she repented of her disinterestedness, liver since the capitulation tlie Japanese Government “like a weather vane responsive to every international breeze lias been vacillating between promises to return the captured possession to China and the growing desire to retain her grip on the mainland." This has left a very unfavourable impression. It would have been better if Japan had frankly declared that she wished to keep her winnings. As it is she has shown herself undependable; her critics can point to Tsing-tau as proof Unit with Japan you never know when 1 von stand. The second and the greatest blunder ever made by Japan was the formulation of tint notonious “Twenty-one demands.” The third, her action in the summer of HUS. was when the Allies had decided upon joint intervention in Siberia. The Japanese Covernmcnt ‘•seemingly expecting the war to continue for two years more,” adopted in Siberia a policy identical with that which had been adopted in China. With Kurope engrossed j in war, and Russia torn bv domestic strife, Japan saw and seized the opportunity to extend her influence on the northern mainland. “The sending of ten times the troops originally announced. the occupation of the trade routes and the frantic efforts to get control of tile Chinese eastern railroad are all evidence of a .policy of aggression by military.” Mr G lesson has some queer stories to tell of the relations between the Japanese and the other members of the joint expedition. The fourth blunder was the demand for Shantung at the Abirsailles Conference. Her Japan had a golden chance of making ivliat the French call a moral gesture, but missed it. If she had admitted that Japan had suffered nothing and gained much from the war; if she had foreborne to press her claims, hut had left the conference to deal with the question at its own discretion, she would have dispelled suspicion once and for all. But on behalf of Japan it maybe urged that moral gestures were rare at the conference. The delegates expected them from the other fellow, hut themselves indulged very sparingly in them. Japan may l>e pardoned if she failed to see why she. should exhibit a monopoly of altruism. The fifth blunder is Korea--the ten years’ rule of a mild people by the sword, culminating in the harsh measures by whii-li, the independence demonstrations of 1919 were suppressed. All these things are not easy tu explain away.